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# From the Editor's Desk



Dr. Emanuele Sica, in a fascinating contribution, writes of the scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon in November 1942, a watershed for the history of France in the Second World War when more than eighty vessels, including fifteen destroyers, three battleships and twelve submarines were purposely sunk by French Navy personnel. In so doing their actions gained the respect of the Allies for the French armed forces and especially its Navy. Major international pro-Allied newspapers hailed the *baroud d'honneur* of the *Marine française*, which had stayed true to its words that its ships will never fight for the Axis side.

Jordan Fraser examines the evolution of the UAV from a platform to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence to a precision killing machine. For the operator pilot situated as far as 8,000 miles away the raw intimacy of war is removed. He asks the following questions concerning the rise of these killing machines: is the use of drones for the purposes of combat ethical and moral? How are we as a society to reconcile the increased use of drones in combat? Who should decide the targets for future drone strikes? Since drones are now here to stay, how can we ensure their principled use going forward?

In our interconnected world, our increasing dependency on the internet in our business and private lives has made society susceptible to the application of information operations. Derwin Mak writes of North Korean information operations focused externally to improve the views of the international community of North Korea. The irony is that this YouTube external propaganda campaign is not accessible to most North Koreans.

Margarita Yakovenko reawakens us to the challenge of Haiti and the future after the withdrawal of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). She highlights that Haiti needs to further develop its security sector in order to gain complete control over domestic security matters. Addressing the chronic understaffing, underfunding, under-resourcing, political challenges, and internal structural issues in the Haitian National Police is a good place to start.

Every year at the RCMI Annual General Meeting, the Wing Commander Hamilton E. Boulter Award is announced. The award which consists of having one's name engraved on a plaque prominently displayed in the Institute's Library goes to the author who has written the article deemed to be the finest in the preceding year. Your Editor is pleased to advise that this year's winner is John Thompson for "Gaza in the Rockets Red Glare" from Volume 73, Issue #3, May – June 2013. On behalf of all of us in the Institute, well done John!

By the time you read this, we will be in our new Institute. There we will 'pick up the pace' with respect to our Roundtables, Speaker's Lunches and Dinners, as the 'Venue of choice' for meetings, book launches by academics, government officials, business leaders, media, and security and defence analysts.

I look forward to seeing you at 426 University Avenue!

Sincerely,

Chris  
Colonel Chris Corrigan (retired) CD, MA  
Executive Director,  
Editor of *Sitrep* and Chair of the Security Studies Committee

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# The Scuttling of the French Fleet at Toulon

by Dr Emanuele Sica

On 10 May 1940, the German army launched a massive attack on France. A week later, German *Panzerdivisions* were already advancing through France, cutting in half the French army. With their morale rock-bottom, poorly-led French units massively surrendered or were routed, joining the millions of French civilians fleeing the German push. Confronted by one of the biggest military debacles in the history of modern France, the French government had

no choice but to sign an Armistice with the Nazi state on 22 June. Armistice terms were harsh: France would be divided in two, the northern half under German control, the southern half nominally independent headed from the thermal city of Vichy by the First World War national legend Marshall Philippe Pétain, but quickly morphing into a collaborationist state whose bargaining room would inexorably shrink as

the war progressed; its own army, the *Armée d'Armistice*, would be capped at 100,000 men, the other soldiers being quickly demobilized; the French state would foot the bill for the occupying German army and finally the 1 million and a half prisoners of war would be shipped to German POW camps. Compared to the other services, the French Navy suffered a far lighter fate. To be sure, the ships would be docked in their home ports or in overseas ports across the French empire, but the Germans promised they would not touch them. (Article 8 of the Franco-German Armistice).

The motivating reason behind this moderate choice rested on Hitler's fear that a harder stance would force the

*Dr. Emanuele Sica, a native of Italy, earned his Laurea Triennale (MA Equivalent) in Modern History at the Università la Sapienza in Rome, Italy, with a thesis on French armed volunteers fighting for the Germans in the Second World War. He completed his PhD at the University of Waterloo with a doctoral thesis on the Italian military occupation of southeastern France in the Second World War, 1940-1943, with a particular emphasis on the occupation policy of the Italian army and its effects on the relationship between the Italian soldiers and the local population. Dr. Sica has been teaching at the Royal Military College of Canada, History Department, since 2011.*



French Navy to desert and join forces with the Royal Navy. Conversely, the British too were worried that, notwithstanding the formal assurance included in the Armistice and the express word given by French Navy commanders to their British counterpart, the *Kriegsmarine* would sooner or later acquire control of the French fleet. Thus, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave order to neutralize French ships within British reach. On 3 July 1940, French ships

docked at the British ports of Plymouth and Portsmouth were boarded by British armed soldiers, not without some minor resistance from their sailors. The real drama however unfolded in the warm waters of the North African coastline. French Navy ships, including four battleships, were moored at the port of Mers-el-Kébir in French Algeria. The French were handed an ultimatum which urged them either to

join forces with the British or have their ships disarmed and herded into British ports. Following French commanders' firm refusal, British ships opened fire, damaging or sinking almost the entire squadron, leaving 1,297 French sailors dead and 350 wounded. The confrontation in Mers-El-Kebir refueled the Anglophobia in French Navy ranks, an atavistic feeling dating from early modern times. The head of the French Navy himself, Admiral François Darlan, did nothing to hide his staunch repugnance for Britain. However, until 1943, the majority of French warships kept being docked at the Mediterranean port of Toulon in southeastern France and played no relevant part in the naval conflict in the Mediterranean Sea.

Western Allied powers were confronted with a dilemma in late 1942. Following a pressing Russian request for the opening of a second front in Europe, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed for a cross-channel invasion of France via Great Britain, a strategy the British considered premature. Finally, the Allies temporarily ruled out an invasion of France as supply routes throughout the Atlantic were still not safe and thus could not guarantee an amassing of war materiel and men on

*The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J Langley CD and Lt (N/S) Edith F Groundwater Langley*

the British Isles. Alternatively, it was decided to prepare an invasion of the Italian peninsula, the “soft underbelly of the Axis” in Churchill’s own words. To this end, on 8 November 1942, Anglo-American troops landed in Vichy-controlled Morocco and Algeria,

If nothing else, Operation *Torch* got the French collaborationist regime in hot water with Nazi Germany. Notwithstanding Pétain’s immediate call to resist, which was reified by the resistance of Vichy troops at the Allied landing in Oran and Casablanca, Hitler was furious at the ambiguous attitude of some French high-ranking officers, in particular the obfuscation of Admiral Darlan, then commander-in-chief of the French armed forces, who had just happened to be in Algiers to visit his ailing son. Indeed Darlan secretly negotiated with the Allies and, in return for a position of High Commissioner in North Africa, ordered Vichy troops to join the Allied side. Collaborationist Prime Minister Pierre Laval, who went to Munich the day after the landing with the daunting task of convincing Nazi officials of Vichy’s loyalty, was severely chastised by the Führer. Evidently, the Germans no longer trusted the Vichy regime. The Germans were worried about the allegiance of the French troops after the confusion caused by Admiral Darlan’s betrayal. The Axis feared that the French Mediterranean area was next in line for an Allied invasion. The “North-African Imbroglío” persuaded both Hitler and Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, that a joint invasion of France was absolutely necessary to prevent a possible Allied landing on that country’s Mediterranean shore.

On 11 November, the Germans and the Italians launched Operation Case Anton. Two German Panzer Armies, the 1st and the 7th, advanced through the Vichy zone from the north, along with the Italian Fourth Army from the east. The occupation of southern France went relatively smoothly, with little opposition from the *Armée d’Armistice*, as French soldiers had been given express orders from the War Minister General Bridoux to offer no resistance while staying confined to barracks. At most, in a few isolated cases, soldiers sang the *Marseillaise* or hid their weapons. In most cases, French officials surrendered their arms. Marshal Pétain limited himself to a solemn protest via radio waves.

The real objective for the advancing German columns, besides the *Armée D’Armistice* arms depots, was the naval port of Toulon. A Greek and later Roman colony in the 2nd century BC, the harbor town had already seen some drama due to its strategic location. During the winter of 1543-44, it was occupied by Ottoman troops who transformed its cathedral into a mosque. Between the late sixteenth century and the early eighteenth, the French monarchy commissioned the construction of a naval arsenal, a shipyard and a small sheltered vault. During the French Revolution, in 1793, it was again occupied, this time by the English Navy, and, as an omen of what would happen 150 years later, French Navy commanders burned their ships to avoid surrendering them to their enemies. Later on, to prevent attacks from the sea, the French bolstered its

fortified heights and extended its dockyards to accommodate the construction of the first French ironclad frigates and of its first submarines. At the beginning of the war, in June 1940, 36 warships were moored in the Toulon harbor. In November 1942, their number jumped to 80, some having limped back from the Mers-el-Kébir disaster. The ships ranged from the powerful battleships and heavy cruisers of the High Seas Fleet commanded by Admiral de Laborde to ships having been decommissioned with only a skeleton crew and no military significance.


French Navy high-ranking officers in Toulon though were put in a difficult conundrum. On one hand, their leader Darlan had surprisingly switched sides and had fervently solicited, with two messages sent on 11 and 12 November, Navy commanders to sail their ships to French colonial ports in Africa. On the other hand, Pétain, while officially disavowing Darlan by removing him from command, reaffirmed along with Laval the orders to defend the bases against any Allied intervention. Torn between their Anglophobia and the uneasy situation of being cornered by Axis troops on the ground, Admiral André Marquis, the *Préfet Maritime* in control of the *Place de Toulon* (Stronghold of Toulon), and Admiral de Laborde struck a temporary deal with Kriegsmarine envoys, reaffirming their desire to defend Toulon against any Allied prospective invasion. In any event, the Germans and the Italians would have been unable to reach the Toulon zone at the beginning of the invasion, and therefore were obliged to leave the French Navy command in place.

It is evident however that the sand in the French Navy’s hourglass was beginning to run out. In Hitler’s mind, the Toulon deal was only a temporary reprieve to enable German and Italian units to deploy near Toulon for a prospective assault on the Mediterranean port. Moreover, it was widely feared in Axis circles that the Stronghold of Toulon could soon provide the Allies a safe landing spot for their prospective invasion of France. Thus, on 18 November, Hitler authorized the plan, codenamed Operation *Lila*, to seize the Toulon naval base. Motorized German units would cordon off the stronghold entrances, while Luftwaffe squadrons would circle over the maritime facilities, prepared to bomb and lay magnetic mines in the case of French escape. Finally, a group of U-Boats would be lurking at the entrance of the harbor.

At 0400 hours on 27 November 1942, elements of the 7th and 10th Panzer divisions along with 1,300 soldiers of the elite 2nd Panzer Division *Das Reich*, invaded the port of Toulon. Fort Lamalgue, which housed the Préfecture Maritime, was easily stormed. The tactical surprise was complete as German scouting units had previously captured all French police posts on the way to Toulon. Admiral Marquis was unceremoniously woken up from his slumber and arrested. However, his deputy, Rear Admiral Marcel Robin, was nowhere to be found and managed *in extremis* to warn Admiral de Laborde at the navy dockyard. The bewildered Commander In Chief of the High Seas Fleet at first refused to believe the Germans had not

kept their words, but alarming reports were pouring in from other harbor gates that German soldiers went as far as climbing fences and walls to rush as fast as possible to the docks. Thus, communicating by radio from the flagship of the French Navy, the *Strasbourg*, he finally ordered the crews, to be sent to their stations and to make preparations to scuttle their ships.

word that you must hand over your ship undamaged,” to which request de Laborde laconically answered “It has already been scuttled.” To be sure, as a siren wailed, explosions sounded all over the *Strasbourg*, blasting gun after gun, while its engines were blasted by hand grenades or cut with an oxyacetylene torch. To make the scene even more dramatic, the ship was sinking at even keel.



From one end of the harbor to the other, explosions were framing the silhouettes of ships in the darkness of the night. The Germans attempted to board some of the ships before disaster struck, but in many cases were unable to prevent their scuttling. For instance, the cruiser *Algérie* was boarded by a German party when it was already to the point of sinking and all its guns had been blown up. All the Germans could do was round up its crew and put them under arrest. The *Algérie* kept burning for two days, its demise marked from time to time by exploding torpedoes

By 0520 hours the Panzers had broken the gates of the Mourillon navy yard which housed most of the submarines. Five of them (*Venus, Casabianca, Marsouin, Iris* and *Glorieux*) immediately headed for the exit channel under a hail of German bullets. Their escape however was hindered both by German airplanes showering them with depth charges and by the shallowness of the harbor, which forbid any submerision. Eventually, only the *Casabianca, Marsouin* and *Glorieux* were able to reach ports in Algeria, the other two ending up scuttled by their crews outside the harbor.

and ammunition. The heavy cruiser *Colbert* was also boarded, but wary German soldiers were slowed both by French sailors leaving the ship and by fragments of the hull hurled by the explosions aboard. In most cases, the Germans failed to bully the French, who delayed the eventual boarding with a mix of small talk and hardened stances. As the warm rays of the Mediterranean sun illuminated Toulon, a hellish view awaited attackers and assailants alike. Everywhere from dock to dock ships engulfed in flames and acrid smoke were capsizing or sinking in the harbor, some of which burned as long as one week after the assault. The Toulon harbor had become the cemetery of the French Navy.

In the meantime, German land forces were having a hard time to find their way in the maze of warehouses, factories and docks in the Toulon arsenal. The Milhaud piers, where the main ships were moored, were only reached at 0620 hours. This delay gave plenty of time to the defenders to prepare demolitions charges carefully laid out on guns and essential machinery parts. Sea valves were opened. Upon arriving at the piers, German tanks started firing their 88-mm. guns towards the *Strasbourg*, killing Lieutenant Dominique Fay and wounding a few sailors. The *Strasbourg* answered back with volleys of heavy machine-gun fire, but was stopped by Admiral de Laborde. To prevent any further bloodshed, both parties agreed to a temporary ceasefire. A German officer went to parley with de Laborde: “Admiral, my commanding officer sends

Operation *Lila* was a serious tactical blunder. German troops failed to reach the arsenal before the battleships and the submarines were either scuttled or, in some rare instances, scurried away to join the Gaullist forces in North Africa. In all, more than eighty vessels, including fifteen destroyers, three battleships and twelve submarines were purposefully sunk by French Navy personnel. Only the ships undergoing severe reparations with skeletal crews aboard were unable to be sabotaged as much as their fully-commissioned companions. Therefore, three super-destroyers and one destroyer could be salvaged, repaired and used by the Italian navy. With the

*Continued on page 8*

# Rise of the Machines: The Role of Drones in Modern Warfare

by Jordan Fraser

In the summer of 2013, a movie called *White House Down* was released into theatres. The film stars Jamie Foxx playing fictional US President James W. Sawyer, whose similarities to current US President Barack Obama are too numerous to count. The premise of the film is the White House being taken over by disgruntled ex-CIA operatives and family members of military personnel slain in special operations sanctioned by the President. The movie opens, however, with President Sawyer announcing a full withdrawal of American troops from the Middle East in a treaty agreement with Iran (geopolitical realities aside). In an attempt by the presumably Democratic president to persuade the presumably Republican House Speaker to get on side with the treaty, the President argues that the only people negatively affected by the treaty will be the corporations of the military-industrial complex. This is because they have a stake in the United States' continued involvement in conflicts around the world. The House Speaker then argues against closing down some of America's military bases in the Middle East as part of the treaty deal, to which President Sawyer responds: "You know those bases are for show. We can launch a drone from a carrier anywhere in the world and hit whatever target we want."<sup>1</sup>

What struck me from this quote was the extent to which Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones, as they are more commonly known, have become part of Hollywood's, and by extension the West's, consciousness and culture. Thirteen years ago, drones were in the primary stages of testing out at the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) proving grounds at Indian Springs Airfield in the Nevada desert.<sup>2</sup> Since then, they have morphed the CIA into an organization more clearly defined by its paramilitary killing operations than traditional intelligence gathering activities. What are we to make of these killing machines? The Predator B produced by General Atomics, for example, can stay in the air for more than 24 hours, climb to 50,000 feet, sip fuel, carry cameras, perform video relay and in some cases carry lethal payloads that can be launched by an operator sitting at an Air Force base in the continental United States. The operator is often an Air Force pilot who, after killing an al Qaeda operative (and possibly his family, from 8,000 miles away) can get in his SUV and drive home to his wife, kids and mother-in-law for a hot meal of meatloaf that he doesn't particularly like. The raw intimacy of war is removed and replaced with a joystick and throttle vaguely similar to Microsoft's various flight simulators. Or is it? With the rise of these killing machines, four questions arise: is the use of drones for the purposes of combat ethical and moral? How are we as a society to reconcile the increased use of drones in combat? Who should decide the targets for

future drone strikes? Since drones are now here to stay, how can we ensure their principled use going forward?

The first recorded use of UAVs in combat occurred on August 22, 1849.<sup>3</sup> The Austrians used balloons fitted with bombs to attack Venice. The balloons were directed against the Venetians and were set on fire by way of an electromagnetic charge that passed through a copper wire, causing the bombs to fall on the city. Unfortunately for the Austrians, the balloons proved to be ineffective as a weapon since the wind caught most of the balloons and blew them back against the Austrian lines.<sup>4</sup> However, had they been successful and dropped a number of bombs over the city of Venice, it is a high possibility that the 19<sup>th</sup> century equivalent of human rights groups would have been agitating to bring Emperor Franz Joseph I before the 1840s version of the International Criminal Court on charges of war crimes.<sup>5</sup> While this is a bit facetious, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century drones appear to potentially be victims of their own success. Various human rights groups would like to see their use limited in the targeting and killing of various members of al-Qaeda and other suspected terrorists.<sup>6</sup> Which leads us to our first question: is the use of drones for combat ethical and moral?

Since 2001, the use of drones has skyrocketed, and since President Obama's first inauguration in January 2009 their use has risen further still. In 2012 alone, the United States carried out 333 drone strikes solely in Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup> For President Obama, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, drones are clearly perceived to be a less 'bloody' way to conduct a war. But is the use of these weapons ethical and moral? Firstly, as Canada has no UAVs, or armed UAVs for that matter, we must approach this issue from the American perspective. The President is Commander-in-Chief and as such has the responsibility to keep the American people and men and women of the United States Armed Forces safe. With the war in Afghanistan in its thirteenth year, the American people are rightly weary of war and tired of watching ramp ceremonies at Dover Air Force Base. Western governments, including the United States, are also increasingly reluctant to commit combat troops to missions around the world, with Libya as the most recent and obvious case in point. Furthermore, the concerns about the use of drones, from the perspective of human rights organizations, are legitimate and deserve public debate. That being said, if we in the West are reluctant to send our soldiers to fight against terrorist entities, we must make sure that at least the drones can carry out that mission for us.<sup>8</sup> After all, the primary duty of any government is to protect its citizens. 9/11 demonstrated that nations couldn't simply wait and allow threats to materialize. Pre-emptive military action must, therefore, sometimes be taken and drones give Western governments the ability to do just that. Therefore, if drones

*Jordan Fraser, BA, MA, is a recent graduate of the War Studies Programme from the Royal Military College of Canada. He works on Parliament Hill.*

are used to eliminate enemies of the state, moral obligation of a head of government or commander-in-chief to protect his or her people is fulfilled.

The other question is: are drone strikes ethical? President Obama is the duly elected head of state of the United States. He is the representative of all the people, and, has personally committed himself to ensuring he approves those al-Qaeda suspects targeted for killing.<sup>9</sup> At the weekly Tuesday counter-terrorism meeting at the White House, the profiles of those nominees for the 'kill list' are examined. White House officials, however, have made it clear that when a strike opportunity presents itself, President Obama has made it a rule that the final say on a kill strike belongs to him.<sup>10</sup> This is a very moral arrangement, and White House officials have also made it clear that President Obama is intent on keeping the leash short on how many names are added to the kill list.<sup>11</sup>

The second question raised by the increased use of drones is: how are we as a society responding to the increasing use of drones in warfare? By and large, the general populace of Western societies seem to be satisfied with the conduct of war via drones. If newspapers are any indicator of general public opinion then an opinion-editorial from the *National Post* editorial board would indicate that even Canadians are general satisfied with war conducted via drones. In an op-ed from May 7, 2012, the National Post Editorial Board wrote: "Drones don't result in soldiers coming home in flag-draped caskets. And because no American or allied life is at risk, drone controllers can afford to exercise maximum restraint—firing precision-guided munitions only when the possibility of collateral damage to innocent civilians is at a minimum... These drone strikes are an essential, if unappreciated, component of the war on terror. They keep Western soldiers safe and enemy leaders fearful and on the run."<sup>12</sup>

Thus it seems to portend that for the vast majority of people, drone strikes represent a 'cleaner' and 'safer' way for the West to go to war. That being said, drone operators still face the same moral dilemmas they did as fighter pilots: to shoot or not to shoot. Many drone operators, however, find themselves much more intimately aware of their targets. They watch their target come home, kiss his wife, play with his kids and put his family to sleep.<sup>13</sup> Strikes are to be timed so the family is away, but accidents do happen. Drone pilots and sensor operators are dealing with a new intimacy with their targets, resulting in the Air Force moving more chaplains and medics to drone bases in the United States, to help drone operators deal with bad days where a mistake is made and a family or child is killed, along with or instead of the target. That being said, pilots are dealing with the new reality of killing someone 8,000 miles away while they are at work, and then going home and helping their 8-year old with homework after family supper. Pilots would have dealt with these issues previously while deployed abroad; now, they are dealing with them when they go home at night. But, they are going home at night, and that makes drone warfare much more palatable with the Western

public than boots on the ground overseas.

Who should be ordering drone strikes to kill suspected al-Qaeda terrorists? In early 2013, President Obama came under scrutiny for his significant use of drones in the fight against al-Qaeda. Some of this criticism likely stemmed from his nomination of John O. Brennan as the Director of the CIA. Brennan was the primary architect of Obama's aggressive drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere during his first term in office. Right now, the final authority on kill strikes rests with the President. However, in an address at the National Defense University in May 2013, President Obama tried to address the issue of drone strikes by suggesting tighter rules surrounding their authorization. He also proposed an independent overseer in the executive branch or a unique court with powers to authorize killings.<sup>14</sup> While it is understandable as to why the President has floated such ideas, they may not be altogether wise. The President of the United States is the Commander-in-Chief. He needs the authority to carry out the actions he deems necessary to protect the United States. He is subject to three very apparent and immediate checks on his power: Congress, the Supreme Court and the people of the United States. And it appears that the latter has already caused him to be even more judicious in his use of drones for kill strikes. After the recent public outcry over the use of drones, the number of deaths as a result of drone strikes was significantly lower in 2013, pegged at 271 deaths, versus 2012's body count of roughly 500.<sup>15</sup>

The United States has a rich history of democracy. Democracy means that leaders are responsible to the people. These figures already indicate that President Obama has heard, listened to and acted upon the concerns of the people of the United States on the use of drone strikes for killing al Qaeda terrorists. While special courts and independent overseers may sound good, the best check for a democratically elected leader is the people. We want our leaders ultimately responsive to us, the ones who elect them.

Finally, how can we ensure that drones are used in a principled manner going forward? One easy way would be for the President to bring selected Congressional leaders into his confidence on these matters, or have his senior officials brief them. Looping decision-makers into the intelligence circle makes them more appreciative of its purpose, usefulness, strengths and weaknesses. There has also been talk of amending the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) that was passed by Congress in the wake of 9/11.<sup>16</sup> This allowed the President to carry out whatever military actions he deemed necessary against those responsible for 9/11 (i.e. al Qaeda). Amending this authorization and making its parameters narrower, time-limited and renewable might force the President and the administration to better make the case for why certain operations need to be carried out. Making the AUMF renewable for five-year terms would be something worth looking at. It would be a way to inject more democratic oversight of the President's military actions against al Qaeda

terrorists. Ultimately, however, the demand for oversight must be from the populace. They must be informed of how their government is prosecuting the war on terror. That requires government being a little less secretive and little more trusting of its people. A massive national security apparatus has built up since 9/11 in the United States, much of it secretive. The United States, however, is a nation built upon a much more open tradition of democracy.

Abraham Lincoln, the 16<sup>th</sup> President of the United States and also a wartime president, stated, “I am a firm believer in the people. If given the truth, they can be depended upon to meet any national [crisis]. The great point is to bring them the real facts.”<sup>17</sup> In many respects, this must be the approach of the American government with its information on drone strikes. At minimum, give the peoples’ representatives knowledge of the kill list and drone program and what it aims to do. Keep them informed. Congress represents the people, and the people deserve to know what their government is doing. Given the facts, the American people can be counted on to do the right thing and will be determined to meet the scourge of terrorism and fight them using drones. Trust the people, and they will meet the crisis.

Drones are an excellent technological innovation of the West. They frighten the Taliban, who have nicknamed Sentinel drones the “Beast of Kandahar.”<sup>18</sup> Targeted drone killings have an important place in the toolbox of weapons for counterterrorism. Like all tools, however, they must not be used to try and address every problem faced in our counterterrorism efforts.<sup>19</sup> Much science fiction has been written over the years about machines taking over the Earth or even subduing mankind. While enjoyable as fiction, these fantasies are just that: fantasy. We are given choices as human beings, and as citizens of great democracies. We have enemies, and we always will. We must meet, confront and defeat them; of that there is no doubt. But we must meet them and maintain our principles, or we lose the very thing we fight for. Drones are here to stay in our arsenal of weapons to confront, defeat and dismantle al-Qaeda and extremist Islamic terrorism. However, they must be used judiciously and responsibly. The responsibility for demanding that accountability lies at the feet of one entity: we, the people. ♣

***The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.***

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#### ***Toulon—continued from page 5***

rest, German and Italian engineers divided up the scuttled ships for scrap metal to be used to fuel the Axis war engine. Nevertheless, if the result in terms of armaments was poor, Axis leaders were elated. Hitler could not hide his satisfaction for having stopped French ships from joining the Allied side, and the Italian Navy itself was elated by the elimination of one of its main competitors in the Mediterranean. The Toulon catastrophe was definitely a watershed for the history of France in the Second World War. Internally, it demonstrated the irrelevance of the Vichy regime, which never recovered from losing both its empire and fleet in one fateful month. In the international arena, it certainly improved the views of the French armed forces and especially on its Navy. Major international pro-Allied newspapers hailed the *baroud d’honneur* of the *Marine française*, which had stayed true to its words that its ships will never fight for the Axis side. In the words of the *London Times* (issue 30 November 1942) “even those who believe that the French Fleet could have served more usefully in the liberation of France, by joining with the Allies, cannot refuse to render profound homage to the French Squadron for the manner in which it kept its plighted word.” ♣

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# North Korean Pop Culture: Diplomacy on YouTube

by *Derwin Mak*

**N**orth Korea, formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), is the most reclusive and secretive country in the world. However, in recent years, it has been using the video-sharing website YouTube to promote itself to the outside world. This is a paradox because the DPRK denies internet access to most of its people.

The DPRK lagged behind other countries in setting up an internet presence. It did not have a government website until 2000, when a foreign sympathizer, Alejandro Cao de Benós<sup>1</sup>, set up the DPRK's first website. YouTube appeared in 2005, and since then, the DPRK has set up at least five, possibly six or more, official and semi-official YouTube channels under these names:

1. *North Korea Today (DPRK News Channel)*: channel of Korean Central Television (KCTV), the state TV broadcaster.

2. *Stimmekoreas*: channel of Voice of Korea, the state international radio broadcaster. "*Stimmekoreas*" is its German name, but video descriptions are in English.

3. *North Korea*: channel of the Korean Friendship Association (KFA). The KFA is nominally a non-governmental cultural association founded in Spain by Alejandro Cao de Benós. In actuality, the KFA is controlled by the DPRK's Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

4. *DPRKMusicChannel—Official*: a "semi-official" channel established by the KFA Poland and "approved by DPRK Government official organisations." Although the channel was created by the DPRK's Polish sympathizers (or so it claims), its information, video titles, and descriptions are in English.

5. *Koryomedia*: Channel of Mokran Video, distributor of North Korean movies on DVD.

6. *dprkconcert*: this channel's user does not disclose any information about itself on YouTube. It shows entire North Korean concerts and excerpts. It may or may not be government-run or approved. In any case, the user has access to much KCTV footage.

There may be other DPRK-controlled YouTube channels.

These channels often post the same videos or variant versions. For example, both *dprkconcert* and *Stimmeskoreas* posted the Moranbong Band's 2013 New Year's Day concert, but the *dprkconcert* video includes the arrival of Kim Jong-Un and the audience's wild applause for him.

## North Korea's "Charm Offensive" On YouTube

Since most North Koreans have no access to the internet, these videos must be aimed at foreigners. The potential audience includes South Koreans, whose government jams TV signals from the North but allows access to YouTube.

North Korea, like all countries, engages in cultural diplomacy to some extent. Cultural diplomacy is the use of movies, television, radio, literature, music, sports, and other forms of culture to influence other countries. It is diplomacy by "soft power" as opposed to "hard power" methods such as military force and trade sanctions.

The DPRK government probably realizes that the foreign media portrays the country in consistently negative terms, e.g., the police state, isolationism, famine and poverty, missile threats, and public executions. North Korea's YouTube videos, however, show the country as a kinder, gentler place. These videos show a side of North Korea that foreigners rarely see: music bands, soap operas, children's animation, and even comedy shows. The DPRK is using YouTube in a "charm offensive" of cultural diplomacy.

North Korea cultural diplomacy is not new. North Korean dance troupes went to the Soviet Union as early as 1949.<sup>2</sup> However, cultural diplomacy has fallen in and out of favour with the DPRK regime over the years. For example, cultural relations with other countries declined during the purges of 1956,<sup>3</sup> and North Korea resumed being "the hermit kingdom". But in recent years, North Korea has had some high profile cultural exchanges, such as the visit of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra to Pyongyang in February 2008 and the visit of the Unhasu Orchestra to Paris in March 2012.

Though much less publicized than the concert tours, North Korea's use of YouTube has reached many more viewers than the orchestras did. In addition, posting YouTube videos is less expensive than sending artists overseas or hosting foreign visitors. A bonus is that some videos carry advertisements, doing what YouTube users call "monetizing" the video and earning a small amount of hard currency for the DPRK.<sup>4</sup>

## A Change In Strategy: Pop Culture

North Korea's YouTube campaign is a major change from previous forms of cultural diplomacy. North Korean cultural diplomacy almost always used high culture and folk art, such as classical music and folk dancing. That type of content is certainly on YouTube, but YouTube has also given the world unprecedented access to North Korea's pop music, soap operas, comedy shows, animation, movies, sports, and other examples of pop culture.

North Korea is a weak exporter of pop culture. North Korea had no films at the 2013 Toronto International Film Fes-

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tival, although one or two films had been shown in past years. In contrast, South Korea had eight films in the 2013 festival.

North Korea has yet to excite the world's audiences in a way that the U.K. does with its rock music, Japan does with its anime, or South Korea does with its soap operas. Foreign audiences do not think North Korean pop culture is interesting enough to buy. No foreigner wants to pay hard currency for iTunes downloads of North Korean hits such as "We Will Follow You Only, Kim Jong-Un" and "Death to US-Imperialism"<sup>5</sup>. However, North Korea guessed that if it were to show videos for free on YouTube, foreigners would watch them. The plan worked; North Korea Today has 10,500 YouTube subscribers and 10 million views so far.

### Old Habits Die Hard

However, the DPRK still has much to learn about mounting a charm offensive through YouTube (or any other medium). The foreign media is biased towards showing only the negative aspects of North Korea. This reputation isn't entirely unfair; North Korean defectors and Chinese visitors confirm the country's internal problems. Still, the foreign media never shows "good" news from North Korea, like sporting events (unless American basketball player Dennis Rodman is in it).

To be fair to the foreign media, the DPRK can be its own worst public relations enemy. Dr. Younghaie Chi, while citing Western media bias against North Korea, says that the DPRK regime must take the greater part of the blame for its poor image; it blocks foreign access to its people and does not cooperate with the foreign media.<sup>6</sup>

The DPRK's YouTube strategy continues the lapses of media savvy in dealing with foreigners. Although it posts light entertainment (e.g., music, comedy, soap operas), the DPRK also posts many videos of military parades and exercises, missile launches, Kim Family propaganda, and anti-U.S. children's cartoons. Such scenes only confirm the "Axis of Evil" image of North Korea.

All the video titles are in English, but many videos do not have subtitles or captions in English or other foreign languages. Stimmekoreas (Voice of Korea) posted a video called "North Korean Soldiers Comedy Show", with stand-up comedians in army uniforms. This could have been an attempt to show that North Koreans, as well as the Korean People's Army, do indeed have a sense of humour. However, it lacks foreign subtitles or captions. South Koreans can understand it, but the DPRK's other major enemy, the Americans, will not.

However, North Korea (KFA) posted the KCTV news report on the execution of Jang Song Thaek dubbed into English. Apparently the execution of a thrice-cursed traitor takes priority over stand-up comedy in cultural relations with foreigners.

### Pussycat Dolls, Pyongyang Style

In 2012, Kim Jong-Un personally selected eighteen young, attractive women to form the Moranbong Band, North

Korea's first girl band. Thus he created his country's version of the U.S.'s Pussycat Dolls or South Korea's Girls' Generation. They performed their first concert on July 6, 2012. The DPRK posted videos of it on YouTube, where the band quickly attracted foreign attention.

The foundation year is significant. A.D. 2012 was also *Juche* 101, the centenary of Kim Il-Sung's birth in the DPRK's *Juche* calendar<sup>7</sup>. The band is named after Moranbong, the recreational district of Pyongyang. Perhaps Kim was emulating South Korean rock star Psy, whose hit song "Gangnam Style" is named after a posh district in Seoul.

The Moranbong Band fascinated North Korea watchers and probably the North Koreans themselves. Never before



had they seen attractive North Korean women in miniskirts, playing and singing a variety of songs. Over several concerts, their play list included Korean folk songs (e.g., "Arirang"), foreign classical music (e.g., "Radetzky March"), European easy-listening hits from the 1930's to 1960's (e.g., "Love Is Blue", "Isle of Capri"), Chinese Communist hymns ("Ode to the Motherland"), and even the Mickey Mouse Club song. They played these songs on electric instruments with fast disco arrangements reminiscent of K-Tel's *Hooked On Classics* albums of 1981 to 1983. The band defied stereotypes of North Korean music. Where was the Korean People's Army Merited Chorus? Where were the children singing peasant songs?

Their repertoire also includes American songs. The Moranbong Band has played Bill Conti's theme of the movie *Rocky*, with images of Sylvester Stallone projected behind them. At its debut concert, the girls sang a medley of Walt Disney songs while crude imitations of Mickey Mouse and other characters danced languidly on stage.

North Korea watchers speculated that Kim Jong-Un was opening his country to foreign culture, including that of the United States, as shown by the *Rocky* theme and Disney songs. Indeed, the girls' physical appearance, with their fashionably-styled hair, high heels, and miniskirts, is influenced by Western and South Korea rock stars.

Since North Korean TV and CD's are largely unavailable outside North Korea, the Moranbong Band gained its international audience through YouTube. The girls became the first North Korean pop stars created by YouTube. This was probably no accident; in visual appearance and musical

style, they seem to have been deliberately created to be shown to foreigners.

Are they a sign of cultural and political thaw in North Korea? A closer look at the Moranbong Band shows that North Korea is not actually changing, but rather, wants the world to think it is changing.

### Old Songs, New Beat

The Moranbong Band started its debut concert with a jazzed-up arrangement of the Korean folk song “Arirang”. This was innovative by North Korean standards. However, the concert’s songs were not really different from what North Koreans had been performing for decades. About half of each Moranbong Band concert consists of traditional folk songs, like the above-mentioned “Arirang”, and political and military hymns (e.g., “Do Prosper, Era of the Workers Party!”). The rest of the songs are uncontroversial, sexless North Korean “easy-listening” tunes (e.g., “When I Walk Deep at Night”). The music was all old music with a new dance beat.

The Moranbong Band has nothing controversial or sexy like what their South Korean counterparts, Girls’ Generation, sing. This is not surprising, given that North Korea does not have any hard rock or heavy metal, certainly not like the underground (but tolerated) Soviet rock and heavy metal bands of the 1970’s and 1980’s.

The Moranbong Band intrigued Americans by playing the *Rocky* theme and Disney songs, but these are old songs. The *Rocky* theme is from 1978, and the most recent Disney song they performed was from *Beauty and the Beast*, a 1991 movie. Perhaps more recent Disney hits, like “Let It Go” from *Frozen* (2013), with its message of breaking free of societal constraints, are too subversive for North Korean audiences.

### Opening to Foreign Cultures without the Foreigners

Nonetheless, that a North Korean band played *any* American movie songs, even old ones, surprised foreigners. American movies are (supposedly) banned in North Korea. Could the Disney medley be a sign of an impending cultural openness?

The answer is: not necessarily. First, North Koreans, especially the elite of Pyongyang, are not totally isolated from American and foreign pop culture. It is true that foreign films do not regularly screen in cinemas and their DVD’s are banned. However, the Pyongyang International Film Festival, which occurs every two years, does show foreign films. State television has shown some Disney movies, and students studying English get to watch foreign films<sup>8</sup>. Also, the privileged few who can travel abroad will know about Sylvester Stallone and Walt Disney<sup>9</sup>. In addition, the elite illegally watch foreign movies on smuggled DVD’s and flash drives. Performing Disney songs in Pyongyang did not open North Korea to anything new. However, the DPRK did succeed in making foreigners think the regime was opening up.

Secondly, if North Korea had really wanted a cultural exchange, it would have partnered with American movie companies. North Korea has partnered with American organizations before, such as the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s



concert in Pyongyang (2008) and the Korean Central News Agency—Associated Press joint photo exhibit in New York (2012). But for the Moranbong Band’s first concert, North Korea staged its tribute to Disney (i.e., American) music without involving any Americans. The Walt Disney Company did not approve or license the performance of its songs or the use of its characters.<sup>10</sup> The Disney act was created entirely by North Koreans.

American news media concentrated on the fact that North Korea had committed copyright piracy upon an American company.<sup>11</sup> However, a more significant implication is that North Korea was merely pretending to open itself to foreign culture without any real intent to do so.

### Nuclear War Is Sexy

Despite their glamorous, sexy image (by North Korean standards), the Moranbong Band cannot avoid the DPRK’s pervasive militarism. Kim Il-Sung created the *songun* policy (military first), where the military’s needs are the first priority in all affairs of state and allocation of resources. Although they wear minidresses and high heels, the Moranbong girls sing the same old military hymns that previous generations had to learn. They also wear military-style uniforms (albeit with miniskirts) for some concerts.

At their 2013 New Year’s Day concert, the Moranbong Band took the militarization of pop culture to a new height. The stage decorations included large snowmen holding missiles, either the Unha or the Taepodong. Large model missiles flanked the giant video screen on stage. The band performed the military song “Without a Break”. A video of a missile launch played behind them. The video turned into an animation of a nuclear missile strike on the United States, ending with not just the U.S., but the whole world, exploding. Then the band repeated the entire song.

This was the only song where the audience jumped into the aisles and danced and clapped. We will never know if their reaction was spontaneous or staged. In any case, they cheered when the world exploded.

American singers are not immune to military imagery either, but they are far less militarized than their North Korean counterparts. American singers go on U.S.O. tours and sing patriotic songs, but it would be improbably for, say, Mariah Carey, to sing a dozen songs about victory in Iraq, much less glorify nuclear missiles. But in North Korea, even a girl band promotes nuclear war.

### **The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same**

On the surface, North Korea's YouTube videos and the Moranbong Band show that North Korea is liberalizing its culture and opening to the outside world. But as discussed above, nothing is changing in North Korea. Rather, the DPRK regime is manipulating foreigners to believe that change is happening.

### **Politics and History: It's All Show Business**

The Chinese philosopher Laozi wrote the proverb, "A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step."<sup>12</sup> So what if the North Korea's YouTube charm offensive shows no significant change in the country? Just using YouTube is a change. Kim Jong-Un has to start with one step.

If Kim Jong-Un is starting on a journey of a thousand miles, he has taken one step forward and two steps back. On August 20, 2013, he allegedly executed an ex-girlfriend and several members of the Unhasu Orchestra while the Moranbong Band was forced to watch. The DPRK's Korean Central News Agency did not explicitly or directly deny the executions, but rather, accused the South Korean media and government of quoting a report in the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, presumably the one about the executions, "to spread rumours of 'punishment' and 'covering' in a bid to hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK."<sup>13</sup> However, the Unhasu Orchestra has had no verifiable public appearances since the alleged executions, leading foreigners to think that something bad must have happened.<sup>14</sup>

If Kim Jong-Un actually executed several artists, he is not convincing the world that he is creating a kinder, gentler society. If they are still alive (imprisoned?), hiding them is not good public relations either.<sup>15</sup>

North Korea's YouTube cultural diplomacy is entertaining and informative and sometimes humorous, but it is not a sign that the country is changing. Instead, it is a public relations campaign to fool us into thinking that change is hap-

pening. Perhaps Kim Jong-Un has seen the American movie *The Producers* (the 2005 version) and is living one of its song lyrics: "If it's politics or history, the thing you got to know is everything is show biz." ❖

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### **NOTES**

- 1 Benós is one of the most unusual persons associated with North Korea. Although he is descended from Spanish nobility, he became infatuated with North Korean Communism at a young age and ingratiated himself to the DPRK government. The DPRK let him found the Korean Friendship Association and gave him a position as Special Delegate of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and a rank in the Korean People's Army. Hence, he is the only non-Korean to hold a government position in the DPRK. The documentary film *Friends of Kim*, about Benós leading a tour group of foreigners in North Korea, shows him unfavourably.
- 2 Charles K. Armstrong, "The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945–1950," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 62, no. 1 (2003), pp. 71–99. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3096136>
- 3 Adam Cathcart and Steve Denney, "North Korea's Cultural Diplomacy in the Early Kim Jong-un Era", *North Korean Review*, volume 9, number 2, Fall 2013, p. 32.
- 4 The DPRK Music Channel's video of the Moranbong Band's New Year's Day 2013 concert has 5 advertisements spread throughout it, undoubtedly to exploit the band's popularity with foreign fans. When I viewed it, the advertisements included a commercial for a Japanese video game and an appeal by Sir Paul McCartney against cruelty to food animals. The advertisers likely did not choose where their YouTube advertisements would pop up.
- 5 The hero worship and god-like portrayal of its star in the "We Will Follow You Only, Kim Jong-Un" music video must be seen to be believed. Watch it on YouTube.
- 6 Dr. Younghae Chi, "Session 2 from EAHRNK Forum, 3rd of Sept, 2013", YouTube video
- 7 That North Korea measures time in years since the birth of Kim Il-Sung is highly reminiscent of the Japanese Imperial Family and Chinese dynasties, which measured time by reign years of their emperors).
- 8 Email from Sherri L. Ter Molen, Wayne State University, February 6, 2014.
- 9 Kim Jong-Nam, oldest son of Kim Jong-Il, was arrested at Narita International Airport while trying to enter Japan with a forged Dominican Republic passport in May 2001. He said he wanted to visit Tokyo Disneyland.
- 10 Kelly Blessing and Sangwon Yoon, "North Korea's Kim Enjoys Minnie Mouse Without Disney's Blessing", *Bloomberg News*, July 9, 2012.
- 11 Sherri L. Ter Molen, "Does NK-Pop's Moranbong Band Have a Shot at a U.S. Billboard Music Award?"; presentation to the Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs, East Lansing, Michigan, October 2013. Available on YouTube.
- 12 The proverb's literal translation is "A journey of a thousand li begins under one's feet", but the more common English translation conveys its meaning better.
- 13 Korean Central News Agency, "Those Who Hurt the Dignity of DPRK's Supreme Leadership Will Pay Dearly: KCNA Commentary", September 22, 2013. Some foreign journalists have interpreted this news release as a denial of the executions, but it does not explicitly or directly deny that they occurred.
- 14 No new videos of the Unhasu Orchestra have appeared on YouTube since North Korea (Korean Friendship Association) posted "KCTV DPRK Unhasu Orchestra in Concert) Full Concert" on August 20, 2013, the alleged date of the execution.
- 15 The Moranbong Band girls survived the alleged executions, though. Simon Cockerell, a tour operator of Koryo Tours, saw them at Masik Pass Ski Resort in January 2014: <http://koryogroup.com/blog/?p=2565>





by *Margarita Yakovenko*

In an ideal world, security sectors exist to protect the citizens from external and internal security threats. Unfortunately, in many failed and fragile states, the threats often come from the security sector itself. Indeed, back in 1995 in Haiti, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide disbanded Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'H), which committed grave human rights abuses against Haitians civilians from 1991 to 1995. It is estimated that during that time close to 4,000 civilians were killed by the FAd'H. In its place, Aristide created the Haitian National Police (HNP), which now includes police, corrections, fire, emergency response, airport security, port security, and coast guard. However, the HNP was also involved in human rights abuses at the end of the 90's. The police officers were involved in drug trafficking, kidnappings and extra judicial killings. Understandably, Haitians are now very distrustful of the HNP. This distrust needs to be remedied in order for the police officers to do their job effectively. However, after decades of abuses by the security sector forces, and with the current challenges the HNP is facing, it will not be easy to do.

In 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1542 to prevent the country from slipping into the state of anarchy after the ouster of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February of that year. Since then, it has been working with the government to help reform the HNP. However, the Haitian Senate has been vocal about its dissatisfaction with the peacekeepers who have been accused of sexual abuses and the spread of a cholera epidemic; as a consequence, the Senate wishes to remove them as soon as possible. Before MINUSTAH forces fully withdraw, Haiti needs to develop its security sector to the point of self-sufficiency with complete control over domestic security matters.<sup>1</sup> In

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order for the HNP to become a self-sufficient and responsible force, the following issues must be addressed: understaffing, underfunding, under-resourcing, political challenges, and internal structural issues.

## Needs and Challenges

### Understaffing

Considering the size of Haiti's population, the HNP is stretched very thin. While the UN recommended ratio of police officers to people is 1:450, in Haiti it was 1:1816 in 2006



—BUNDESARCHIV

and 1:986 in 2011, which means that the current number of people per one officer is almost double of what it should be. Thus in order to meet the desirable ratio of police officers to people, MINUSTAH and the Government of Haiti (GoH) decided to focus on the augmentation of the police force as the main goal in the HNP reform. However, they have not been successful at achieving this goal as they did not attain their desired goal of 14,000 officers by 2011, as aspired to in the 2006-2011 Haitian National Police Development Plan. Instead, they reached only 10,106 officers by the end of June 2012, which translates into only one officer per 952 people. The current 2012-2016 Haitian National Police Development Plan aims to attain 15,000 officers by 2016, which means the

ratio of police officers to people is 1:735. Although attaining this mark would be one step closer to the UN recommended ratio, it will still be very hard to attain since it means training around 1,000 officers per year/per promotion. The 23<sup>rd</sup> promotion in December 2012 fell short of its goal and graduated only 239 cadets. It expected to have close to 600 cadets, which would still fall short of the 1,000 cadets per promotion target. Although, the numbers of earlier promotions are higher, the promotions fall short on average by 200 cadets.

Due to understaffing, the HNP's presence in the regions is at best inadequate and requires constant support of MINUSTAH. Even in Port-au-Prince where the police force is more concentrated compared to the rest of the country, there are still gross understaffing issues: only seven police officers are conducting criminal investigation in Port-au-Prince, whereas the Chief of UNPOL Judicial Police Unit believes they need closer to 20 investigators. Consequently, only 80 out of 908 murders have been investigated in 2011 and 42 out of 617 murders in the first nine months of 2012. Since there were no additional officers added to the investigations unit in 2012, the lack of progress is not surprising.

Since it takes time to train new cadets and time is of the essence, the HNP took on 936 cadets for 22<sup>nd</sup> promotion as per the Office of Internal Oversight Services' (OIOS) account, whereas the Police Academy in Port-au-Prince can only accommodate 700 cadets. As there are not enough qualified instructors, the HNP and MINUSTAH crowd the existing classrooms. Indeed, the average class size is 60 cadets, which is twice the recommended size.

### **Underfunding & Under-resourcing**

The OIOS audited MINUSTAH mission in August 2012 and concluded that the HNP is "ill-equipped and poorly funded". Under-resourcing is bluntly evident in the HNP criminal investigations unit, which has inadequate equipment and logistical support to conduct criminal investigations as demonstrated by its lack of basic equipment, such as: laser trajectory finder kit and ballistic comparative microscope etc.

Since the government does not have enough funds, external donors fund the training of cadets. The government is paying the salaries. However, considering the growing amount of graduating cadets, the government will have increasing difficulty paying all of the salaries of new officers. Moreover, in order to reach the desired number of officers the HNP Reform Plan intends to increase "the number of instructors within the Police School and create a body of instructors at the National Police Academy". Unfortunately, in order to accomplish this, the government will either strain its ability to pay the existing and new police officers, or it will be further dependent on the external funding from donors, which is unsustainable in the long run.

Furthermore, while the government's annual budget is increasing; the percentage that is dedicated for the police reform is steadily decreasing – from 5.5% in 2006 to 4.8% in

2011. On the one hand, it is puzzling that the HNP's share of budget is decreasing while the HNP itself is increasing size due to the new graduates. On the other hand, the HNP has low absorption capacity. It is usually unable to absorb up to 18% of its budget on an annual basis.

### **Political Challenges**

In the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index that scores countries on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), Haiti's public sector scores 19 and ranks 165<sup>th</sup> out of 175 countries. Indeed, in 2012, the opposition accused that the executive branch of anti-democratic practices, such as: "the politicization of State institutions such as the judiciary and the Haitian National Police...".

The level of corruption in Haiti is also causing civil unrest. There are frequent anti-government demonstrations to protest lawlessness, food insecurity, high cost of living, and the lack of basic services. From August to October 2012, the number of demonstrations held per month tripled from 22 to 64, before decreasing in November and December. Indeed, some instances of corruption are quite shocking.

For example, as per the reports of the UN Secretary-General, the presidential advisor Mercurieu Valentin Calixte shot and killed a merchant in a bar altercation, for which he was charged. However, he served only seven months in detention at which point Judge Fernaud Judes-Paul released him, claiming that there was "insufficient" evidence to connect Calixte to Derissaint's murder. Understandably, this level of corruption has a negative effect on the HNP's proper functioning.

Security sector is politicized in Haiti, where judges and high ranking police officers are promoted to senior positions on the basis of political loyalties, rather than merit. Moreover, the security sector is rampant with impunity. For instance, even though Justice of the Peace for Chantal Barthelemy Vaval shot and killed Marc Sony Dorestant during a criminal proceeding that he was overseeing, he was not prosecuted or even investigated.

Furthermore, the 2013 Failed States Index's External Intervention indicator, which reflects the number of external assistance and actors, gives Haiti the score of 9.9 out of 10 (worst). Indeed, the state is overwhelmed by the multitude of external actors and donors who all have their own unique solutions to security sector reform (SSR). Consequently, the state is struggling with coordinating and setting priorities for all of the groups. For instance, back in 2009, there were 22 coordination groups managed by the Ministry of Planning and External Collaboration. Understandably, there is an ownership deficit on the part of the government in regards to reform, where many local actors believe that SSR initiatives are hijacked by the external actors who do not realize the local realities. Indeed, the first reform plan was seen as an attack on the sovereignty of the institution.

## HNP's Internal Challenges

Back in 2008, the North-South Institute produced a case study on the HNP that cited internal governance issues such as “problems of coordination, transparency and accountability” and “complex and centralized hierarchy” as the main concerns in the HNP. Due to the complexity of the HNP, stovepiping is also a major issue—where the managers unnecessarily escalate issues to the Director General, which harms the efficiency of HNP's operation. Furthermore, due to the large number of external actors, the HNP's individual departments seek external support, which undermines internal cohesion within the HNP.

Currently, the HNP functions under a multitude of authorities: the President of the Republic, the Supreme Council of the National Police (CSPN), the Minister of Justice and Public Safety, and the Secretary of State for Public Security. This multitude makes for a layer of complexity that slows down the HNP's proper functioning. Unfortunately, the government is further expanding the organization of the HNP. Although they are not functional yet, in the *2006-2011 Haitian National Police Development Plan*, the government envisioned the creation of four more directorates, in addition to the three existing ones. In addition to those expansions, the *2012-2016 Haitian National Police Development Plan* envisions to further expand the HNP by adding: four more bureaus, three more General Directorates, a General Directorate Adjoint, a medical directorate, a directorate of wellbeing for officers, and adding Secretary of State of Public Security to the CSPN.

Another disconcerting issue about the HNP organization is flawed hierarchy. The Inspector General is under the authority of the Director General of National Police and the Minister of Justice and Public Security. The Inspector General conducts inquiries into the allegations of human rights violations by the police officers (i.e vetting) and recommends those who are to be dismissed. However, it is the Director General that has the power to act upon the recommendations, after confirming with the Minister. However, the Minister, who has the power to dismiss the Inspector General, is also responsible for the functioning of his ministry. Thus the Inspector General has the tricky job of ensuring that his recommendations will be acceptable to the Minister and the Director General, otherwise it could cost him his job. Indeed, the Inspector General has been replaced three times in 2012, which as the United Nations Secretary-General rightly points out does “raise questions about the independence and the effectiveness of the oversight body”. Consequently, the oversight body is not an independent body, which means its recommendations could be easily influenced by politics.

Lastly, the HNP's current regulatory framework is outdated and disordered. The operation of HNP depends on around 70 general orders, guidelines and standard operating procedures; many of which were developed in emergency or as a transitional measures. Even the *2012-2016 Haitian National Police Development Plan* has described the General Inspectorate of the HNP as an entity that is “centralized and

compartmentalised...[and] has limited functionality”, whose procedural framework is outdated and does not meet the current realities of the HNP.

## Achievements and the Way Forward

As of the end of 2011, the HNP and MINUSTAH put 4,462 out of 12,678 police officers through their joint certification and vetting process. More importantly, 79 out of 139 police officers who have failed the vetting process have been dismissed by the Minister of Justice and Public Security. However, even though a lot of officers have gone through the vetting process, it is far from being completed. Fortunately, in his March 2013 report, the Secretary-General mentioned that the HNP and MINUSTAH have now started the vetting process of the applicants to HNP prior to their entry into the Police Academy. This is a step in the right direction as it will speed up the hiring process since the graduates will be able to work right after graduation, rather than waiting for the results of the vetting.

The issues that contributed to the low number of cadets in the 23<sup>rd</sup> promotion, the excessively rigorous medical tests and weak recruiting campaign, have been fixed since the current 24<sup>th</sup> promotion consists of 1,102 cadets, who graduated in October 2013. This is a promising number as far as reaching the goal of 15,000 officers by 2016 is concerned. In order to further speed up the hiring process, the OIOS recommended that the medical exams should take place close to admission to the Academy.

However, fulfilling the desired 1,000 cadets per promotion quota means that the classrooms and the accommodations will be overcrowded since the Academy is meant to accommodate 700 cadets. This issue puts into question the quality of the training these cadets receive. Considering the distrustful attitude of the populace towards the police, Haiti and MINUSTAH needs to focus on the quality, rather than the quantity. Producing a large amount of undertrained officers is likely to further insecurity since the officers will be unable to adequately deal with certain situations. Moreover, having more police officers does not necessarily translate into more security. Thus the GoH and MINUSTAH need to focus on the quality of their police, rather than quantity. Before aggressively recruiting, the state should ensure that the current officers have proper training and resources to do their job effectively. In addition, the government should ensure that it can afford to pay the salaries of all the officers it is producing. Otherwise, without pay, these officers will be easily susceptible to corruption, which would further deteriorate Haiti's security environment.

Other than the increasing number of police officers, there are other successes in the HNP reform. In 2012, a lot of progress has been made in training and equipping the officers. For example, the automated fingerprint identification became fully operationalized, while searchable criminal database system was not far off from becoming fully functional. Furthermore, MINUSTAH provided training to the HNP of-

officers on: investigation techniques, crime scene management, fingerprint identification, gender violence, anti-kidnapping, illicit drug trafficking, crime scene analysis, first aid, border activities, judicial policing, and etc. In addition, MINUSTAH developed human rights modules for the basic training of cadets.

Among other projects, Canada's Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) funded the following: the rehabilitation of four crossings and 14 police stations; the Coast Guard development activities; the acquisition of HNP vehicles; the construction of naval base in Les Cayes; first aid training for 7000 HNP members and disaster response training to high level officers. From 2010 to 2012, Canadian DFAIT/START funded the First Aid Instructor Training in Haiti Project, which produced 200 First Aid trained instructors and 17 instructor-trainers certified within Haiti—in addition to training 4500 police officers in basic First Aid and another 350 officers in Emergency Preparedness.

This “train the trainers” success should be reproduced in other areas of the HNP reform. Indeed, the goal should be to train enough trainers and instructors in the HNP that the training can mostly be led by the HNP itself, while MINUSTAH will be left to monitor the training and evaluate the graduating cadets. Even though diverting the responsibility for the training from MINUSTAH to the HNP will potentially slow down the training process, it will force the HNP leadership and the government to take ownership of the security sector reform in Haiti. The government already mentioned in the HNP Reform plan that it intends to increase “the number of instructors within the Police School and [create] a body of instructors at the National Police Academy”. This intention should be expanded on in the next Reform plan and it should be followed thorough. However, the instructors should be

Haitians, rather than UN staff. A greater amount of responsibility and control over the training process will ensure the state oversees the growth of HNP and takes responsibility for it, which will ensure that the number of new graduates does not exceed the amount of salaries the government can afford to pay.

Moreover, in order for the HNP to become a self-sufficient and responsible force, the government needs to devolve more funding to the HNP reform. Since the government's annual budget has been increasing, it should proportionally increase the HNP's budget. The Government of Haiti needs to understand the urgency of the situation it's in. The heavy dependence on UN peacekeepers in security matters is still very much a reality for the HNP. Considering the high and growing criminal rate and the low number of Haitian police officers, it is safe to say peace will not follow the hurried massive withdrawal of UN troops. Although their presence has been controversial, their withdrawal and the possible subsequent chaos is not a better choice. The Government of Haiti should closely work with MINUSTAH to coordinate the withdrawal step in step with the growing strength of the HNP. Otherwise, the HNP will be overwhelmed by the crime that will quickly fill the security/power vacuum left by the withdrawal of MINUSTAH. \*

*The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.*

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Senate asked MINUSTAH to withdraw its peacekeepers by May 2014, but UN extended the MINUSTAH mission until October 2014. UN is seeking to extend it further.



## Call for Papers

### 17th Annual CDAI Graduate Student Symposium

### “Canada's Security and Defence Interests”

### October 16–17, 2014, Currie Hall, RMC Kingston

Abstracts of proposed presentations from Masters and Doctoral students in the realm of security and defence are being accepted in two rounds, with deadlines for submission of 12 May (first round) and 15 September (second round). Between 16 and 20 presenters (circa 5 to 7 panels) will be accepted. Applicants will be notified of the result of their submission within 10 days of the deadline they submit against. The final draft of presentation papers (maximum 4,000 words) must be submitted by no later than 29 September.

Cash prizes of \$1,000, \$500 and \$250 will be

presented to the top three presenters, who will also be offered an honorarium of \$2,000 each to develop their presentations for publication in a CDA Institute publication. An additional prize of \$750, the Colonel Peter Hunter Award will be presented by the Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI). The recipient of the Colonel Peter Hunter Award will also be offered the opportunity to develop the paper into an RCMI publication.

Please send all presentation abstracts with your institutional affiliation and contact information (no more than one page) by email to [policy@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:policy@cdainstitute.ca).

<http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/symposium>