



# SITREP

A PUBLICATION OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

## CANADIAN DEFENCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR

**Camp Julien, the major Canadian Camp in Kabul, Afghanistan, with King's Palace in the background.**

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(DND Photo KA2004-R102-093)

## FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

The Canadian Defence Policy Statement (DPS) has finally been released, and the document does certainly put in motion some significant changes to Canadian defence policy.

We are therefore very pleased to have Col (Retd) Howard Marsh, Defence Analyst at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) in Ottawa, offer his thoughts on the recently released DPS. In "Defence Policy Statement 2005: A Defence Policy for the 1990s?" Col Marsh questions whether the document will actually represent a useful blueprint for the Canadian Forces in the coming decades.

We would especially like to thank Col Howard Marsh and the CDAI for permitting the reproduction of this paper, which was originally published in *On Track*, Vol. 10, No 2 (Summer 2005).

The United Nations, while having a prominent place in Canadian international security policy, has been under severe strain due to the growing US disenchantment with this international body. The most recent example of this disenchantment can be seen in the Bush administration's reaction to the Oil For Food Program.

To shed some light on this program, we are fortunate to have Ron Cleminson, a former Foreign Affairs official with extensive experience in Iraq, where he served in both the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), and its successor, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). In his article, "Solving the Puzzle: The Oil For Food Program as a UN Success Story," Mr. Cleminson argues that the real oil scandal has little to do with this highly successful program.

The threat posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is given an important place in the Defence Policy Statement. This should come as little surprise, given the prominence of such threat perception in the post-9/11 security environment.

We are therefore fortunate to conclude with three articles that examine various aspects of this threat. The first article, titled "Is Al-Qaeda a Nuclear Threat?" is written by Robin Frost, an independent scholar on matters of international security. According to Mr. Frost, there are a number of constraints on what can be termed "nuclear terrorism" – the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed terrorist group, while certainly still possible, should not be overestimated.

The second article is written by Dr. Douglas Ross, professor at Simon Fraser University and Executive Director of the Canadian-American Strategic Review (CASR), and is based on his presentation to the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence in March of 2005. In "Coping with Canada's Radically Changed Threat Environment: World WMD Terrorism and Missile Defence Mania," Dr. Ross examines the US fixation on missile defence, and offers suggestions to improve Canadian security in the face of WMD terrorism.

We would like to thank Dr. Douglas Ross and the CASR for permitting the reproduction of this paper, an earlier version of which appeared as part of the 'CASR Online Symposium 2004/2005'.

The organizational and ideological nature of Al-Qaeda, and the means to defend against such a group, is the subject of the final article in this issue. Written by Sunil Ram, professor at American Military University and a member of the RCMI Defence Studies Committee, this article is titled "Reality and the War on Terror."

We hope that you, our readers, find these articles both interesting and informative. ■

Sincerely,

**David S. McDonough**  
Editor of *SITREP*



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# DEFENCE POLICY STATEMENT 2005: A DEFENCE POLICY FOR THE 1990s?

by Colonel (Retd) Howard Marsh

Summer months provide time for reflection. The initial demands of analysis that accompanied the spring release of the Defence Policy Statement (DPS 2005) have passed. A reflection on whether Canada has the right policy for the approaching geopolitical season might now be in order.

I have already written on the impediments to achieving DPS 2005, in particular on the existing approach to the administration of defence policy in Canada. The fragile state of Canadian political leadership also works against achieving the defence objectives, and the pernicious mechanisms of the public administration of defence, if left uncorrected, will stymie transformation plans. Now I would like to reflect on whether Canada has the correct defence policy.

DPS 2005 is founded, in large part, on Canadian military operational experience of the last ten years, moral persuasion from communities committed to "*The Responsibility to Protect*" agenda and reflects academic analysis provided by Dr. Thomas Barnett's '*gap and connected core thesis*' ([www.thomaspmbarnett.com](http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com)). However, a defence policy based on the past and current state of affairs is likely to be found wanting as time passes.

Thus DPS 2005 has inherent risk in that it may initiate a transformation shaped by the military and geo-political demands of the last ten years, but which is unlikely to be realized in the next ten to fifteen years because of the impediments mentioned above, particularly the very long gestation period of equipment acquisition, and possible other obstacles. In 2020, Canada could find itself with a transformed military force suitable for 1995 scenarios, but inappropriate for the third decade of the 21st century.

In reality, foreign and defence policy is driven by the 'tools' at the government's disposal. Unfortunately Canada's toolbox is relatively empty. Some key essentials, such as the means to deploy and support military force, are near non-existent. Personnel levels and requisite skills are low. Promissory notes, furthermore, are not tools. For a long season, Canadians and their

allies will have to wait and see if there is any currency behind the recent budgetary promises. Until the tool chest is replenished, Canada will be severely limited in its ability to play a more meaningful role internationally.

The Government's recently announced intention to do something of substance in Darfur, Sudan, illustrates Canada's dilemma.


The promised deployment probably fell apart, not because of African sovereignty sensitivities, but due to the Canadian Forces' (CF) inability to support an overseas military contingent. There is no strategic airlift, no medium lift helicopters and no mobile forward support. The nation's lack of effective tools has defined a foreign policy stance of non-involvement. Canada can only go where others are willing to transport, protect and support the Canadian military.

Not having the relevant military tools is a condition that will likely debilitate Canadian governments for the remainder of this decade and possibly well into the next. Defence policy statements need to be accompanied by skilled people and effective equipment before words become tangible assets. Professional development and equipment acquisition have long gestation periods. A special operations

corporal is not an entry-level product, but is rather the result of a ten-year mentoring. The sad truth about acquisition of major military equipment is that, on average, our governments have preferred a slow, 15-year approach, and the timeline is becoming alarmingly longer. By the time Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of key transformational items is achieved, fifteen or twenty years from now, there can be no assurance that they will be the best equipment for the challenges of the day.

This is the gamble of the 2005 Defence Policy Statement; it is built, for the most part, on the continuance of asymmetric warfare in which Dr Barnett's 'core' countries remain connected and the 'gap' countries remain unconnected. Dr. Barnett's thesis, in which he argues that the lack of global connectedness is the primary cause of armed conflict, is one of the pillars of Canada's foreign and defence policy.

China, India, Russia, Europe, America, Australia and others are connected. These 'core' nations enjoy the stability and pros-



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perity that comes from being connected diplomatically, economically, and commercially. For the most part the people of these nations are connected to the Internet, banking services, water and sewer, electrical, transport grids, etc.

The 'gap' nations, for the most part, lack connections. These nations dwell in a three thousand kilometre wide swath that runs from the Caribbean Sea to the Ivory Coast, across sub-Saharan Africa, through the Middle East to Kabul and on to East Timor. The peoples and nations inhabiting this swath of the globe are the least connected to the Information Age. As well as lacking modern communications they have the dubious distinction of possessing the largest concentration of failed and failing states. The highest level of misery, piracy and displacements of peoples reside in this swath. It is here that most of Canada's military, diplomatic and development assets are destined to be sent in the coming years.

However, will there continue to be a disconnected swath of nations in ten years, or will the gap become absorbed by globalization? Is it more likely that the connected nations become more strident and attempt to redefine regional power blocks? If the disconnected 'gap' continues then transforming the CF to a medium weight force makes sense. However, should the connected 'core' of nations assert themselves then the military needs to prepare for the more lethal warfare of major power struggles.

It may well be that this global condition of 'core' and 'gap' will persist, but a quick review of history, especially Canadian defence policy, alerts us to the unpleasant reality that our policy is more often than not inappropriate for its season. Canada has a very poor track record of being militarily prepared for the next geo-political season.

In the 1930s Canada's leadership agreed with the Imperial assessment that there would be no major power conflict in the next ten years, and Canada continued to disarm because the Paris Pact of 1928 had declared war illegal. That disastrous foreign and defence policy resulted in Canada going to World War II unprepared. Canadian Army casualty rates in the European theatre were 235% higher per manoeuvre division than those of the better prepared and equipped American divisions. Likewise, Canada's navy suffered much from the military poverty of the 1930s. During the same decade the Royal Canadian Air Force had become little more than a small civilian flying agency. That Canada responded so well to the challenges of the Second World War is nothing short of miraculous.

Immediately after WW II the then Minister of Defence, Brooke Claxton, envisioned that a 30,000 man military was adequate for Canada. Within five years the Korean War proved that approach inappropriate. Canada's military expanded to some 125,000 personnel by the late fifties. For a while, Canada's military had a short season of the right policy for the Cold War.

The 1964 Pearsonian foreign and defence policy shrank Canada's homeland military. While European-based forces were reaffirmed, Canada-based units were run down. This had the unusual consequence, for example, of some Canadian NATO

forces in Europe being placed on standby to reinforce domestic units deployed to Quebec during the 1970 October Crisis. That defence policy focused on multilateralism while the subsequent demand was domestic.

The Trudeau era of foreign and defence policy, 1968-1983, reduced the CF. Prime Minister Trudeau, however, realizing that he had erred, reversed his earlier stance by increasing defence expenditures toward the end of his mandate.

The 1987 White Paper emphasized NATO and attempted to rebuild force strength, acquire nuclear-powered submarines and replace main battle tanks. The economy of Canada and the events of 1989 made that defence policy ineffective in less than two years.

The 1994 White Paper on defence envisioned a post-Cold War era of world order characterised by peace. The 1994 Defence Economic Review placed the military on a steep slope toward disarmament. Few in this country and elsewhere were prepared for the disorder that occurred once nations were no longer restrained by the Warsaw Pact, and when militant Islamism introduced a new form of conflict to the world.

In summary, recent Canadian governments have produced inappropriate defence policies in six out of seven attempts. A fifteen percent success rate in the last seventy years does not bode well for DPS 2005. The system, it seems, tends to get it wrong. This historical trend suggests that the current transformation policy has not much chance of being appropriate.

So what can be done?

I believe that now is the time to prepare for wars amongst 'core' nations; it is not the time to transform for 'gap' conflict. The transformation that is currently underway may have been right for the 1980s, in that it would eventually have given our armed forces the wherewithal to deal reasonably well with the exigencies of the last ten years. Given the long time lag between policy articulation and implementation, now is the time to plan and build robust tactical units that are ready for the return of major power conflict.

I perceive that the world is currently in a benign state of geopolitical intercourse. Asymmetric warfare may be unpredictable, but it is much less deadly than the symmetrical version of major power warfare. Reflect on the casualty rates of the World Wars in comparison to the asymmetric conflicts of recent years. Tens of thousands have died in the War on Terrorism; tens of millions died in the Second World War.

If I have persuaded you that the world is most likely passing through the relatively benign nadir of asymmetric warfare and that the more virulent symmetrical war fighting is going to return, then you can better appreciate this concern.

Effective military capability requires well-trained and well-lead servicepersons, with relevant equipment and support. This is not achieved quickly, not even in a decade. It takes a lot of time to build effective military capability. Military planners and the Auditor General of Canada know that replacing existing obsolete systems takes about 15 years, and that timeline is increasing.

*Continued on page 16*

# SOLVING THE PUZZLE: THE OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM AS A UN SUCCESS STORY

by F. R. Cleminson

In the last two years, the credibility of the United Nations and the personal integrity of the Secretary General have been targeted by an organized and focussed campaign of distortion, manipulation and misinformation. The attacks have centered on a series of unsubstantiated allegations of scandal and corruption in the operation of the UN backed Oil For Food Program (OFFP), a complex humanitarian endeavour which operated in Iraq from 1996 to 2003 under a Security Council mandate. The irony is that within the program itself, there was virtually no scandal of note. Nevertheless, the constant stream of abuse forced the Secretary General to characterize the year 2004 as having been his "*Annus Horribilis*".

Of course, such attacks against the personage of the Secretary General are not new. Bashing the UN has become a popular political sport in Washington D.C. These attacks have been nurtured by a cabal of neo-conservative activists, who appear unable, or unwilling, to forgive the UN for having been proven right in the controversy surrounding the absence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion.

## The Program

To gain some perspective, it is essential to understand the origin and scope of the OFFP; particularly its responsibility for oversight. Right after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations Security Council, under American leadership, put in place a comprehensive set of sanctions designed to isolate the regime in Baghdad. Unfortunately, those measures also had unintended negative consequences on the everyday living conditions of Iraqis. In an effort to mitigate this damage, the Security Council adopted Resolution 986 (1995). It set up the Oil For Food Program under which Iraqi oil was authorized to be sold on the international market under established UN guidelines.

The program itself was initiated at the beginning of 1996 and operated until the invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces in 2003. The Security Council authorized this unique humanitarian initiative under the guidance and leadership of the United States in late 1995. Establishing such a complex and unprecedented program, under the political pressures of the day, presented the United Nations staff with a set of unique challenges. Certain risks were entailed in developing a humanitarian program while main-

taining the constraints of a sanctions regime specifically designed by the Security Council to enforce strong and effective international controls against a corrupt Iraqi government. New policies and procedures, developed under pressure and within a restricted timeframe by the Security Council, had to be implemented quickly by a staff with little relevant experience and expertise from which to draw.

Creating and operationalizing such a mammoth program in just a matter of months was nothing short of a miracle. Complicated, complex, but nevertheless effective, the distribution and supply infrastructure under UN control undertook the responsibility of ensuring that humanitarian aid reached individual families in each of the 15 southern governates. Alternate arrangements were instituted for the semiautonomous Kurdish enclaves to the north. Because of the zero growth policy of the day, the United Nations staff had to move quickly to a "contracting out" arrangement, in which private commercial companies were engaged to provide certain inspection and monitoring services designed to meet sanctions requirements, as well as to ensure the proper and direct distribution of OFFP goods to more than 25 million ordinary Iraqi citizens.


From the aspect of UN management and procurement, OFFP represented an extensive undertaking. Over the life span of the program the Security Council approved approximately 30,000 contracts. Though approximately 6000 contracts were held up for various reasons, not one was on the basis of pricing. OFFP dealt with more than 300 oil companies that traded in Iraqi oil and with in excess of 3,500 companies which supplied humanitarian goods. At its peak, the OFFP employed more than 3,600 Iraqis directly in an extensive supply and distribution network which spanned the country.

From the humanitarian perspective, the program succeeded in its mission of significantly improving the every day living conditions of almost every family in Iraq. Statistics show that, from 1996 to 2001, the daily food intake for the average Iraqi increased from 1300 to 2300 calories; a spectacular improvement of particular importance in terms of both the young and the elderly. As a result, malnutrition amongst Iraqi children dropped by 50%. In addition, a vaccination campaign for children, funded and managed by the UN program, virtually eradicated polio in Iraq over the same five year period.

The oil sales revenues, amounting to some US\$64.5 billion, were deposited directly into UN controlled escrow accounts in Paris. Some US\$34.5 billion were expended for humanitarian goods. Funds were allocated for other purposes, including war reparations to those who suffered damages as a result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The remaining funds were

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*F. R. Cleminson, trained in the RCAF as a radio-navigator, served in a variety of staff and operational positions in Canada, the US and overseas. In 1982, he joined Foreign Affairs where he created and headed Canada's Verification Research Program for 15 years. In 1991, he was appointed a Commissioner to UNSCOM and, in 2000, to its successor UNMOVIC. He continues to closely follow affairs in Iraq.*



Courtesy of the Randell-Virtual Research Group

**Inside and Outside the Oil For Food Program: Solving the Puzzle.**

passed by the UN to the Iraq Provisional Authority in June 2003. At no time did Saddam Hussein have access to or authority over any of the funds in the UN managed escrow accounts.

Oversight responsibilities for the OFFP fell to the Security Council's Iraq Sanctions Committee; in reality a committee of the whole. That responsibility included the approval of all contracts within the Program as well as the identification of any irregularities in their implementation. The OFFP staff, per se, were never given the authority by the Security Council to prevent smuggling. In the Security Council's view, all member states were responsible for enforcing the sanctions and it was expected that states bordering Iraq would monitor cross border activities and deter smuggling.

OFFP remains, to this day, the largest humanitarian initiative ever undertaken in the history of UN operations. Member

states, including Canada, supported it immediately as a practical means of alleviating the plight of Iraqi citizens who had long suffered under the yoke of Saddam Hussein's regime. In essence, the program called for the sale of controlled quantities of Iraqi oil as a means to finance food, medicine and other humanitarian necessities. At the same time, restrictions were put in place to ensure that the proceeds from such sales could not be spent on proscribed weapons systems of those which could threaten Iraq's neighbours.

**International Oil Transactions**

That the international oil industry in its global reach, particularly through "third party" transactions, presented an attractive target for scandal through collusion, corruption and quick profit, has never been in question. The fluctuating prices at the local gas pump testifies to that. Internationally, the machinations of compa-

nies such as the Haliburton Corporation and its subsidiaries, most recently in postwar Iraq, have come to personify questionable ethics and practices. Haliburton, a large oil services conglomerate (once headed by Vice President Dick Cheney), has been challenged for price gouging and for other contract improprieties in postwar Iraq. In fact, the FBI is reported to have considered an extension of its probe to consider possible criminal misconduct. So it's clear that in this volatile energy resource area, there was, and still remains, plenty of room for scandal and quick profits.

Sales and activities at the international commercial level which took place outside of the strictures of the program itself, are being recognized as having been beyond the oversight authority mandated by the United Nations Security Council program managers. In fact, these activities should have been subjected to and pursued within whatever national and international commercial oversight standards and mechanisms then in existence. Those standards and mechanisms, if in fact they existed, were inadequate. Nevertheless, it is from the murky area of international commercial transactions, including the ultimate disposal of Iraqi oil by middlemen in the oil market, that allegations of scandal first emerged.

### **Investigations Underway**

As a result of the uncertainty spawned by these unsubstantiated allegations of scandal, three separate sets of investigations emerged. They are ongoing. The first was initiated by a number of committees of the US Congress, the second by the UN Secretary General under Security Council guidance, and the third set, by a number of US government agencies. The latter are likely to be mirrored in other countries as national responsibilities regarding illegal oil transactions become more apparent.

The first set of probes, undertaken by at least a half dozen congressional committees, have simply resulted in additional broadsides of politically motivated allegations and innuendoes levelled at the operation of the Oil For Food Program and, by inference, at the United Nations itself. Congressional investigations seem more intent on finding scapegoats than on understanding what really went on and seeking lessons for the future. Of these probes, the most disruptive and disreputable have been those initiated by Senator Norm Coleman and Congressman Henry Hyde. Mr. Hyde is best remembered for his relentless pursuit of smut in relation to the attempt to impeach President Clinton. Coleman, junior senator from Minnesota, in hounding Kofi Annan to resign, has used both character assassination and personal ridicule in a manner reminiscent of the junior senator from Wisconsin half a century ago.

The second set, initiated by the Secretary-General himself, was activated on 21 April 2004. Paul A. Volcker, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve System, agreed to head an Independent Investigation Committee (IIC). South African judge Richard Goldstone, the first Balkans War Crime Prosecutor, and Professor Mark Pieth of

the University of Basel, a Swiss lawyer recognized internationally as an expert on money laundering with the OECD, joined the IIC as members. Reid Morden, formerly head of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), assumed responsibility for day to day operations. Today, he leads a forensic auditing group of more than 40 professional investigators under a programmed budget of US\$30 million. The IIC has produced two comprehensive interim reports; the first on 3 February 2005, the second on 29 March 2005. Its final report is expected by late summer 2005.

The third set of investigations, likely to become of increasing significance in terms of "scandal", have been initiated independently by a number of US government agencies. They will be focussed more directly on criminally related activities; specifically possible malfeasants committed by American companies. The lead agency at the moment appears to be the Manhattan District Attorney's office, within whose legal jurisdiction, United National Headquarters is located.

During the period in which OFFP was running, the US became, indirectly, the biggest purchaser of Iraqi oil. American companies accounted for some 70% of all Iraqi crude oil exports by buying the oil through middlemen who, in turn, dealt directly with Iraq. In terms of "scandal," therefore, the focus is likely to be on the international commercial petroleum consortiums and on methods of extortion employed by middlemen. These include smuggling, vouchers, bribes, surcharges, and just plain kickbacks.

It is of interest to note that these illegal activities, which took place beyond the purview of the OFFP personnel, were not unknown in either New York or Washington D.C. That became clear in testimony provided by Robert Einhorn, former Assistant Secretary of State, who served as the action officer during the period under review. Before a congressional committee in 2003, he confirmed that "in the late 90's, we understood that a lot of shenanigans were going on...under the table payments and so on...we made vain efforts to limit the scope." In the shadow of revelations such as these, Manhattan US Attorney David Kelley, recently announced the indictment of four defendants accused of participating in a scheme thought to have paid millions of dollars in secret kickbacks to oil companies located in Texas. Scandal investigations in gross terms such as these are likely to focus on the "middleman" aspects of such international oil transactions.

All in all, these three sets of investigations represent an interesting junction and unique crosscutting of international and national law enforcement cultures. As for the United Nations itself, the consequences of such inquiries and investigations will be welcome. Transparency will serve to exonerate the UN from the scandal allegations, and from a parochial perspective, may also serve the useful purpose of identifying possible inadvertent mismanagement styles and practices on the part of staff. It would be eminently unfair, however, if UN actuarial performance criteria in play during the 1996-2003 era were to be judged against US generally accepted accounting principles (USGAAP) updated in 2005.

<b>US Gov't Organizations</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Senate Perm Sub-Committee on Investigations	Chair: Sen. Norm Coleman, Junior Senator from Minnesota
Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Chair: Sen. Richard Lugar, Senior Senator from Indiana
House International Relations Committee	Chair: Rep. Henry Hyde From Illinois
House Sub-Committee on Govt. Reform	Chair: Rep. Christopher Shays From Connecticut
House Energy Committee	Chair: Rep. Joe Barton From Texas
<b>US Agencies</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Govt. Accountability Office	WSHDC Formerly Govt. Accounting Office
Office of Foreign Assets Control	WSHDC Treasury Dept.
Central Intelligence Agency	WSHDC CIA Report Oct. 2004
Federal Grand Jury	NYC
US Attorney's Office in Manhattan	NYC
Justice Department	WSHDC
US Federal Reserve Bank	WSHDC
US Federal Reserve Bank of New York	NYC
Manhattan District Attorney	NYC
<b>Others</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Independent Inquiry Committee	NYC Chair: Paul Volker
Interim Coalition / Provisional Auth. etc.	Baghdad
Inter-Advisory and Monitoring Board	NYC
KPMG, Ernest & Young, etc.	Various private organizations by contract

*Some of the Jurisdictions - Probing, Prodding, Interfering, Investigating.*

### Perspective

It is unfortunate that there have been so many unsubstantiated allegations, which for purposes of obfuscation have been profited as if they were facts. By treating allegations of corruption as facts, particularly for ideological reasons, the success of the program's primary role of providing "aid" to nearly every Iraqi family in distress has been virtually ignored.

Despite what ultimately might be identified as inherent flaws in the program, OFFP did enjoy measurable success in meeting the day to day basic needs over a period of some seven years, of some 27,000,000 ordinary Iraqi citizens. In so doing, it contributed to the maintenance of political support for a continuation of the sanctions regime, which in turn, according to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report, which was tabled in the US Congress in October 2004, prevented Saddam Hussein from reactivating his WMD programs.

In terms of Iraqi oil transactions, the better part of the funds illicitly pocketed by Saddam were earned by cheating on sanctions against Iraq by selling oil smuggled out at a time which predated the creation of OFFP. Figures tend to indicate that the bulk of the money talked about was from either smuggling or "third person" transactions. The United Nations had neither the mandate nor the capacity to police activities such as smuggling. This was

the task of the Multinational Interception Force created by the Security Council in 1990 and of the national authorities in countries through which the oil passed.

As for the program itself, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who served as British Ambassador to the UN and as British Representative on the Security Council before, during and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, described OFFP as having been an "exceptional program which had to be dealt with in an exceptional way." Greenstock served subsequently in the post-war occupation of Iraq as the Senior British representative. Recently he cautioned his colleagues that those "who are pouring out poison on the OFFP, should examine their own responsibilities." Greenstock serves today as Director of the "Ditchley Foundation," one of Britain's premier "think-tanks".

### Conclusions

Was there scandal? The answer is yes. But allegations of scandal, in terms of the disposition of Iraqi oil, predate the creation of the Oil For Food Program.

The fault for scandal lies not with the United Nations but clearly with the international community, with the inadequacy of its own commercial oversight standards, and with gross neglect by national authorities, primarily by those nations which consumed the oil.

Smear? Definitely. The multi-pronged personalized attacks spearheaded by ideologically driven politicians and their apparatchiki, using deliberate distortions and unsubstantiated allegations as their tools, personify a fully blown, professionally orchestrated smear campaign.

Can we learn something else from it? Time will tell. The results of credible and transparent reporting now emerging suggests that the full story of OFFP could be used to provide useful case studies on the creation of innovative and effective international enterprises; reflecting a positive manner upon the credibility of the United Nations in that regard. Indeed, it can be plumbed to provide many other valuable lessons for the future. This is not the last time that the Security Council will be called upon to undertake unique tasks under less than ideal conditions. ■

*The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.*

# IS AL-QAEDA A NUCLEAR THREAT?

by Robin Frost

Deciding whether terrorists would go nuclear is an all-but-impossible task. If one discounts the argument that the two instances of atomic bombing in the Second World War were state nuclear terrorism, there are no cases to study and no historical evidence to unearth. Neither terrorists nor those who fight them, especially secret or secretive specialized governmental counter-terrorism agencies, are particularly prone to disseminating credible, concrete information in the public realm. While we can do our best to understand, even empathize with, terrorists in order to come to some sort of roughly plausible approximation of their moral, strategic, and political beliefs, in the end we are forced to resort to 'what-if' and 'best-guess' thinking: speculation, in a word (which places this note firmly in the tradition of some of the scholarship that has preceded it).

Nonetheless, there is a considerable amount of evidence that must inform this speculation and narrow its range. First of all, there are technical considerations. While they cannot be discussed in any detail here, they must be acknowledged. Assembling enough fissile material for even the crudest nuclear device – and the amounts needed varies inversely with the bomb's sophistication – would be very difficult and probably extremely expensive for a terrorist organization. The theoretical knowledge and practical skills required to design and build a nuclear weapon are of a high order, while setting up, equipping, and successfully operating an undetectable clandestine weapons laboratory would also be so difficult and expensive as to be virtually prohibitive, even for the best-funded terrorist organization. The Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese cult responsible for the Sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway in March, 1995, operated relatively openly under Japanese laws regarding religious organizations that made it all-but-untouchable and had a billion-dollar war chest. Nonetheless, it gave up the attempt to develop a nuclear weapon very early on in the process, preferring to work with chemical and biological agents instead.

The evidence, much of it admittedly negative, suggests that buying or stealing a functional nuclear weapon would be an even more difficult, perhaps impossible, task. Nuclear weapons are guarded like national treasures; indeed, it is fair to say that for new nuclear weapons states, including potential rogues, their nuclear weapons are national treasures, symbols of national strength and modernity bought at immense cost, that they would be most unlikely to hand over to terrorists unless the terrorists were acting as mercenary agents of the state itself.<sup>1</sup> And the

threat of nuclear retaliation, even if the possibility of tracing the weapon back to its source were thought to be low, should be enough to deter any rational state from using a nuclear weapon against another nuclear weapons state or one under the protection of a nuclear weapons state.

Leaving aside the technical issue, there remains the question of whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons if they somehow managed to obtain them. Terrorist organizations vary among themselves at least as much as any other set of broadly comparable human institutions – religions, for example, or tribes. In other words, they have different goals, different histories, different leaderships and leadership styles, different cultural roots, different political contexts, different sets of moral beliefs and constraints, and different strategies. Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish several broad categories of terrorist organization, such as social revolutionary, nationalist/separatist, and religious.

Of these types, we would suggest that apocalyptic religious or cultist terrorists are the most dangerous from a purely motivational and strategic viewpoint. These organizations believe they have a direct divine mandate. As such, they recognize no secular legal or moral constraints on their actions, nor do they answer to an earthly constituency, while the promise of immediate heavenly reward means that self-preservation itself has no value, voiding any possibility of deterrence. Their political agendas, to the extent that they have any, are typically both vague and grandiose; in the most threatening form, they believe that human civilization itself must be destroyed so that a new order, typically populated or led by members of the cult, can emerge.

With the Aum Shinrikyo, the world probably came as close as it ever has to true nuclear terrorism. No other known cult that has approached the wealth and technical resources of an Aum Shinrikyo, but any apocalyptic cult potentially poses a threat to the security of its host state and, perhaps, the world – this potential only increases as the cult amasses wealth and power. Religious groups have not traditionally attracted as much attention from security agencies as more typical terrorist organizations:<sup>2</sup> while the fight against terrorism must be very carefully balanced against the need to respect civil rights, including religious freedom, we hope that the lesson of Aum Shinrikyo has been taken to heart.

The next most dangerous form of terrorism is the religiously inspired transnational variety uniquely exemplified by Al-Qaeda. While Al-Qaeda is not apocalyptic and has more narrow and better-defined political goals than a cult such as Aum Shinrikyo, it has some characteristics of a purely religious terrorist group. Specifically, it claims a religious justification for its actions and says that killing its enemies, which it generically calls 'infidels', is not only not immoral, it is a positive religious duty

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that will be rewarded in the hereafter. It has also tragically demonstrated its practical and psychological ability to engage in mass casualty terrorism. Unlike cults, however, Al-Qaeda does have a broader constituency beyond its membership that it relies upon for support and towards whom it appears to feel at least some moral obligations. It locates its struggle in the concrete world of real political actors, not in a more abstract spiritual realm, the outcomes it desires are equally concrete, and to the extent that it engages in strategic thinking, it does so in response to the configurations and dynamics of power in the real world.

Al-Qaeda, therefore, is not as utterly unconstrained from mass casualty terrorism as an Aum Shinrikyo might have been. At the same time, however, the risks of its using nuclear weapons is considerably higher than that of some other types of terrorist organization. Al-Qaeda can easily differentiate, on ethnic grounds, its target populations from those on whose behalf the organization claims to be acting. Some of its potential targets for nuclear terrorism are far from its heartlands in the Middle and Near East, and the chances of killing significant members of its core constituency in such an attack are very low. Finally, it might believe that its transnational nature would provide a level of immunity to retaliation, hence its alleged undeterrability.

Nationalist/separatist terrorists are, on the whole, less likely than a group such as Al-Qaeda to engage in nuclear terrorism. In these cases, the terrorists are acting on the claimed behalf of a clearly-defined, relatively small constituency on whom they depend not only for material support but also for whatever legitimacy they might have. They would therefore be significantly constrained against mass casualty terrorism to the extent that their constituency harboured moral or other objections, such as the fear of retaliation, to it. These groups also frequently rely on overt or covert sponsorship by states, although state support for terrorism has declined significantly in recent years with the end of the Cold War, and the attempts by states such as Libya to rehabilitate themselves in the international community. Nonetheless, if this sponsorship existed, it could be another powerful source of constraint. Finally, in these cases the claimed national homeland is, by definition, a part of the target state and the target and constituent populations either live close together or are actually comingled, which would be another check on the use of weapons of mass destruction, which are indiscriminate by their nature.

Having said that, there are cases in which these constraints, both moral and tactical, would not apply as strongly, and possibly not at all. Chechen separatists consider themselves oppressed by Russian imperialists and colonizers whose 'headquarters', Moscow, is more than a thousand kilometres away from Chechnya, and the two populations are quite distinct. Chechnya has been massively victimized in two recent wars to repress separatism, while the Chechens have never truly acceded to Russian rule and anti-Russian sentiment runs deep. This suggests that the broad Chechen population might be inured to violence and have few inhibitions against killing Russians in large numbers. There is also an alliance of some sort between those Chechen separatists

led by Shamil Basayev and Al-Qaeda, although it is hard to say whether this is a marriage of convenience or reflects true jihadi Salafist sentiments among the separatists. Whatever the case, Basayev's organization has a consistent record of taking very large numbers of hostages in incidents that have ended with correspondingly large numbers of casualties (although these have chiefly been at the hands of Russian forces).

All these factors, which would seem to point to a higher risk of nuclear terrorism, must, however, be balanced against the fact that, unlike transnational jihadists, nationalist/separatist terrorists have distinct homelands and population bases that would be vulnerable to retaliation. In the case of a Chechen nuclear attack on a Russian target, for example, nuclear retaliation against Chechnya would be a virtual certainty.

And then there are the potential wild cards in our pack: actors such as single-issue, right-wing extremist, or ideological revolutionary terrorists. Groups such as these are often small, mobile, and little-known, and might be peculiarly prone to developing apocalyptic ideologies and cult-like behaviour. With the present massive international focus on Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, there is a real risk of their developing some form of WMD capability while being almost completely ignored by security agencies. It is extremely unlikely that such small groups could obtain true nuclear weapons, but the risks of their using radiological devices could be high.

Finally, we must remember that terrorists, with the possible exception of Al-Qaeda, are not known for great tactical innovation. The traditional tools of terrorism – hostage taking, bombing, shoot and run sniper attacks, and so forth – have only recently been expanded to include the use of suicide bombers, and even that is really only a particularly unpleasant and vicious variation on an older theme. Terrorists in general probably share the same ignorance and fear of WMD prevalent in the broader population and likely see no reason to turn to unknown, possibly unpredictable, and certainly dangerous substances and techniques when the older tactics have proven to be simple, reliable, and cheap – or so, at least, we hope. ■

#### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> The most egregious known example of clandestine nuclear trade, the A.Q. Khan network, did not deal in weapons or fissile materials.

<sup>2</sup> Except, of course in some authoritarian countries, where religious groups have been persecuted as 'threats to state security' because of their perceived threat to the ruling ideology.

*The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.*

# COPING WITH CANADA'S RADICALLY CHANGED THREAT ENVIRONMENT: WORLD WMD TERRORISM AND MISSILE DEFENCE MANIA

by Dr. Douglas A. Ross

The international threat environment has changed very much for the worse because of the continuing proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons and knowledge of how to fabricate them. India and Pakistan have become full-fledged nuclear weapon states (NWS). North Korea has recently joined the 'nuclear club' – making a total of nine NWS including the Security Council's P5 and Israel. Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Japan and South Korea may not be far behind if the diffusion of nuclear capabilities is not arrested soon. The utter disarray and complete ineffectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference of May 2005 lends still further urgency to the proliferation threat facing the world community.

Almost all of the NWS also have significant biological weapon (BW) research programs as well. The Russians, Israelis and the North Koreans are probably far ahead of the others. Meanwhile, Israeli strategic planners have threatened to initiate preventive counter-proliferation strikes against Iran if it continues to move down the road towards a viable atomic weapons manufacturing capacity. Israeli preparations for suppressive strikes might also trigger either collaborative American attacks on Iran's suspected weapons development sites, or independent preemptive attacks by the US alone to try to contain Israeli salience in the Middle East crisis.

## The Leadership of the Bush Administration

The Bush Administration has been worried since January 2001 about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and is convinced that something must be done to halt and reverse the process. This conviction is quite reasonable. However, the Administration's unilateralist methods for dealing with this massive challenge have left much to be desired.

A new threat of 'WMD terrorism' has arrived. That threat is all too real and requires international cooperation and collaboration to reduce and contain the scale of the threat as soon as possible. Bush Administration policies on missile defence and Iraq have backfired, however, and impeded the development of an effective international collaborative approach to the challenge of counter-proliferation.

Most Western publics have not yet been convinced that any such WMD risk really exists. The failure to find WMDs in Iraq after the March 2003 invasion has increased public scepticism about Bush Administration fears in this regard and produced pervasive suspicion that the American government is exaggerating

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the threat environment to justify imperialist interventions across the oil-rich Middle East. Perversely, with too few allied troops in Rumsfeld's 'coalition of the willing' (many of whom have begun to withdraw from Iraq), and too few American forces deployed to be able to secure all of Saddam's weapon depots, one cannot say conclusively that Iraq's WMD capabilities were destroyed. Some residual hidden capabilities may have fallen into the hands of the insurgents. They may also have been obtained indirectly by terrorist groups through intermediaries conducting 'salvage' at abandoned CW and BW sites.

In addition to the threat posed by leaking Iraqi WMD, there is the still serious risks posed by residual uncontrolled Russian nuclear weapons and other BW materials which have been only partially contained by 'cooperative threat reduction' agreements with the United States. Russian security fears fanned by American unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty in 2002 have led to a blanket refusal by Moscow to discuss its residual inventory of 'tactical' nuclear weapons. Neither have Russian authorities been willing to discuss the legacy (and proliferation leakage risks) of the illegal decades long production of biological agents by the former Soviet government. They have been equally unwilling to discuss allegations by the late General Alexander Lebed that a large number of 'suitcase' nuclear bombs went missing in the years after the final Soviet collapse in 1991.

## Evidence for the Growing Threat of Terrorism using WMD

Several radical sub-national and transnational coalitions have sprung up within the Islamic world – groups such as Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda. The determined extremists within these organizations have shown an ever-deepening animosity towards the US and its principal allies, including Europe, Australia, and Canada.

Militant extremism across the Islamic world, coupled with the steady spread of WMD and Mass Casualty Weapons (MCW – largely BW and a few chemical weapons [CW]), has meant that the risk of the use of WMD has actually increased steadily over the past decade – not decreased. (In view of the great potential for economic damage and dislocation, one should include Radiological Dispersal Devices [RDD] into the catch-all category of WMD.)

To the threat posed by extremist Islamic groups one must add the risks posed by radical 'religious' sects such as Aum Shinrikyo and domestic extremist elements in the US and Europe, such as the various state 'militias' and white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups. All of these groups, may, sooner or later, decide that their millenarian programs can best be advanced by some sort of

WMD attack on the established institutions of society.

We now live in an age when international terrorists can practise their own brand of 'Coercive Diplomacy'. We now live in an age of 'terrorist deterrence' when these small militant groups may attempt to drive 'interventionary' forces out of their homeland (or their 'holy land') by attacking the metropolitan heartland of any offending great power who deployed those interventionist forces in the first place.

### **Little Practical Action has been Taken to Reduce the Risk**

From a Canadian security perspective, the most troubling aspect of our present predicament is the fact that the American authorities since 9/11 have failed to secure US territory against nuclear or biological terrorist attack. The continuing porous nature of American borders, coastal regions, and ports invites exploitation and terrorist WMD attacks, especially after the Anglo-American led invasion and occupation of Iraq. Any future attacks on Iran would almost certainly increase drastically the determination of radical Islamic groups to strike at the American homeland.

Canadian officials should bear in mind that in any terrorist campaign to try to drive the US out of the Middle East (or any other part of the Islamic world where radical Islamists see an affront to cultural or theological integrity), the first weapon to be detonated might not be exploded on American territory. First use might occur in the middle of a densely populated city of a country allied to the US, while coupled with the threat to detonate several more at regular intervals on American territory – unless Washington complied with terrorist demands to withdraw precipitately from Iraq and all bases in the Middle East.

The possible advantages are many: the effects of a small yield nuclear blast would be televised graphically and continuously for weeks and months across the US media. (9/11 would be reduced to almost 'footnote' status.) Enormous pressure from American public opinion would be generated in the days and weeks following such an attack, demanding that the administration comply with terrorist demands – at least until all American borders could be wholly secured (a very difficult if not impossible task). Most importantly, the American government would be under intense pressure to relent, without the simultaneous, counterbalancing demands for immediate vengeance.

Allies that should consider themselves vulnerable include Britons, Australians and Canadians – all of whom are members of an increasingly detested 'Anglosphere' across the Islamic world. And despite their increasingly highly multicultural character, their cities are inhabited by people who look 'just like Americans', but who can't actually vote for the President.

### **Activities at Different Levels of Military Effectiveness**

The threat of smuggled, 'prepositioned' nuclear devices is all too serious. It is well-known that Al-Qaeda has been diligently searching for fissile material throughout the past decade. Its

organization is highly compartmentalized so that any success in obtaining such material would not necessarily be known across the organization's international membership. The full extent of A.Q. Khan's covert nuclear technology sales program has yet to be made public. But claims have been made in the press that Al-Qaeda contacts within the Pakistani government were at high levels and involved people in the intelligence and scientific communities, as well as the military.

Meanwhile, US defence spending has been wasted, pursuing the wrong goals: intercontinental 'missile defence' against an as yet non-existent rogue state threat. A working, multi-layered ABM system is strategically unnecessary, still technologically immature, and remains vulnerable to defeat by a wide variety of simple and inexpensive counter-measures.

At best the deployment of elements of an American anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in Alaska and California is premature. At worst, it is a destructively expensive mis-allocation of increasingly scarce resources that further inhibits the urgent remedial action that is necessary to prevent what Graham Allison has called "the ultimate preventable catastrophe": nuclear terrorism.

A working multi-layered ABM system is, to be sure, an essential component for any aggressive campaign to forcefully 'drain the swamps' where international terrorists might be harboured. Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Libya and especially North Korea, all worked steadily on developing ballistic missiles of ever greater range.

From 1998 to 2003, with Pakistani 'private sector' nuclear assistance to Iran, Libya and North Korea, all three states were working on developing a first-generation nuclear deterrent. With the French, Russian and German governments willing to try to 'contain' Saddam, it was only a matter of time before the end of the sanctions regime led to a restart of Iraq's nuclear program too. The Bush Administration's hard line in favour of anti-proliferation has for the moment slowed and halted the spread of nuclear capabilities. Regime change and occupation in Baghdad has ended the risk of Iraqi nuclear capacity for a generation. With the Libyans finally 'seeing the light' and bowing out of the WMD game completely, they too are off the list of proliferation threats (perhaps to try to ensure they won't be blamed, as Graham Allison has suggested, when the first terrorist nuclear device detonates in an American city).

### **What Steps should the US and Canada take to Reduce the Risk?**

The US Administration is highly unlikely to retreat from its effort to field ABM defences, ineffectual (and 'faith-based') though they may be. While it is true that an effective multi-layered ABM system would be a counter-proliferation/intervention enabling instrument by reducing the risk to American overseas invasion forces (and American allies), the system as it stands is nothing more than a "scarecrow defence". It is therefore a major misallocation of scarce resources for the Pentagon and American

foreign policy interests.

A fully tested and effective layered missile defence system would assist interventionary expeditions to overthrow and replace WMD proliferant regimes by minimizing or eliminating completely any last gasp retaliatory missile strikes against American bases, allies or US territory itself – retaliatory strikes that would otherwise deter any and all American (or Israeli) preventive war strikes.

But even a technologically mature and effective ABM 'shield' would not be able to stop smuggled WMD devices. Only enhanced perimeter and internal security measures can cope with the most dire threat we face. A huge investment in better perimeter screening, detection, and neutralization measures is urgently needed. Added intelligence capacity (with drastically improved language capabilities as well as human intelligence [HUMINT] sources cultivated abroad) is a must; improved domestic surveillance can reduce that growing risk. But the prospects for such investment are poor. Political leadership in Ottawa seem to think that Canada is 'off the radar' of international terrorism. Better perimeter and internal security is likely to be labour intensive and expensive. And in the US there is, in addition to an ideological aversion to expanded bureaucracy, a perennial belief that the best defence is a good offence.

Finally, very little has been spent to date on 'consequence mitigation' measures to cope with possible disaster scenarios. Civil defence preparations and medical stockpiling can ease the damage that might be caused considerably, preventing the complete collapse of civil authority. A handful of prepositioned nuclear devices of between one and 10 kilotons could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans in a matter of minutes. But is that really the most likely scenario for the application of WMD terrorism? More germane to Canadians, one of them detonated in a major Canadian city in the middle of a workday could also kill many tens of thousands instantly – while setting the stage for the articulation of demands Washington would be very hard pressed to ignore.

### **The Strategic Posture of Our American Allies**

Unfortunately American investment in ABM R&D has begun to fuel a new military rivalry between the US and China, and even the US and Russia. With the unilateral American abrogation of the ABM treaty, the Russians denounced the terms of the START pacts, and regretfully signed on to the lax terms of the 'Moscow treaty' in 2002. As a result, some 2000 to 3000 more nuclear warheads are aimed at North America (and more are on the way) than would otherwise have been the case had the ABM treaty been left in place.

The central document of the US Air Force, *Vision 2020*, along with the publication of other national strategy documents in 2002, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's determination to advance the revolutionary technological transformation of the American armed forces have all raised fears that the Bush Administration's goal is a permanent military hegemony over all

other major states in the international system. The former Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, highlighted this concern for the American drive for strategic 'primacy' in an op ed essay in the *Globe and Mail* on Saturday 26 February 2005.

Canadian public opinion meanwhile remains essentially naïve, uninformed and self-absorbed to the point of narcissistic isolationism. The vision for the Canadian Forces sketched out by the new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Rick Hillier, is quite inappropriate to the grave threats we now face. Building enhanced 'force projection' capabilities for the Canadian Forces (CF), even for 'peace-keeping' and 'peace-building' activities in 'failed' and failing states, while highly desirable as a meaningful investment in global order and cooperation, is a luxury we simply cannot afford.

### **What should Canadians do to Counter this Threat?**

The Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence has done Canadians a great service by emphasizing that at least \$4 billion per year needs to be added to the CF baseline budget. A target of at least 1.5% of GDP should be established for national defence expenditures in the near term. Until the WMD proliferation challenge is effectively managed and controlled, Ottawa should be looking to raise spending towards 2% of GDP.

Mission number one should be the defence of Canadian territory and Canadian cities against WMD terrorist attack, as well as the prevention of WMD smuggling through Canada into the United States. Police and intelligence personnel in Canada tasked with counter-terrorist identification and surveillance should be enhanced quickly. In the near term ports should be brought under full and effective federal control; port and airport personnel should be screened to the highest standards; and all incoming containers and ships should be fully searched for potential WMD devices or precursor supplies (including fissile materials or biological agent seed stock). Intelligence collection overseas should be expanded urgently and language capabilities among Canada's intelligence community expanded quickly as one of the most urgent priorities.

Canadian Forces – both regular and reserve units – should be expanded quickly to at least 75,000 and a large proportion of the land forces should be within one day's drive (or one hour's flight time) of each of the country's ten largest cities – so that 'aid to the civil power' can be extended immediately in the event of a WMD terrorist act, or to assist in establishing urban quarantine zones. To achieve such rapid expansion in personnel, all overseas deployments should be reduced or ended as quickly as possible. Replacement of the 'Hercules' CC-130 fleet is urgent to permit rapid deployment of Canadian soldiers across Canada's immense territory.

Coastal defences should be improved through the deployment of rapid response teams, helicopter mobile, on both coasts and in the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence region, who can seize and

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# REALITY AND THE WAR ON TERROR

by Sunil Ram

The terrorists that are attacking the West and what their ideologies represent are not those of the Cold War era. The terror campaigns of the likes of "Carlos the Jackal" and Abu Nidal were political in nature, following ideological paths that most in the West could comprehend. It was easy to understand the motivation of such radical leftist movements as the Red Army Faction in Germany or the more ethno-nationalist movements like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. Today, however, the West faces one enemy who, for various self-prescribed reasons, appears bent on destroying everything the West stands for. From a Western perspective, the actions of people like Ramzi Yousef and Osama bin Laden seem like madness run amok, but the past gives us a window into their present logic.

The present scope of fundamentalist terrorist activities can be traced back to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Thousands of young non-Afghani Muslim men went to fight alongside the mujahadin fighters in Afghanistan, where they became pawns of the West in the larger game of the Cold War. As Victor Marchetti, a former senior CIA official observed, "Afghanistan was a golden opportunity for the weakening of the Evil Empire...people were going to come there and fight against the Soviets."

The CIA helped to finance and support the mujahadin war against the Soviets, and in the process supported everyone and anyone who was against the Soviet Union, regardless of their political or ideological motivations. In a classic case of "blow-back,"<sup>1</sup> once the war was over, these "holy warriors" scattered across the world; they left Afghanistan filled with a religious fervor and the belief that they could destroy anything and anyone who opposed their ideal of a fundamentalist Islamic world. The West, as epitomized by America and its support of Israel, became the focus of their hate. The CIA simply chose to disregard the holy warriors it had helped create – warriors who would subsequently go on to create their own Jihad against the West.

One fact that is most important about these new terrorists is their philosophy and the logic behind their demands. There are some overriding factors that these modern terrorist groups have in common, ones that are fundamentally different from the stereotypical Arab terrorist movements of the Cold War era. These differences provide an explanation of why the West ignored obvious warning signs of the radical religious terrorism that has been unleashed on the world.

The first difference is that leaders like bin Laden have a global reach and popularity far surpassing any of their predecessors. Part of the reason is that he and his fellow leaders have been

able to create a politico-philosophical ideology that goes far beyond the basic hatred of Israel and which transcends the old Arab-Israeli conflict paradigm. He has developed an all-inclusive perspective that appeals to a much wider radical element within the larger global Muslim community. Aiding this global appeal has been the dramatic advancement and the availability of communications technology in the late twentieth century. Today, any statement or message by bin Laden is instantly transmitted and translated around the world to his detractors as well as his followers.

In the immediate wake of 9/11, one sentence from a statement made by Osama bin Laden on al-Jazeera on October 7, 2001 is telling. Osama bin Laden stated "Hypocrisy stood behind the leader of global idolatry, behind the Hubal of the age – namely, America and its supporters." To the average person who has limited knowledge of Islam and the history of the Arab world, this sounds like pseudo-religious gibberish. In fact, it is not; much of bin Laden's rambles, when placed in context of Arab and Islamic history, give a very clear sense of what he means and his intention. When we breakdown his statement, the reference to global idolatry and Hubal refers to the statue that stood inside the Kaaba ("cube")<sup>2</sup> in Mecca. Hubal was the most powerful of the pagan gods that the Arabs worshiped prior to Mohammed bringing them the 'true' word of the Koran. The Kaaba today is a symbol of Islamic purity. He is therefore referring to America, the leader of the Western world, as the focus of anti-Islamic thought vis-à-vis idolatry and implies that the US military presence in Saudi Arabia is polluting the purity of the Kaaba – thus America is tainting all of Islam. It is important to understand that the issue of Arabia being holy soil is bin Laden's interpretation; it is not a legitimate theological issue in mainstream Islam.

The logic behind the statement is grounded in early Islamic history, specifically when the nascent Muslim community fled to Medina after being driven out of Mecca by those who worshiped the pagan gods of Arabia. This new politico-religious community, or *umma*, then returned to Mecca to defeat their enemies. Hubal was destroyed and Islam began to spread around the world as the one 'true' religion. So the analogy is that when America and by default the Western world are destroyed, then Islam will again be free to become the one 'true' religion throughout the world.

In the larger context of radical Islamic thought, which has little bearing on what is in the Koran, the secular West is seen as Satan – groups like Al-Qaeda believe that they are fighting a war to save the *umma* from destruction by the allies of Satan.

Amongst this minority group of radical Islam, the dominant ideological tradition is *Salafiyah*, which finds its origins in the term *Dawat-us-Salafiyah*, meaning, "call of those who preceded us." This harkens back to the early followers of Mohammed. The simple logic of the ideology is about returning to the origins of

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Islam and the restoration of traditional beliefs and practices. It is a very narrow perspective of Islam, but it appeals to certain elements amongst the impoverished *umma* who have not shared in the wealth of their leaders or nations. Therefore, the movement towards secularism, democracy and capitalism are all seen as an evil being spread by the Christian West. As Michael Doran succinctly put it, "the entire extremist Salafiyya[h] see Western civilization, in all periods and in all guises, as innately hostile to Muslims and to Islam itself." It is from those who subscribe to the most extreme interpretations of *Salafiyyah* that groups like Al-Qaeda draw their recruits. It is the downtrodden and forgotten that have become the foot soldiers of radical Islam. Mohamed Heikal, the renown Arab journalist and writer, made a prophetic comment in the early 1990s, when he wrote; "the frustration and hopelessness of millions of unemployed people in the vast twilight belts around Arab cities was made worse by their awareness of the wealth of the oil-producing states. The cities can only be a time-bomb for the future unless something is done to address this anger." It is from the cities and the educated Arab/Islamic middle class that many recruits of radical Islam are drawn from. Many of the leaders of these radical groups are well educated and some, like bin Laden, come from wealthy backgrounds. It is their bending of Koranic philosophy that has warped *Salafiyyah* in the last fifty to sixty years into a cult of hate.

Overall western analysts, and more specifically American ones, have been unable to clearly understand the Middle East or the Arab mind in a non-Western mindset. This problem becomes amplified when dealing with the complexities of Islamic religious and philosophical thought. There has in turn been a massive failure by US and other Western intelligence services to fully comprehend the type of enemy they are facing, which has led to a set of policies that are not addressing the real initiatives that are required to defeat an almost implacable enemy.

### **What the West Needs to Do to Stop Them**

The War on Terror, like the War on Drugs, is a sham that, because of the way it is being conducted in the early twenty-first century, practically lends itself to failure. It represents an unwinnable brushfire war as things stand. In his address to Congress of September 20, 2001 President Bush made it clear how America intended to fight this new war:

Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.

The problem with this plan is that the five following factors must come into play at the same time for the War on Terror to even have the slightest hope of success:

(1) *Full cooperation between global intelligence agencies* – something that is unlikely to happen given that the nature of national intelligence agencies does not garner open or full mutual support and aid. The inability of America security and intelligence agencies to work together to stop the events of 9/11 does not bode well for international cooperation in regards to the larger global War on Terror. The gathering of information on people and the arbitrary detention of suspects has become a major civil-rights issue in countries like Canada, Britain and the US. Though it is very important that government not abuse our civil rights, from the perspective of intelligence gathering, civil rights challenges to the new draconian laws imposed in countries like Canada and the US create an impediment to intelligence gathering and cause roadblocks to the sharing of information. Moreover, the 2004 and 2005 purges of the various US intelligence agencies of persons who do not tow the line of the Bush Doctrine have left these agencies with political 'yes' men, thus making them useless for balanced analysis.

(2) *Denial of safe territory for the terrorists* – places such as Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan etc. must all be eliminated as safe havens for training and support of these groups. However, if Afghanistan and Pakistan are any indication of what is happening, it is clear that even with an occupying army and a government that is willing (at some level anyway) to support the US agenda, there is still ample territory that cannot be easily controlled. The Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan is a clear example of this. It is a lawless region that is controlled by tribal chieftains and petty warlords, and a place where the central government has little to no influence or control. It is likely from this region that Osama Bin Laden and the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban operates.

The US also needs to stop supporting regimes like those of General Musharaf in Pakistan. Let us not forget that he came to power in a military coup, and it is his secret service, the ISI, that offered substantial support to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. You cannot make deals with corrupt regimes in order to achieve short-term goals in a long-term war. This perverts the objective of the war from its inception, and will inevitably lead to "blowback" in the future. In the case of Pakistan, this has been reflected in two ways. First the obvious opposition to Musharaf's policies, which has been reflected in the number of assassination attempts against him, may lead to the collapse of his regime which could result in regional anarchy. And secondly, the continued support by Pakistan for terrorists and insurgents operating in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir in India. The US, while conducting its War on Terror, cannot support a regime that is a terrorist state without compromising its own security and integrity.

(3) *Denial of Funds* – blocking of all transactions that fund these groups. Again highly unlikely due to the international drug trade

(a war the US has already lost), the support of organized crime, and the nature of money transfers within the global Islamic community from both private and government sources. This is again going to be hard, given the level of assistance provided through countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran. One argument that also compromises the US position for this type of state sponsored support is America's assistance to Israel. Many Islamic states see their support for "terrorists" in exactly the same light as America's unflagging support of Israel and its war against terrorism – therefore it is somewhat hypocritical from their perspective to stop supporting terrorist groups while America continues to support Israel.

(4) *Stopping of all arms sales* – again something that is not happening. There are too many arms from the former Soviet Bloc states on the open and black-market. Plus, there is limited evidence that the West has been able to interdict arms supplies to the terrorists. The Iraqi experience has shown that Saddam's regime had stockpiled massive amounts of arms for an insurgency campaign, which means the various factions fighting against the coalition forces have ample time to re-supply from other sources.

(5) *Resolving the fundamental social and political inequities of the Middle East and other key Islamic regions* – in other words, stopping grass roots support for such groups as Al-Qaeda and winning the proverbial "hearts and minds" of the Islamic world. Again something that is not happening as we saw the US promoting corrupt leaders like Chalabi in Iraq, while at the same time using heavy handed tactics against the civilian population. Ultimately, the Arab-Israeli conflict must be resolved to give moderate Muslims and Arabs the political ammunition to defeat radical Islam in their own backyards.

So in short, if all the above criteria are not fulfilled, there is effectively no hope in the foreseeable future for the War on Terror to be resolved. Britain fought in Ireland for thirty years, but did not win. The Israelis have been fighting for nearly 55 years, and they still cannot stop terrorism. Therefore, it is imperative that the five previous points be taken in context of the nature of present forms of radical Islam discussed in the first part of this article. Otherwise the West will over time simply lose its ability to effectively combat this type of fanaticism, which in a worse case scenario could lead to the collapse of the Western social system or cause the Western world to isolate itself from the chaos created by radical Islam. ■

#### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Blowback – Intelligence jargon meaning the unexpected and negative impact(s) of covert overseas operations in your home territory.

<sup>2</sup> The ancient stone building supposedly built by Ishmael and Abraham. Today it has been incorporated into the Great Mosque in Mecca and is seen with a massive black cloth cover. The existing Kaaba was built in 1626.

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Introducing substantially new capabilities and force structure is a 20-year endeavour.

The announced and funded elements of the Canadian Forces *Strategic Capabilities Investment Plan (SCIP)* should achieve initial operational capability by 2020. But elements that are not yet funded are unlikely to be realized by then. It is significant that the majority of these unfunded strategic capabilities are symmetrical warfare equipments such as jet fighters, ships, guns and tanks.

Restoring heavier capabilities such as these would take another twenty years, i.e. to 2040. Canada's leadership is betting that an emphasis on medium weight and Special Forces will be appropriate until the middle of the next century, and that our nation will not be involved in intensive combat during that period. I think that this level of risk is too high for my great-grandchildren.

At this stage of world history Canada must maintain a balanced capability across the five services: navy, army, air, joint and special. In this the Year of the Veteran it would be wise to put their expensive lessons of recent decades at the forefront of defence planning, and honour our veterans by safeguarding future generations of young Canadians through the development of a military force that is ready for whatever strategic framework might arise. ■

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investigate any and all ships of concern. The committee's recommendations for requiring transponders and mandatory early reporting of ship arrivals is only too appropriate.

Stockpiles of emergency medical supplies including antibiotics, anti-viral drugs, etc. as well as emergency field hospitals should be established on a far greater scale near all major cities. Consequence mitigation spending should be increased urgently. Finally, research into new methods and technologies for radioactive and biological decontamination of urban environments should be accelerated. ■

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