



SITREP

A PUBLICATION OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE



THE THREAT OF WMD PROLIFERATION

The People's Liberation Army, with its DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), on parade at Tiananmen Square in 1999.

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FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

The previous issue of *SITREP* (Vol. 65, No. 4, July/August 2005) began with an article by Col (Retd) Howard Marsh, reprinted from *On Track*, the flagship publication of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) in Ottawa. This article boldly questioned whether the Canadian Defence Policy Statement (DPS) constituted an appropriate policy framework in the current security environment.

We were doubly pleased when Mr. Peter Gizewski, a Defence Scientist/Strategic Analyst for the Department of National Defence, offered to write a response to Col Marsh's article. As a past speaker for an RCMI Defence Studies Committee Roundtable, and a contributor of an excellent *Otter Paper* based on that event, we are already well acquainted with Mr. Gizewski's insightful and informative analysis, and gladly took him up on his offer.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Gizewski's strengths are more than evident in his article, titled "Defence for the Future: A Response to Col Marsh," in which he argues on the merits of the DPS as a strategic framework for the Canadian Forces (CF).

A key part of this strategic framework is the elusive concept of the "revolution in military affairs," more recently known as "transformation," which the CF – following our American and other Western allies – appears intent on pursuing. To shed some light on this idea, we are fortunate to have an article by Mr. Robin Lobb, an independent analyst and consultant on strategic issues, which examines transformation from one particular issue area, namely "network-enabled operations" or NEOps. In "Network-Enabled Operations and the Canadian Forces: The 'Evolution' in Military Affairs," Mr. Lobb offers his assessment on the benefits and costs of adopting NEOps for the Canadian Forces.

The CF are not alone in examining the potential for military transformation and network-enabled operations. International

concern, for example, has steadily grown over the Chinese military's long-standing interest in such modernization. We are therefore very fortunate to have Dr. Marc Lanteigne, a recognized expert in Asian security studies at McGill University, examine the evolution of Chinese military and strategic doctrine, in his article "A Question of Configuration and Designation: The People's Liberation Army's Paths to Reform."

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is intimately connected to the concept of transformation, as a threat that the military must 'transform' in order to counter, or – perhaps more convincingly – as the ultimate example of the revolution in military affairs.

We conclude this issue with two articles that examine the dangers associated with the most deadly and the most worrisome type of WMD – namely, the threat posed by nuclear weapons. The first article, titled "Tactical Nukes: Forgotten Relics of the Cold War," examines the dangers posed by the tactical nuclear weapons of both the United States and Russia. It is written by Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the US Arms Control Association in Washington D.C.

The second article is an especially timely one, given the recent conclusion of the failed Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. It is written by noted proliferation expert and Project Ploughshares co-founder Ernie Regehr, and is titled "From Abolition to Retention? The Morning After the Failed NPT Review Conference."

This issue features a number of new and very prominent authors, and we would like to thank them all for their excellent contributions. ■

Sincerely,

David S. McDonough
Editor of *SITREP*



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DEFENCE FOR THE FUTURE: A RESPONSE TO COLONEL HOWARD MARSH

by Peter Gizewski

Response to "Defence Policy Statement 2005: A Defence Policy for the 1990s?" by Colonel Howard Marsh from SITREP, Vol. 65 No. 4 (July-August 2005), pp. 3-4, 16.

Release of the Canadian government's Defence Policy Statement (DPS) has generated considerable speculation and comment in recent months. For some, the DPS marks a bold and welcome new vision – one likely to give Canada and the Canadian Forces (CF) a renewed sense of purpose and pride, as well as high profile and prestige on the international front. Yet others contend that it amounts to an over-ambitious programme that will be difficult to implement, costly to maintain and ultimately, unreachable.

Some even express the concern that pursuit of the DPS could well leave Canada ill-prepared to meet the true security challenges of the future.

In a recent article reproduced in *SITREP*, Colonel (ret'd.) Howard Marsh boldly asserts this view – arguing in effect that the DPS's strong emphasis on developing a force geared primarily to asymmetric conflict and to addressing the problems and challenges arising from failed and failing states is misguided at best and dangerous at worst.

Such a course is based primarily on the conditions of the near past and present. Yet for Marsh, this is but a transitory phase, eventually to be replaced by a return of more traditional state on state conflict and "more virulent symmetrical war fighting" in coming decades. And given the long lead times required to ensure procurement of adequate equipment, the time to prepare for such a world is today. By failing to think sufficiently ahead, the DPS in effect risks development of the wrong force, at the wrong time, for the wrong kind of war.

Accordingly, Canada must abandon its present course and prepare for wars between core nations – building "robust tactical units" capable of effectively functioning in "major power conflict." Failure to do so today will leave Canada and the CF badly marginalized, if not irrelevant, in the decades ahead.

Predicting the Future Based on the Past

Such contentions deserve careful consideration. Given the high degree of uncertainty currently attending the international system and the numerous trends operating within it prediction of the future is difficult at best. As such, a future featuring a return of interstate conflict and symmetric war cannot

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fully be ruled out. And historically long lags in procurement *do* suggest that planning for the future must take place sooner as opposed to later.

Yet this in and of itself does not establish that the future Marsh sees is any more plausible than that upon which the DPS is primarily based. Nor, for that matter, does Marsh offer any arguments that are sufficiently compelling to lead us to think otherwise.

In fact, much – if not all – of his case is grounded in a judgement that past Canadian governments have typically performed poorly in assessing and responding to the demands of the security environment. Outlining no less than six out of seven periods in which previous administrations have produced defence policies that were inappropriate to existing circumstances, Marsh observes that such a record hardly bodes well for the future. In fact, it strongly suggests the likelihood that past mistakes will once again, be repeated. As Marsh himself notes "the system it seems, tends to get it wrong."

Yet this is hardly sufficient to indict the course advocated in the DPS.

On the one hand, Marsh's attempt to judge present policy based on the mistakes of past is problematic at best. This is particularly so in light of the fact that, while Marsh points to the system as the culprit, an analysis of why the system itself fails is not offered. As such, no logical connection between the mistakes of past and the present is established.

Yet even if it were – its ability to convince fully would remain suspect. The effectiveness of past practice is clearly open to interpretation. For instance, notwithstanding the problems encountered by the CF over the past decade, some contend that the 1994 *White Paper* was nevertheless relatively accurate both in its characterization of the world and in its prescriptions regarding the approach that best suited Canada in meeting its challenges. And while practice may have fallen short of policy prescription, most actions taken by the forces *did* offer reasonable value for the money and resources spent.¹ Put simply, the degree to which governments "get it wrong" – or *right* for that matter – is often viewed as a matter of degree. Consequently, it is a weak reed upon which to base claims about the soundness of future policy.

As for why, precisely, we should expect a reassertion of inter-state conflict as the dominant form of struggle in the future, Marsh offers even less. In fact, rather than laying out a case for this position based on searching analysis of past history and/or future trends, all that is offered is proof by assertion. To quote Marsh himself, "*I believe* that now is the time to prepare for wars amongst 'core' nations" (emphasis added). Yet aside from this

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NETWORK-ENABLED OPERATIONS AND THE CANADIAN FORCES: THE 'EVOLUTION' IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

by Robin Lobb

Today's threat environment is complex, multifaceted and multidimensional. Worldwide there are regions of political turbulence with rapidly shifting matrices of conflict and cooperation. In cases of armed conflict, the warriors may not be national forces, and their methods of warfare may be neither conventional nor symmetrical. Nevertheless, for the Canadian Forces (CF) the response has always been the same – do what you can with what you've got.

Recent decades have seen the "what you've got" part of the equation transform radically, as reflected in the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), but even this "revolution" has struggled in an effort to keep apace of the speed of change in the Information Age. Not surprisingly, defence policy makers – including those in Canada – are considering new means to meet emerging threats, and these new means include the development of "net-enabled operations" (NEOs).

Definition

NEOs is the military response to the challenges and the opportunities created by the Information Age. At the heart of it is the idea of networking, and the military advantages that the effective integration of information systems (both technological and human) can produce through the creation and exploitation of information. By linking knowledgeable entities in a battle space, forces will be more capable of gaining information superiority and ultimately, greater military effectiveness.

The concept relies heavily on an appropriate integration of both technological and human capital. It requires immense commitments to technologies for networking, info storage and info distribution. But equally, it requires possession of a range of human cognitive and behavioural skills, as well as organizational arrangements capable of ensuring that the information gained through the exploitation of enhanced technologies can be effectively harnessed to support policy aims and objectives.

Such networking would create the ability to achieve shared and "near real-time" situational awareness (SA). Accordingly, effects in the battle space would be better synchronized; speed of command would be increased; and the lethality, survivability and responsiveness of forces would improve significantly. The result would be a capacity to conduct a more precise, agile style of maneuver warfare capable of achieving near-continuous action. Not only would there be an increase in the capacity to more effec-

tively and efficiently destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, but ultimately the result would be the ability to engage in actions capable of breaking an adversary's will while leaving the majority of his forces intact.

In fact, by offering a more efficient means for forces to affect the behaviour of intended targets, NEOs would provide an important "enabler" for conducting Effects Based Operations (EBOs), which can be defined as coordinated sets of actions aimed at shaping the behaviour of intended targets (e.g. friends, allies, neutrals and foes in peace, crisis and war).

Practice: Past and Present

Networking has always been important in military affairs. Historically, there are numerous examples of networking including, perhaps most notably, the employment of powerful phalanxes by ancient generals. Today, NEOs is exemplified by the advanced communications technologies that allow near-real time information exchange among coalition forces.

Recent years have seen the US and the UK become examples of armed forces that are becoming fully involved in this networking capability – investing in and exploiting the advances that technology can provide. Other countries are exploring these emerging technologies as well. Canada is one nation that is reviewing the relative advantages of employing networking notions to their operations. Even adversaries such as Al Qaeda are focusing on the use of net-technologies and net-organized structures to outmaneuver opponents of superior might.

But to what degree is NEOs useful or even viable? Do any examples exist of this futuristic tech-optimal warrior or warcraft?

In terms of real applied examples, it was Operation Iraqi Freedom that showed NEOs' most compelling proof, according to Brigadier General Dennis Moran (then CENTCOM J6), "such technology allowed the rapid sharing of information at all levels of command as well as rapid movement of intelligence to both analytical decision-makers and shooters." The defeat of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan showed that the ability to pass information gathered by Predator and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to ground commanders enabled near-real-time battlefield SA. This greatly facilitated more rapid identification and destruction of time sensitive targets.

Canadian Interest: Pros and Cons

Given the above, Canadian interest in NEOs is hardly surprising. In fact, recognition of the complex and multi-faceted nature of the evolving security environment, along with the need

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for a new more integrated and coordinated approach to it, is clearly articulated in the Canadian Government's recent Defence Policy Statement (DPS). Indeed the language and tone of the DPS is clearly suggestive of the importance of a more networked approach to security.

So too are recent developments in the CF. Calls for a more integrated approach are evident in all three CF environments. For example, the Canadian Army is pursuing every avenue available in an effort to better network its assets. Its Force Employment Concept gives the highest regard to the value of NEOps principles.

Still, while the overall value of technological advances and networking are not in question, limits and risks are also evident. For instance, budgetary obstacles represent an important reason for trepidation in adopting NEOps. This is specifically connected to the need for data sharing with other forces and other groups, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs). After all, there is the additional cost of training – this is necessary for personnel to contend with this sort of info sharing, and for command to better utilize a networked force. Worse still, info collection, access and sharing can run into a whole host of other problems, including info overload, info misuse, and info micromanagement.

Are any of the suggested combat advantages a sure thing? No. Can enemies adapt? Yes. What work has been done on what enemies can do to counter NEOps? Presently, enemies have measures for compensating for asymmetry in tech assets. Worse still is the potential vulnerabilities associated with networking – a networked force would be easier to infect with disinformation and, perhaps, easier to disrupt by focusing on a key network node. All of these concerns are serious enough to be "sale stoppers" on NEOps.

These are some of the issues that could dissuade our decision makers from adopting NEOps. However, it would also be imprudent to ignore the value of such a capability. One of the more obvious ones is the time sensitive nature of a networking capability – if we don't adopt it now, we may miss a chance or a preferred time to have adopted it.

Perhaps more importantly, we have strong alliances with countries that are going to be emphasizing this emerging technology, and going through the risks of developing it. Interoperability is therefore very critical, if we are to participate as equal partners in future missions and share in the collected information. The consequences for not emphasizing this emerging capability are therefore very clear. We would remain unconnected to our allies, and be sending out very clear signals of our unwillingness and inability to keep up militarily, or to help out on specific missions. Our very image among our allies would be tarnished.



DND Combat Camera: ISD00-1376a

The Coyote Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV), pictured above, may serve as an important surveillance platform for the CF's move towards 'network-enabled operations.'

Fortunately, Canada does enjoy a significant advantage compared to other countries. With a small and smart force, adopting NEOps represents a smaller risk and has a higher likelihood of success. Our new recruits, it should also be pointed out, are of a stock better acquainted with both using technology and working in technology-based organizations. Other advantages include our Army's "mission command" philosophy and its disciplined training system, both of which are far along what would be required for establishing some of the basics needed for moving into NEOps. Our forces have intrinsically valuable qualities that lend well to net-centric warfare – they're already part way along to becoming net-centric warriors as envisioned in NEOps.

Toward a Strategy: The Evolutionary Approach

Clearly, a cautious approach is required, both to ensure that risks are minimized as best as can be and to win the 'buy-in' of those most reticent. Ultimately, the CF must build on its existing strengths (i.e. solid training, cohesiveness of small force, doctrine of mission command) needed for a networked force. And acquisitions of networking technology must proceed with a view to extending the existing assets and their uses whenever possible.

It is true that some networking capabilities for conventional high-intensity symmetrical conflict may be used for a number of different mission types outside of that scope, such as asymmetrical warfare, military operations other than war (MOOTW) or contingencies like stabilization and peacekeeping operations, reconstruction efforts and humanitarian aid. However, basic differences point to caution – where one mission requires prompt identification and elimination of the enemy, the other requires close contact with enemy forces and indigenous populations. The bottom line is this: any apparent commonalities between the two uses requires evidence of shared applicability – meaning the CF cannot make

assumptions about what appears to be dual use NEOps and must be guarded against such wishful thinking.

Accordingly, the Canadian Forces need to look at those network capabilities best suited for its likely missions – international peace support ops, humanitarian interventions, and domestic ops. The CF must also investigate the net practices of other armies, such as Germany, France, and Holland, which *may* be better suited to the CF's circumstances than the militaries of either the US or the UK.

Though the expected implementation will be long term, there are some short-term measures to carry out. For human resources – improve the selection and subsequent education and training to reflect the chosen qualities and skills needed for networking. This includes not simply the ability to work with information technology, but to also think and act in an environment that is networked, complex and uncertain. This would allow for better anticipation, reaction, and adaptation – and lead to the development of these assets force-wide.

Finally, the investigation of potential counters to net-enabled capabilities must accompany their development and acquisition. This entails looking at historical cases of strategies and tactics of forces faced with technologically superior adversaries, creating multidisciplinary red teams – cells charged with brainstorming counters – and including this analysis in wargames that involve net-enabled forces. This may serve to identify potential vulnerabilities and also to lead to better return on investment for your force in the field.

Continued from page 3

stated belief, little is provided to support it.

Clearly, one would have hoped for more – particularly in light of the fact that this claim represents the basis for much of the author's indictment of the governments DPS.

A Future of Inter-State War: Would the CF Really be Irrelevant?

Still, the world that Marsh outlines could well come to pass. Possibilities are numerous, and could include: Sino-US tensions over Taiwan, conflict involving a reinvigorated Russia seeking a renewal of past status, and a regional war on the Indian subcontinent which threatens to spread further afield.

Yet even in this event, Marsh's concerns over the DPS and the direction it sets for Canadian defence policy seem overdrawn.

In fact, even if Canada *were* to prepare more fully for such conflicts, its resulting force and its military contribution would still be relatively minor in comparison to the overall level of force that would have to be brought to bear to resolve such disputes.

Furthermore, in a world in which big (i.e. inter-state) wars occur more frequently, it is likely that problems of asymmetric conflict, failed states and humanitarian crises would continue to exist. Indeed, such challenges could well arise out of the very

Conclusion

In short, a gradual, "evolutionary" adoption of NEOps is required, and one that plays to existing strengths and to human factors rather than simply the technological aspects. It must be guided by expected roles and missions. Only in this way can risks be minimized and the benefits of a NEOp'd approach emerge.

Notwithstanding the numerous positive considerations for NEOps, the CF cannot proceed on a course that involves extensive change and investment without a strategy. So we do what we can with what we've got. Right now that means we prepare a plan – a careful and paced one. This plan needs to account for all of our assets, constraints and mission objectives. And it must be designed to progress at an evolutionary pace. This does not necessarily mean slowly, but it does mean that we engage in a process that ensures that the choices we make best fit our unique demands. ■

The author would like to thank Lieutenant Matt Liness, who – for a perspective of where the rubber meets the road – proved a conscientious and insightful voice.

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

wars that analysts such as Marsh contend will be coming. As such, capabilities aimed at meeting the demands of asymmetric conflict and stabilization would retain considerable utility. More to the point, opportunities for timely, effective and internationally relevant military contributions would continue to exist – both for Canada generally and the CF in particular.

Conclusion

In fact, when all is said done, most of Marsh's contentions are difficult to sustain. While the world he posits may well be possible, he offers little that indicates that it is probable. His indictment of past Canadian defence policy is problematic. And his critique of current policy is weak.

Even if a future world *is* characterized by the rise in symmetric conflict that Marsh foresees, it will be far more complex than he lets on. In such a world, it is likely that a multitude of challenges will be present. And, this is apt to ensure that the CF will be more relevant and useful than Marsh suggests. ■

Notes:

1. See for instance, Joel Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy," *Policy Matters*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June, 2004).

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"A QUESTION OF CONFIGURATION AND DESIGNATION:" THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY'S PATHS TO REFORM

by Dr. Marc Lanteigne

Although the global war on terror continues to dominate current military study, the potential for great power military rivalry in the twenty-first century remains an important concern. Much debate in this area has focussed on China, a country which has risen politically and economically over the past twenty years, simultaneously endeavouring to channel its growth into military modernisation befitting a great power. Since its inception, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has frequently undergone periods of reform, not only modernising its resources but also its strategic thinking, a process which continues today.

The Maoist-era doctrine of "people's war," which originated during the Chinese civil war and involved the tactics of active defence (i.e. luring an enemy in deep and focussing on superior numbers to assure victory) was a staple of Chinese military thinking and considered largely unassailable for the duration of Mao's regime. Although the people's war policy was considered politically sacrosanct until the death of Mao in 1976, in reality the PLA had begun the process of moving away from the forces-centric armed forces in favour of developing a military which could better address conflict under modern conditions, well before his passing. A major reason was that the people's war doctrine further exacerbated the greatest weakness in the Chinese military throughout the twentieth century, namely power projection deficiencies.

In examining Chinese strategy during this time, the PLA is seen to have at best a mixed record of out-of-theatre operations. Chinese forces were instrumental in reversing the gains of United Nations-backed forces during the Korean War. However, Beijing's self-described "self-defence counterattack" against Vietnam in December 1979, designed to punish Hanoi for unseating the China-allied Pol Pot regime months earlier, was widely viewed as the PLA's greatest military fiasco, contributing greatly to attempts by Deng Xiaoping and his successors to move away from people's war and towards military modernisation. This process accelerated with the demise of the Cold War as well as the First Gulf War in 1991, which illustrated for China the advantages of "information warfare".

Nevertheless, even with increased military budgets and research and development, along with purchases and joint development programs with Russia, much of the Chinese military, especially the naval and air force sectors, remains well behind Western levels of sophistication and modernisation. Part of the reason for this is the PLA's still greatly underdeveloped R&D

capabilities which have hampered innovation, leaving China's military structure partially dependent upon transfer agreements from Moscow and elsewhere. As well, despite regular budgetary increases to the PLA since the late 1990s, China's overall defence budget remains small, not only compared to that of the United States but also to other great and medium powers. In March 2005, Beijing announced a 12.6% increase in the Chinese military budget to RMB247.7 billion (about US\$29.9 billion), the latest in a steady procession of annual increases. Even taking into account dual-use projects and undeclared revenue, this is still a low figure when compared with annual American military spending. Thus, the idea of a Cold War-style arms race between the United States and China is unlikely despite Chinese advances; the playing field remains significantly uneven.

The modern PLA has attempted to address its power-projection deficiencies in two ways. First, the military has accelerated its programs of modernisation both in conventional and in nuclear weapons development. This has meant a further downsizing of ground forces (although active PLA personnel still total about 2.26 million persons) and a greater emphasis on high-technology and communication, as well as the purchase and development of longer-range air- and sea-based elements. Looking at naval forces, China has made advances in submarine and destroyer deployment as well as air support. Yet the PLA Navy (PLAN) still lacks an aircraft carrier and has only begun the process of developing blue-water capabilities. Looking over at China's "Second Artillery" (missile forces), the PLA has more than thirty intercontinental ballistic missiles with new longer-range models expected to be deployed over the next decade. China has developed its missile capabilities in the name of maintaining a "*force de frappe*," a deterrent which relies on limited rather than overwhelming force.

Second, from a policy viewpoint the Chinese armed forces have been adjusting their thinking to examine the areas of "asymmetrical" conflict, namely the seeking out of weak points in a potential opponent which would be especially vulnerable to attack; in other words, using a pin in place of a hammer. This strategy would prevent the development of a costly arms race which could potentially damage China's economic growth and the substantial diplomatic gains it has made over the past decade. Nevertheless, this strategy has raised alarms in the United States. For example, the 2005 *Report to the US Congress on Chinese Military Power* made note of the PLA development of "assassin's mace" (*sha shou jian*) initiatives, designed to examine methods of unbalanced combat against a stronger rival.¹ A recent article in an American journal also suggested that Beijing is committed to developing asymmetric naval power with an eye to eroding the American military presence in the Pacific.²

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Despite these concerns about possible future advances in PLA power projection, its development since the 1990s has been undertaken with great conservatism, stressing defence of domestic interests rather than an expansion of Chinese power, a product in part of China's desire to make use of an appreciated "peace dividend" since the Cold War's end. Although Beijing has lingering territorial disputes to address, including a disputed border with India and challenged maritime claims in the South China Sea, China's periphery is the most stable it has been in decades, and Beijing's current strategic and foreign policies reflect a wish to perpetuate this situation in order to better focus on domestic-level economic and political development.

The Role of the New Security Concept

Related to the idea of China's strategic conservatism has been Beijing's recent drafting of the "New Security Concept" (NSC). This new thinking on security and cooperation stemmed from Chinese displeasure at the methods employed by other great powers, particularly those in the West, to assure their security since the end of the Cold War. For example, a 1997 editorial in the *Beijing Review* noted that security practices among states often saw the creation of alliances designed to counter a mutual enemy, large powers protecting smaller ones, and weaker states aligning with stronger ones. However, the piece argued that at the close of the twentieth century, state security interests had become so intertwined that it was necessary to approach the ideas of security and cooperation from a different, more community-based standpoint.³ The NSC as a policy can be considered one result of that call for new thinking on China's strategic priorities.

The NSC draws heavily on the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) classical "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," which stresses equality and non-discrimination, mutual trust and benefits and the non-interference in states' sovereign affairs.⁴ The Five Principles have their origins in Chinese diplomacy in the 1950s talks which sought to promote peaceful interaction between states with different social systems by employing methods that discouraged alliance or bloc mindsets which, Beijing argued, often led to mistrust and conflict. The Five Principles (mutual respect for sovereignty and territory, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence), were also revered by China for their flexibility and resiliency, since they were adaptable to both Cold War and post-Cold War strategic interactions. Indeed, the Five Principles experienced a renaissance in China during the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of concerns over growing US-led unipolarity and efforts led by the United States and the West towards humanitarian intervention, exemplified tacitly by the first Gulf War as well as interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti during the 1990s.

China's response to this global trend was that humanitarian intervention had the potential to damage international law, as well as give a green light to strong countries wishing to impose their



The DF-15 missile – one of the many types of short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) currently aimed at Taiwan.

views on weaker ones. Although Beijing's stance on intervention has softened since the end of that decade, as evidenced by China's positive responses to the United Nations' operations in East Timor (now Timor Leste) in 1999, the country continues to take a very cautious, "Westphalian" approach to interference in domestic affairs of other states and Beijing has since specified that certain conditions are required, in particular, UN approval, for "proper" intervention to take place. One major question remaining is whether the current 'war on terrorism' will continue to mitigate Beijing's previously-rigid stance towards the observance of state sovereignty. As a result of China's own terrorism challenges, its government's differentiation between "good" and "bad" intervention will likely continue to grow more distinct.

Other components of the NSC were derived from more recent polices, including then-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's overview of China's foreign policy priorities in the early 1990s, as well as Beijing's policies of developing "strategic partnerships" with select states, including Russia, the United States, the EU,

Pakistan, India, Canada and others during that decade. However, what has distinguished this new doctrine, as one author noted, is that unlike previous strategic ideologies which aligned China against perceived enemy forces, especially imperialism and later hegemonism, the NSC does not identify specific international actors as current or potential adversaries but rather embraces the idea of *bu shu di* ("do not seek an enemy"). As well, China has advocated increasing political, economic and technological cooperation as a further means of strengthening ties between states, as opposed to using only military power as a basis for partnerships.

During the course of the 1990s, Beijing developed the NSC as a strategic paradigm to counter the alliance-based forms of cooperation which were favoured by Western powers during the Cold War, but which, in China's view, were being inappropriately carried over into the post-Cold War international system. Much Chinese political ire was directed towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a regime which defied naysayers who predicted its demise after the 1980s, by not only enduring but expanding its mandate to include operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan while also increasing its membership to include former Warsaw Pact states. Moreover, through various initiatives, NATO's sphere of interest extended well into Central Asia, much closer to China's sensitive Western borders. Then, following 9/11, the United States began directly deploying its own troops in Central Asia, creating further concerns in Beijing about possible "encirclement" by the West.

The idea of alternatives to the alliance system was also elaborated upon within China's 2000 *National Defence White Paper*, which stressed that "multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region should be oriented towards and characterised by mutual respect instead of the strong bullying the weak, cooperation instead of confrontation, and seeking consensus instead of imposing one's will on others."⁵ This form of security thinking was judged by China to be more compatible with the country's strategic interests during its transitional period away from Cold War bipolarity. In 2001, China placed these ideas into practice by shepherding the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), created as a security community encompassing Russia and most of Central Asia in order to combat regional terrorism and political extremism. The SCO can be seen as the most solid manifestation of China's desire to see strategic cooperation through community-building rather than via hierarchical alliances.

The Next Challenges

Beijing has identified strategic issues which extend beyond those of traditional security, as China's 2004 *Defence White Paper* articulated. Security in the fields of information, environment and the economy are growing concerns alongside more traditional areas as China adjusts to independence and globalisation. The idea of "economic security" has been especially accentuated through a variety of case examples which Beijing assessed with

the benefit of first-hand knowledge. These have included the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-8, which not only caused serious economic damage throughout much of China's periphery, but also strong security ramifications, especially in Indonesia. As Beijing continues to open to international markets, it no longer has the luxury of remaining aloof from potential threats to its economy.

China is also concerned about maintaining access to international resources, especially energy, and guarding against trade blockages, which has meant a great deal of emphasis being placed upon protecting land and sea trade routes that may be vulnerable to disruption. The so-called "Malacca dilemma," a term coined by President Hu Jintao in December 2003, refers to the problem of choke points in Chinese trade and concerns about the country's vulnerability to economic pressures or sabotage. As Beijing continues to expand its economy, becoming more dependent on external resources, including energy and raw materials, to maintain growth, there looms the possibility that China will be more assertive diplomatically and militarily in order to protect foreign economic interests.

For the present, however, China's military modernisation remains tempered by Beijing's desire to better its security through regional cooperation. Examples of "cooperative" security thinking were also evident during outgoing Chinese president Jiang Zemin's speech at the 16th Party Congress in November 2002. In the section on China's external affairs, he noted that China's strategic interests would include dissuading hegemony, advocating different paths to development for different countries, promoting economic globalisation in ways which would create mutual benefits, fighting international terrorism, and offering support for "extensive people-to-people diplomacy" designed to increase linkages and communication.⁶ All of these issues have been carried over to the foreign policy under Hu, as the reorganisation and rethinking of the PLA continues. ■

Notes:

1. "Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China," Office of the Secretary of Defence, United States, 2005, 26.
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TACTICAL NUKES: FORGOTTEN RELICS OF THE COLD WAR

by Daryl Kimball

Fifteen years ago, the Berlin Wall was knocked down, marking the end of the political and ideological rivalry that divided East and West and threatened to turn Europe into a nuclear battlefield. Even though the Cold War is over, the threats posed by the weapons built during that era remain. In the 21st century, these weapons are more useful for terrorists than for fighting terrorism or keeping the peace between nations.

During a May 24, 2005 Congressional hearing a senior US government official was asked what terrorist threat makes him lose the most sleep. Paul Longworth, who was at the time the deputy administrator for defense nuclear proliferation at the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, replied,

In my mind its a lost nuclear warhead because that's ready to use. And probably an artillery shell or something that is a man portable nuclear weapon. That's a very low risk, high consequence event.

Significant attention has been focused on the need to control and reduce US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, but the two countries tactical nuclear stockpiles have largely been ignored. It is past time to reevaluate US, NATO and Russian policies that are blocking action that would allow for better accounting, security, and eventually the verifiable elimination of obsolete US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons, beginning with those that remain stationed in Europe.

Beginning in the mid-1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union built vast array of tens of thousands of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, many of which were deployed outside their national borders in Eastern and Western Europe, the Korean Peninsula, on land, air, and at sea. These relatively lower-yield, more portable bombs were designed for use on the battlefield in the event of a direct military confrontation involving the two superpowers or the NATO and Warsaw blocs.

By 1991, the United States was estimated to have an arsenal of just over 7,000 tactical nuclear gravity bombs, land-based tactical nuclear weapons, and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons. The bulk of these weapons were based in Europe.¹ The US Defense Department estimated at the time that the Soviets held approximately 2,000 sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and "as many as" 10,000 land-based tactical nuclear weapons.² Other independent estimates of the num-

ber of Russian tactical nuclear weapons during this period are even higher.

In September and October of 1991, as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate, US President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced a series of common sense, but nevertheless bold steps to withdraw significant portions of their forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles. The measures – known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) – successfully addressed the danger that Moscow might lose command and control of these widely dispersed and vulnerable weapons during a very tumultuous time.

Among other measures, the United States pledged to eliminate 2,150 land-based tactical nuclear weapons, another 500 deployed on surface ships and submarines, and approximately 900 nuclear depth-bombs.³ Not included in the US plan were the roughly 1,400 tactical nuclear gravity bombs under US control at NATO bases in Europe.

In early 1992, the new Russian government reaffirmed Gorbachev's policy and announced it would eliminate all army tactical nuclear weapons, one-third of naval tactical nuclear weapons, one-half of its air force tactical nuclear weapons, and half of all its air defense tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, Russia announced it would consolidate its remaining tactical nuclear stockpile in centralized storage locations within Russian territory.⁴

In May of this year, Russia issued a report that stated it has reduced its tactical nuclear arsenal "by four times" since 1991 and intends to "further reduce the level of these weapons." That would suggest that Russia still has at least 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons. But given the fact that it was never clear how large Russia's tactical nuclear weapons stockpile was in 1991, it is not clear how many weapons have actually been eliminated under the plan. And because the PNIs were necessarily developed in haste and without time to negotiate detailed monitoring and verification provisions, there remain serious questions regarding Russia's implementation of its PNI pledges. In a June 10, 2005 statement sent in response to questions from *Arms Control Today*, the US State Department said: "Russia has failed to state publicly the status of the elimination of its nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for air defense missiles, nuclear mines, or nuclear weapons on land-based naval aviation."

Unfortunately, not since the 1991 PNIs have leaders in Washington, Moscow, or Brussels taken serious steps to solidify the earlier gains and fully account for the tactical weapons that remain on each side. Nor have these policy makers sought to adjust their respective nuclear doctrines, which have left the

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United States with approximately 1,300 tactical nuclear weapons – including over 400 hundred gravity bombs on NATO bases in Europe – and thousands of tactical nuclear weapons stored at sites within Russia.

As a consequence, these forgotten weapons, which provide no practical purpose in defending the United States, NATO, or Russia, pose an unacceptable security risk.

Nuclear Insecurity

The Kremlin claims that it has successfully consolidated its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal on Russian soil, that its remaining tactical nuclear bombs are secure, and that we should trust it to do as it says. But in at a time when the threat of nuclear terrorism is very real, simply trusting that Russia knows where its tactical nuclear weapons are and is keeping them secure is not enough.

Earlier this year, the Associated Press reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense acknowledged there were two attempts to penetrate military nuclear installations in 2002 and 2003, both in the European part of Russia.

The June 22 article reports that Col. Gen. Igor Valynkin, chief of the Russian Defense Ministry's 12th Main Department, which is in charge of atomic weapons, said, "Our system is good, it works and it provides nuclear security." However, Valynkin acknowledged that "there are problems with nuclear security" and said it is being improved with help from the United States and other foreign donors.

Valynkin told the Associated Press that the main source of a potential terrorist threat to the Kremlin's nuclear weapons facilities is "Chechen terrorist groups," which have warned that they will target Russian facilities of all kinds. If Russian military officials think there are "problems with nuclear security" in Russia, maybe we should be too.

The Current US-Russian Impasse

The time has come to finally tackle the unfinished task of controlling Cold War tactical nuclear weapons. Although numerous statements and pledges have been made, the combined effects of political inertia, a lack of will, and lingering US-Russian suspicions are blocking progress.

In 1997, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to explore controls on tactical nuclear weapons in the context of future negotiations on START III. But the two leaders failed to follow through, as the US-Russian strategic nuclear arms reduction process stalled over disputes about missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

At the May 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, the United States, Russia, the member states of NATO and all other NPT states parties endorsed further action on reducing tactical nuclear weapons. In the final conference document, the states called for "... the further reduction of

non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process."

A NATO report of December 2000 also noted that "the extensive Russian nuclear arsenal," called for "specific CSBM [confidence and security-building measures] proposals to enhance mutual trust and to promote greater openness and transparency on nuclear weapons and safety issues," including the "exchange [of] data on US and Russian sub-strategic nuclear forces."

But even after the September 11 attacks, which highlight the length to which Al Qaeda will go to inflict harm, the Bush administration failed to elevate the issue of tactical nuclear weapons on the US-Russian bilateral agenda. John Bolton, former US undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, said in March 2002 that the administration is "willing to discuss tactical nukes" with Russia but that tactical nuclear weapons are not a top priority.⁵

This attitude helps explain why Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin did not discuss further tactical nuclear weapons reductions or transparency measures in the context of the May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). While SORT promises to reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to less than 2,220 on each side by 2012, it does not require the destruction of the warheads or their delivery systems, nor does it provide additional verification provisions. As a result the US and Russia will have the option of maintaining a large "hedge" arsenal of stored warheads, which may increase Russia's perceived need to retain its tactical nuclear stockpile.

Today, both the United States and Russian officials profess willingness to discuss further controls on tactical nuclear weapons, but there is no active effort to do so. Russia, which has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for its diminished conventional capabilities, refuses to enter into talks on tactical nuclear arsenals so long as the United States and its NATO partners still deploy such weapons in Europe.

In June, the Russian news agency Interfax quoted Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov as saying, "We are prepared to start talks about tactical nuclear weapons only when all countries possessing them store them in their territories."

US assistant secretary of State Stephen Rademaker responded by describing Ivanov's proposal as nothing new and a "stalling tactic...designed to make sure there are no negotiations on the issue." He also said, "[I]t is a very convenient position for the Russians to take because they can withdraw their tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad... and say that they have withdrawn [their arms] to national territory and why doesn't the United States do the same." It is unclear if Moscow houses nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, which is a Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea between Lithuania and Poland.⁶

But if Russia's stance is a thinly disguised effort to stall action, the rationale behind current US and NATO tactical nuclear weapons policy may be even thinner.

The United States still stations some 400 nuclear gravity bombs on bases in the territories of six of its European fellow NATO members: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. NATO's current strategic plan claims that its nuclear forces in Europe "provide an essential political and military link" between the United States and European alliance members. NATO further maintains an antiquated nuclear posture, which allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict, including in reply to a conventional weapons attack.

Given the reality that NATO troops are fighting together in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, it is silly to suggest that nuclear weapons are needed to maintain the bond between alliance partners.

In addition, the devastating power and inescapable collateral effects of such weapons make them inappropriate tools against the non-nuclear targets and adversaries that concern NATO today. The predominant US tactical warhead stationed at NATO bases is the B-61. This weapon is delivered by aircraft and has yield in the range of 100 kilotons – significantly more powerful than the 15 kiloton bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

None other than Colin Powell has called into question the role and value of such nuclear weapons on the battlefield. As Secretary of State in 2002 as India and Pakistan stood on the brink of a war that could escalate into a nuclear conflict. He said:

I mean, the thought of a nuclear conflict in the year 2002, with what that would mean with respect to loss of life, what that would mean with respect to the condemnation – the worldwide condemnation – that would come down on whatever nation chose to take that course of action, would be such that I can see very little military, political or any other kind of justification for the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons in this day and age may serve some deterrent effect, and so be it, but to think of using them as just another weapon in what might start out as a conventional conflict in this day and age seems to me to be something that no side should be contemplating.

As made clear by Powell, these so-called "battlefield" nuclear weapons have no military or warfighting utility for Russia or the United States. They are dangerous and obsolete Cold War relics. The United States and Russia are no longer squaring off against one another. They are working together to address the twin dangers of terrorism and proliferation. Rather than treating tactical nuclear weapons as just another part of the vast US military arsenal, the United States and NATO can and should diminish their value and spur further, radical tactical nuclear weapons reductions leading to their eventual elimination.

To open the way to cooperation with Russia on the consolidation and dismantlement of its large and destabilizing tactical nuclear stockpile, NATO defense ministers should formally reconsider the alliance's nuclear use policies and take overdue steps to begin withdrawing its obsolete tactical nuclear forces from Europe.

Assistant secretary Rademaker has said that the United States would welcome a discussion of NATO's nuclear policy if any alliance member initiated it. But he added, "So far as we are aware, there is no member of NATO that disagrees with the current NATO policy on tactical nuclear weapons."⁷

Recently, some attempts have been made to initiate this process, but they have fallen short. German Defense Minister Peter Struck said May 6 that Germany would raise the issue within NATO. But at the alliance's June 9 Nuclear Planning Group meeting, Germany only informed other NATO members of the growing debate in Germany on the matter. Despite resolutions from both houses of the Belgian parliament to raise the issue, Belgian defense officials failed to broach the issue at the same meeting.

If and when NATO begins the process of revising its tactical nuclear weapons policy, the United States and other states could call Russia's bluff and press President Vladimir Putin to open negotiations on verifiably accounting for and dismantling remaining US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

For more than 15 years, US, Russian, and NATO leaders have failed to tackle the dangers posed by their leftover Cold War tactical nuclear weapons arsenals. Whatever symbolic value the weapons may provide for NATO unity is far outweighed by the risk that some of Russia's weapons might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or a terrorist group. A new initiative to reduce and verifiably eliminate these weapons would reduce the salience of all nuclear weapons, reinforce global nonproliferation efforts, and reduce the nuclear danger. ■

Notes:

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6. "Deeper Nuclear Cuts Unlikely for Now," by Wade Boese, *Arms Control Today*, July/August 2004.
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FROM ABOLITION TO RETENTION? THE MORNING AFTER THE FAILED NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

by Ernie Regehr, OC

The failure of the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was as predictable as it is disturbing. There is no doubt that it reflects a dangerous erosion of consensus on one of the most fundamental security challenges of the age – assuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons – of which the three primary elements are preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to hitherto non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of non-state groups, and persuading nuclear weapon states (NWS) to honour their disarmament obligations.

The failure to agree on next steps in meeting this threefold challenge does not alter the fact that there remains an overwhelming, though not total, consensus among states that nuclear weapons are a dangerous threat to humanity and need to be eliminated and universally prohibited. Indeed the NPT is a legally binding instrument that embodies that consensus, but the Treaty faces urgent compliance questions, and thus growing doubts that the global consensus against nuclear weapons will hold.

The compliance concerns extend to all three non-proliferation objectives, but what was confirmed again at the May Review Conference is that they are inter-linked and, as NGO disarmament advocates and most NNWS have been insisting all these many years, that the absence of demonstrable progress on the disarmament agenda is indeed undermining progress on the other two fronts.

But it is not the pace of reductions to nuclear arsenals that is at the core of disarmament non-compliance. As the US and Russia are fond of reminding us, there have been significant reductions from the Cold War peak of close to 70,000 warheads worldwide to current levels of just under 30,000, of which less than half are actually deployed (what is rather less impressive is that there have been only modest reductions from 1968 levels of about 38,000 warheads, when the nuclear powers first agreed to the NPT and to pursue disarmament in good faith). But in 2002 the US and Russia did sign the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Moscow Treaty) to further reduce their strategic arsenals, each from about 4,000 to less than 2,200 warheads by 2012.

While we would all obviously welcome much brisker progress toward disarmament, even the current modest pace of nuclear reductions would be more welcome if it were not accompanied by doctrines and modernization programs that clearly signal a commitment to the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons and a rejection of total nuclear disarmament.

In other words, the abolitionist norm of the NPT is being pushed aside by increasingly bold reassertions of nuclear reten-

tionist doctrines, and unless the NWS take specific steps to demonstrate an unambiguous retreat from nuclear retentionism, the NPT will not survive and the struggle to prevent the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons and materials will be lost.

Challenging the Nuclear Retentionists

This nuclear retentionism was on full display at the failed Review Conference in the form of the continued denial of the disarmament commitments that all NWS accepted in 1995, when the Treaty was indefinitely extended, and in 2000, when all states parties to the NPT agreed on a comprehensive program of disarmament in the form of "13 practical steps." Of course the retentionist agenda is championed by the United States, but it is also supported, or at least accepted, by the other NWS and by the NNWS allies of the US. The Director of the US Arms Control Association, Daryl Kimball, commented after the Review Conference that it had "reinforced the view of the majority of countries that the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states *do not* intend to live up to their NPT-related nuclear disarmament commitments".¹

To reverse this perception, and thus to restore confidence in the NPT, will require early action on at least the following four measures, which would not accomplish full disarmament compliance but would demonstrate a shift away from nuclear retentionism:

- Reconfirm extension of the moratorium on warhead testing until the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) becomes law;
- Start negotiations on a Treaty to ban any further production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and address the problem of existing stocks;
- Return to the principle of irreversibility in disarmament; and
- Reduce the political/military role of nuclear weapons through doctrinal and deployment shifts.

The failure to act on these measures will only place the nuclear abolitionist commitment of the NPT in further doubt.

Steps 1 through 6 and Step 9e of the 13 practical disarmament steps agreed to in 2000 codify these four measures. Steps 1 and 2 are the agreement on early ratification of the CTBT and to abide by a testing moratorium until the treaty comes into force. The United States is not only refusing to ratify the treaty, but is also indicating that it may end its moratorium on testing – testing being a clear signal of the intention to retain and go on develop-

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ing nuclear weapons. Steps 3 and 4 contain the commitment to negotiate a treaty on fissile materials and to establish a nuclear disarmament subsidiary body at the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Blame for the failure to implement these measures must also go to China, which has linked its support for negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) to parallel talks on other nuclear disarmament issues and on a treaty to prevent the weaponization of space – both of which have been refused so far by the US.

The United States and Russia bear joint responsibility for non-compliance on the commitment to irreversibility in disarmament agreed to in Step 5. The 2002 Moscow Treaty, while providing for significant reductions in deployed weapons, offers no guarantees that any of the weapons withdrawn from deployment will actually be destroyed and not kept for redeployment at some future time – again, a clear signal of a nuclear retentionist posture.

Action on these elements of the essential disarmament agenda as developed in 1995 and 2000 would provide concrete evidence that the unambiguous nuclear abolition pledge made by the NWS in Step 6 was being taken seriously. This step is the famous, and now infamous, "unequivocal undertaking" to "accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." The explicit rejection of the first five steps, accompanied in the case of the United States by newly articulated nuclear use doctrines, renders this Step 6 commitment, to put it gently, unreliable.

The abandonment of all of these measures amounts to the abdication as well of the final basic measure referred to above – the commitment to work toward a "diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies" as articulated in Step 9e. And blame for the explicit rejection of this core nuclear disarmament step must go well beyond the official nuclear weapon states to be shouldered also by the non-nuclear weapon states that are the NATO allies of the United States. Since making the commitment in 2000, they have repeatedly and collectively declared NATO's intention to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely. The NATO nuclear doctrine states that "the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary...." NATO states then add the explanation that "nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable [and] thus, they remain essential to preserve peace."

Again, this retentionist agenda in NATO is in direct violation of the NPT's abolitionist objective and critically undermines global confidence in the NPT. Just as the international community has lost confidence in Iran's commitment to the Treaty, given its clandestine pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing technologies and notwithstanding its repeated proclamations of unflinching fidelity to the Treaty, so too has the international community lost



The United Nations headquarters in New York.

confidence in the NWS commitment to the Treaty, given their rejection of core disarmament principles and notwithstanding their repeated declarations of fealty to the Treaty.

Getting Disarmament Back on Track

What has to change on the disarmament side of the NPT is not a mystery. Nuclear weapon states and their allies have to make an unequivocal break with their nuclear retentionist doctrines and practices and start keeping their promises – and the immediate agenda remains as it was outlined and agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference.

It is true that all this is easier said than done, but for starters it must be said again, and then done in measurable and accountable steps. A declaration by the United States administration that it will in all circumstances maintain the nuclear test moratorium, even if it can't persuade Congress to actually ratify the CTBT, would be a simple but important step.

It is particularly ironic that it is a China-US standoff in the CD that is holding up efforts to negotiate an FMCT since such a treaty is as much a non-proliferation as it is a disarmament measure. Substantive differences between the US and China on the issue are slight, and with a modicum of political will, or goodwill, the deal could be in place – namely, FMCT negotiations in parallel with broader disarmament and space security discussions. In any case the five official nuclear weapon states have already put in place a moratorium on fissile material production,² and the US and China should share a keen interest in the primary objectives of an FMCT – persuading India, Pakistan, and Israel to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, and establishing a ban on any unsafeguarded enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of plutonium. Washington's recently announced intention to pursue civilian nuclear cooperation with India included a statement of support for an FMCT by India, but no commitment to join the moratorium of the NWS on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

The United States and its non-nuclear weapon state allies within NATO could send a major signal of a retreat from nuclear retentionism with a simple declaration to change NATO's nuclear doctrine. Instead of saying that NATO must retain nuclear weapons because "they remain essential to preserve peace," NATO states should declare what they have already committed to in the NPT, namely, that it is the elimination of nuclear weapons that is essential to preserving peace, not only for NATO states but for the entire world. If they were then to follow up this assertion with the removal of the few hundred US nuclear bombs that remain on the territories of European non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT,³ they would demonstrate that they mean what they declare, in both the NPT and NATO contexts.

Russia and the United States would make a particularly persuasive retreat from nuclear retentionism if they were to agree that all warheads and delivery systems that are to be taken out of deployment in fulfillment of the Moscow Treaty would be destroyed, and that the agreed reductions would therefore be made permanent. They could add credibility to those commitments by announcing a realistic timetable for their implementation.

These basic measures would leave a great deal of disarmament work yet to be accomplished, but they would make it unambiguously clear that the disarmament course is on a track toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, not simply a more efficient management of consolidated and modernized existing arsenals.

Proliferation Challenges

Getting the nuclear disarmament process back on track would, of course, not automatically solve the horizontal proliferation challenges. Proliferation pressures in any one state emerge out of particular national and regional circumstances, but the more nuclear weapons are legitimized by the rest of the world, the more a potential proliferator can claim legitimacy for its own nuclear ambitions. So getting disarmament back on track and reasserting the abolitionist norm would dramatically improve the political climate within which non-proliferation measures are pursued.

Again, the main elements of the non-proliferation agenda are well known, and widely agreed, though not as firmly established as the disarmament agenda. There is broad recognition of the importance of tightened export controls on nuclear materials, and of increased transparency and monitoring of nuclear facilities to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons programs. In that regard, the "additional protocol," a supplement to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard agreements expanding the scope and effectiveness of inspections, demonstrates a serious effort to improve compliance, and is gradually becoming the verification standard for confirming compliance with the NPT's non-proliferation provisions (even though the pace at which it is being adopted is not what it should be).⁴

While there is also growing support in some circles for the idea that the weapons-sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle – the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of plutonium – should be placed under international control, this idea is still

resisted by many developing states that fear it could limit their access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

The US and Non-Proliferation

Effective non-proliferation is impeded as much by disagreement over methods as by lack of consensus regarding objectives. A significant factor in the failure of the Review Conference is the fear that the Bush administration no longer considers the NPT to be the primary or even a significant bulwark against proliferation. In addition to becoming more overt about its own nuclear retentionism, US non-proliferation strategy is now less about preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, period, than about keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of certain states it regards as rogues.

Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explains the shift in this way:

Previous U.S. presidents treated the weapons themselves as the problem and sought their elimination through treaties. President Bill Clinton, for example, warned in November 1998 of the threat "posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons" (italics added). President Bush framed the issue differently in his 2003 State of the Union address: "The gravest danger facing America and the world is *outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons*" (italics added). The Bush administration thus changed the focus from "what" to "who." This corresponds to a strategy that seeks the elimination of regimes rather than weapons.⁵

Thus Pakistan, Israel, and India are accepted as *de facto* nuclear weapon states, but Iran and North Korea are to be stopped. It's not that the White House welcomes the three *de facto* NWS; rather it believes that their acquisition of nuclear weapons is secondary to other strategic considerations regarding them – and, as we have seen, US self-defined strategic interests tend to trump multilateral commitments. The move toward civilian nuclear cooperation with India is emblematic of the Bush administration's counter-productive policy of selective non-proliferation, and it is above all an attempt to re-define the nuclear weapons club. The *Indian Express* newspaper called it "a road map for India's integration with the global nuclear order as a full fledged nuclear weapon state".⁶

Some analysts conclude that, in addition to its selective non-proliferation, the US has shifted from non-proliferation to counter-proliferation – a strategy that combines the pursuit of defences against proliferators (ballistic missile defence) with the threat of military action in response to suspected proliferation activities (including the threatened use of nuclear weapons against possible

proliferators). Counter-proliferation thus shifts the focus away from the pursuit of multilateral cooperation and agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear materials and technology, and pays less attention to the build-up of a gradually maturing system of scrutiny that can provide reliable assurance that such materials are not being diverted for weapons purposes.

In counter-proliferation diplomacy is not abandoned; rather it is refocused on bilateral negotiations, or on joint negotiations by selective groups, backed by the overt threat of force and, as we have seen in Iraq, the resort to force outside the authority of the international community. For the US, the states that are the focus of its counter-proliferation are determined less by the degree of the risk of proliferation they represent and more by the nature of their relationship to the United States.

An American administration actively committed to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be welcomed, and it is also clear that effective non-proliferation must include the expectation that non-compliance with global norms will produce severe consequences. But the non-proliferation effort cannot be led by a single state, however powerful, and especially when that state has lost the confidence and respect of much of the world. The ongoing American commitment to retaining and refining its nuclear arsenal, as well as its use of force in Iraq to sideline rather than strengthen and support the global non-proliferation monitoring and inspection system, currently make the United States a poor candidate for giving leadership to the international nuclear non-proliferation effort.

Looking for Leadership

Rescuing the NPT and returning the international community to a path of both disarmament and effective non-proliferation require the collective leadership of states committed to both. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC), a small group of middle power and smaller states (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden, and South Africa) performed this leadership function extraordinarily well in the run up to, and at, the 2000 Review Conference, serving as a disarmament/non-proliferation challenge team. NAC is now thought to have run its course as a collective force. While individual NAC states remain committed to the full implementation of the NPT, a new configuration of challenge states is now needed.

Proposals vary. Some have suggested that the NAC group could now be joined by the progressive wing of NATO, forming a group that could more effectively challenge NATO's retentionist doctrine and apply more effective pressure on the three NWS that are part of NATO. Others point to the powerful political and moral legitimacy that would be enjoyed by a grouping of the states that have at one time actively pursued the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons but have explicitly rejected that option (including, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Libya, South Africa, Sweden, and others).

One suggestion for the kind of work such a group should

undertake comes from the Middle Powers Initiative in its recent NPT Briefing Paper, *Deadly Deadlock*, by Douglas Roche:

[A] group of like-minded States, from all regions, could now start new work to identify the legal, political and technical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Examples of such work would include establishment of verification capabilities, fissile material and nuclear weapons inventories, nuclear material controls, strengthening and expanding NWFZs, national abolition legislation like New Zealand's, and NATO nuclear-sharing issues.⁷

A particular challenge for such a group should be the development of a clear strategy to lure nuclear weapon states away from their retentionist presumptions and to get them to offer concrete evidence of their commitment to the abolitionist norm of the NPT.

In July an interesting group of seven states that includes one NWS presented a modest nuclear disarmament agenda for consideration by the September World Summit. Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa, and the United Kingdom called on the Summit to endorse a range of measures that would contribute to "achieving a world free of nuclear weapons," including progress on treaties to ban testing and the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, as well as non-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures.

It is a welcome initiative, and we will have to see a lot more such efforts if the NPT is to be salvaged and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are to be advanced. ■

Notes:

1. Quoted in Rebecca Johnson, "Day 26 Briefing: Spineless NPT Conference Papers Over Cracks and Ends with a Whimper," Acronym Institute, May 27, 2005 (emphasis added). [Online]. Available from: <http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/05rep12.htm>.
2. The moratorium is positive, but hardly magnanimous, since they all have surplus stocks, and the US and Russia have enough fissile materials to make many thousands of nuclear bombs. See David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Fissile Material: Stockpiles still growing," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (November/December 2004) pp. 14-16. [Online]. Available from: http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04albright_016.
3. Current estimates are that as many as 480 American non-strategic nuclear weapons remain stationed in six NATO states. See Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, "US nuclear weapons in Europe, 1954-2004," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (November/December 2004), pp. 76-77. [Online]. Available from: http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd04norris.
4. The IAEA Board has approved additional protocols for 108 states; 98 of these have been signed, and 67 ratified.
5. Joseph Cirincione, "A New Non-Proliferation Strategy," a paper presented to the Conference on Transatlantic Security and Nuclear Proliferation, Rome, June 10-11, 2005. [Online]. Available from: www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/Rome_Conference_Paper.pdf.
6. C. Raja Mohan, "Singh, Bush press civilian nuclear button," *The Indian Express*, July 19 2005. [Online]. Available from: http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=74661.
7. Douglas Roche, *Deadly Deadlock*, Middle Powers Initiative Briefing Paper (June 2005). [Online]. Available from: www.gsinstute.org/2005NPTpoliticalanalysis.pdf.

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