



SITREP

A PUBLICATION OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE



DND / SGT ROXANNE CLOWE, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA

Prime Minister Stephen Harper shakes hands with Cpl Tanya Roth on March 12 during his first official visit to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

The Challenges of Afghanistan	3
The Air Force Equipment Situation: Challenges For The New Government	5
The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs:	9
Whatever Happened To Our Canadian Officers' Training Corps (the COTC)?	13
"Och Laddie - 'Tis a Fine Idea - But Who Pays?"	16

From the Editor's Desk

Since the last issue of SITREP much has occurred at home and abroad that has impacted on defence and security. At home an election and the forming of a new government took place coincident with the deployment to Afghanistan of over 2,200 soldiers, members of the RCMP, Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency. The mission has a dual, potentially conflicting, mandate of conducting combat operations – the hard approach – against the Taliban at the same time trying to ‘win hearts and minds’ through the soft approach of nation-building and reconstruction. The sustainment of a 10-year commitment by a very small under-resourced military will involve the entire Army, regular force and reserve, and results in a lack of flexibility for the government over the next decade to explore other intervention options such as UN humanitarian operations or robust peacekeeping where Canada may have a greater impact...Africa? Or to have sufficient balance and flexibility to conduct disaster relief or homeland defence operations here at home in Canada?

Elsewhere free speech is being challenged with people being murdered over cartoons, Iran is testing the World's tolerance for nuclear proliferation and the rule of law in Iraq remains in question.

Appropriately this issue mirrors a number of these themes. Our first article puts into context our multidisciplinary approach to our challenging commitment to Afghanistan. As former Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, LGen (Ret'd) Ray Crabbe knows all too well the challenges of force generating, conducting operations and sustaining a deployed force such as we have in Afghanistan.

Two articles address the vexing issue of maintaining military capability through defence procurement and are written in the spirit of best advice to the new government. With operations in Afghanistan being primarily Army-centric, one could easily lose focus on issues stressing the Air Force. General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, former Chief of Defence Staff, discusses the status of the Air Force fleet, the dysfunctional procurement system and recommends options for Canada. Colonel (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald closes the issue with a lighter but equally important examination of the election campaign budget promises and reveals a forecasted \$3.6 billion cut in the defence capital budget in 2010/11.

The secular West continues to be confronted by an escalation in the clash of value systems and the threat posed to free speech by violent followers of Islam. LTC Ralph Peters (USA Ret'd), a first time contributor, is one of America's most prolific authors in defence affairs. His article is very apt given Canada's Afghanistan mission. Insightful, he addresses the complex challenge of the Western secular mindset in dealing with religious terrorists – pitting religion versus state/states, the impact of media serving terrorist aims and the West's inclination to use technology in fighting the suicide terrorist bomber.

Examining the resurrection of the Canadian Officers' Training Corps is the subject of our final contribution made by Honorary LCol Dr. Neville Poy. He provides an interesting and welcome perspective on how well Canada could benefit based upon his recent visit to the United Kingdom and the British University Officers' Training Corps.

We hope that you, our readers, find these articles both interesting and informative.

Sincerely,
Chris Corrigan, Colonel (Retd)
Editor of SITREP



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THE CHALLENGES OF AFGHANISTAN

by LGen (Ret'd) Ray Crabbe

Recent attacks against members of the Canadian Forces in Kandahar, the death of Mr Glyn Barry, and the incapacitating injuries to and deaths of our soldiers are vivid reminders of the dangers inherent in the new mission in this troubled part of Afghanistan. The recently completed deployment of 2,200 soldiers involves taking up new and demanding challenges in a war that is different than any others to date.

Canada's role is to provide much needed security in the Kandahar region, and through the continuation of the current 150 man Provincial Reconstruction Team, provide diplomatic and developmental support. This is an extension of the former Liberal government's 3D approach to foreign affairs: defence, diplomacy and development. Through the security provided by the military, this all-inclusive approach is designed to contribute to the good governance of the area, to provide humanitarian support, and assure human rights.

As evidenced already, this new role calls for offensive operations against remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda, as well as others sympathetic to the terrorist cause, in the most dangerous and lawless region of the country. The 2,200 member contingent – largely from Edmonton – is initially operating under the US-led coalition but will revert to NATO command sometime this spring. In short, the Canadian government's strategy is to fight the war on terrorism off-shore and in doing so, assist this 'failed state' from reverting back to a base for terrorist organizations.

Kandahar is an agricultural city of about half a million people and was founded by Alexander the Great in the fourth century BC. The city was the last bastion of Taliban and al Qaeda forces before being routed by the US Army in December 2002. Notwithstanding, there remain deadly elements of these factions, as well as warlords, bandits, drug dealers, and other scum in the Kandahar region, bent on ensuring that the US and others do not succeed in changing the political and social fabric of the country.

The immediate and most dangerous threat to Canadian soldiers is the dreaded Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs. This includes murderers – euphemistically known as suicide bombers – who do not place the same value on life as western societies. The past few months has seen the adoption by the enemy of tactics similar to those being applied against US forces in Iraq. The challenge in this form of warfare is that Canadians and other western troops must fight in accordance with the laws of war and the Rules of En-



DND / M/CPL RON DUCHESNE, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA

Female Canadian Forces members and a Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency (CFPSA) member along with Popeye, the grounds keeper at Camp Nathan Smith, plant flowers for International Women's Day, with local Afghan men in the background.

gagement for the operation. The latter includes minimizing casualties to Afghan civilians. The enemy knows no such rules, and is completely at ease with killing innocent civilians to achieve his goal. This ethical versus non-ethical warfare is a very serious challenge and one in which Canadian soldiers are well versed.

The urban terrain of Kandahar with its narrow streets and natural defiles makes the job extremely dangerous and demanding because of the susceptibility to IEDs and ambushes. The enemy can meld into indigenous crowds and quickly disappear after inflicting their nasty attacks on soldiers. The rural terrain is equally imposing; the rugged and unforgiving mountainous regions are well known to the enemy, giving them a tactical advantage. Canadians were introduced to the difficulties imposed by such terrain, as it

LGen (Ret'd) Ray Crabbe has served in a variety of command and staff appointments, including a tour of duty with the United Nations in Cyprus and NATO Forces in Germany. He served in several command and staff appointments including CO 1 PPCLI, Commander Special Service Force, Commander Canadian Contingent United Protection Forces in the Former Yugoslavia, Commander Land Force Atlantic Area, and Commander 1 Canadian Division. In 1997, he was appointed Deputy Chief of Defence Staff at National Defence Headquarters where he was responsible for Canadian Forces operations and intelligence worldwide. He retired from the Canadian Forces in 1998. He continues to make an active contribution as a defence media commentator and as a Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.

is similar in nature to the mountains around Kabul, in which Canadian soldiers operated in 2002 when serving with US forces.

Poppy growing and the narcotics trade is still alive and well in Afghanistan, including the region in which Canadians will operate. It is estimated that over 80% of the heroin reaching Europe comes from Afghanistan. Narcotics are a major source of funds for warlords and al Qaeda. Recent estimates place the value of heroin sales at over \$2 billion for drug traffickers. Given their dependence on the poppy fields and the narcotics trade, they will fight to protect the cultivation and exportation of drugs. Simply destroying the poppy fields is not the solution. The peasants and farmers who have existed off the cultivation of poppies for hundreds of years will need to be re-trained to grow alternate crops. This will not happen until the required security for their protection has been established and they have the confidence in it. This will be a long term objective, but a vital one.

Unfortunately the Afghanistan border is still like a sieve, especially the one thousand kilometer border with Iran and the 2,500 kilometer border shared with Pakistan. There is no doubt that these countries provide refuge to the terrorists and insurgents, as well as a means of getting into and out of Afghanistan. The mountainous regions just east of Kandahar - and a potential operating area for Canadian

troops - offer such refuge and passage, adding significantly to the challenges facing the soldiers. These difficult routes into and out of the neighboring countries allow free passage for terrorists and arms into the country, and narcotics out.

One of the major strategies undertaken by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the US and NATO is to create an effective Afghan army and police force capable of providing security to its people. This is a very time-consuming and difficult task in a nation that has not had a truly national military for some time. Training and equipping an army from scratch is a challenge for any country. In Afghanistan, this is made even more difficult, given the requirement to mold members of different ethnic backgrounds into a fighting force in a nation where armies were ethnically based and run largely by warlords.

These challenges are further exacerbated by the destruction of the country's infrastructure by the Soviet forces during the 10 years of war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, and the subsequent deterioration under the Taliban. Although aid money is pouring into the country, Afghanistan remains an economic basket case and was recently ranked by the UN 173rd out of 178 of the least developed nations. Economic progress cannot be achieved until the infrastructure is rebuilt, dependence of foreign aid is decreased substantially, and efficient markets are established.

All of these depend on establishing much needed security under which economic development and recovery can occur.

Canadian soldiers are making a difference in Afghanistan. They are rising to the challenges and are making a significant contribution to this troubled and difficult region. They are very well trained, equipped, led and disciplined and will continue to do this country proud. Canada and Canadians must be prepared to stick it out for the long haul, and support the troops in this dangerous mission. This will not be an easy or short victory. But it will be a vital one. ♣

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THE AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT SITUATION: CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT

by Gen (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson

Introduction

Two related factors characterize the acquisition of aircraft and other major capital systems for the Air Force. The first is that the equipment, and therefore the acquisition process, is especially complex. Second, it is expensive.

These usually mean that aircraft capital programs are “big-ticket” items and thus prone to controversy, intense competition and resistance to decision-making. In consequence, change in the make-up of the Air Force’s inventory of major equipment does not come easily. On one hand, it must build on current holdings to the greatest extent possible. On the other, though, the high cost of procurement is mitigated by extraordinarily long service life (note, for example, the Sea King and the C-130 Hercules fleets that entered service in the 1960s and the CF-18s in the early 1980s).

Canada’s Air Force is small. Once (in 1945) the world’s fourth largest, it has gradually shrunk to the point where it currently has fewer than one hundred fighters, a fleet of ancient transport aircraft, forty-year old maritime helicopters, and eighteen maritime patrol aircraft greatly in need of updating. Few aircraft in the current inventory can be called reasonably modern. Furthermore, no attempt is made by Canada to maintain a full spectrum of airpower roles and missions.

The election of the Conservative Government in January, 2006, offers a window of opportunity to fix the dysfunctional procurement system and to ensure that the Air Force is equipped with the right equipment, in the right num-

bers, to meet the strategic and tactical challenges facing the Canadian Forces in the early 21st century. This implies that the roles and missions of the Air Force need to be examined and adjusted as necessary.

There is an important industrial dimension to the equation. For reasons that are well known, the usual practice these days is to buy aircraft off-the-shelf from foreign suppliers. However, because there is a viable aerospace industry in this country, one that focuses on high-tech systems

Capability	Aircraft	Number	Acquired	Est. End Life	Remarks
Air Superiority	CF-18 Hornet	80	1982	2017	48aircraft operational
Medium Airlift	CC-150 Polaris	5	1993	2025	Limited freight cap. 2 air refueller
Tactical Airlift	1. C-130E 2. C-130H Hercules	19 13	1964 1975-97	2010 2020	5 air refueller
Tactical Helicopter	CH-146 Griffon	75	1995	2020	
Maritime Helicopter	CH-124 Sea King	27	1963	2005+	To be replaced by 28 CH-149 Cyclone
Maritime Patrol	CP-140 Aurora	18	1980	2015	
Sovereignty Patrol	CP-140A Arcturus	3	1991	2020+	
Search & Rescue Fixed Wing	1. C-130E 2. CC-115 Buffalo	10 6	1964-97 1967	2010 u/k	From Tac Airlift
Search & Rescue Helicopter	CH-149 Cormorant	15	2002	2020+	
VIP/Utility Airlift	1. CC-144 Challenger 2. CC-138 Twin Otter	6 4	1982- 2002 1970	2015	

Existing Aircraft Fleets

and services in niche markets, air force procurement should take advantage of domestic sources wherever practicable, to the mutual advantage of DND and Canadian industry.

Present Situation

As a matter of practical reality, the starting point in assessing the acquisition needs of the Air Force is the current array of equipment holdings. Given the advanced age of several existing fleets, it is not surprising that these and the roles they serve are largely a legacy of the Cold War, as may be seen in the above table.

Gen (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson served as Chief of the Defence Staff from 1986 to 1989, culminating a distinguished 38-year career with the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Forces. A fighter pilot, he commanded at every level of the Air Force prior to his appointment as CDS and served extensively with Canada's NATO Forces in Europe. Presently he is President of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. This article is a condensed extract from a major paper on defence acquisition published by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

Continued on page 6

This Table indicates that certain fleets are approaching the end of their service lives, and will therefore either have to be replaced soon or their missions deleted.

Factors Affecting Air Force Acquisition

In the face of today's greatly altered strategic environment, the usefulness of airpower has to be reassessed, to ensure that it is employed by Canada to best advantage. Fortunately, an inherent quality of airpower is its flexibility; more and more, thanks to technological advances, aircraft and mission systems can be brought to bear effectively



CP-140 Aurora

ERIC MORSE

in a wide array of operational circumstances. The CF-18 Hornet, for example, was deliberately acquired as a multi-role aircraft. To the greatest extent possible, future air fleet acquisitions should reflect the same sort of multi-role flexibility. This need is all the greater, given the combination of long in-service life of modern military aircraft and the certain prospect of changing strategic requirements during that extended lifetime.

An interesting feature of modern air force systems is the increasing degree to which on-board equipment contributes to overall system effectiveness. More and more, the

aircraft itself has become simply a platform for the carrying of very sophisticated high-tech systems, the effective life spans of which are considerably shorter than that of the aircraft (a consequence, of course, of the rapid pace of change of military systems technology). Systems upgrades, therefore, are the order of the day in many cases, with obvious cost advantages over complete aircraft replacement.

Strategic Requirements

The broad lines of the present and future strategic environment are generally understood. On this basis an ideal equipment framework can be postulated, but there will inevitably be capabilities that are beyond the reach of the Canadian Forces for either budgetary or policy reasons. Here is a reasonable estimate of the aircraft mission requirements that should be met by the Air Force over the next several decades, more or less in order of priority.

1. Control of the Air. This is the original and fundamental use of military aircraft. Without “fighters” (a misnomer), there is no “force” in air force. Control of the overhead airspace is vital to the effective operations of army and naval formations in combat and to the provision of tactical air support of these formations through ground and anti-ship attack, interdiction, and reconnaissance. At home, control of Canadian airspace is an essential requirement for defence against hostile incursions, whether by foreign nations or terrorists, and for the enforcement of national sovereignty.

2. Strategic Airlift. Recent operations have demonstrated the pressing need for assured access to very long range, large load capacity transport aircraft.

3. Tactical Airlift. Tactical transport aircraft are essential to the support of both domestic and overseas operations, for the initial rapid deployment of troops and equipment, and for sustaining in-theatre operations.

4. Helicopter Battlefield Mobility. The modern battlefield, in Afghanistan-type situations, demands a high degree of tactical mobility by land forces, as provided by light, medium and heavy lift helicopters.

5. Shipborne Helicopter Operations. Canada's fleet of Patrol Frigates and support ships would lose much of their operational capability without these helicopters.

6. Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Canada, as a vast three-ocean nation with the world's longest coastline and a sparsely populated northern region, needs the capability currently provided by the Aurora and Polaris fleets. Forecasts of global warming and related sovereignty challenges in the Arctic suggest that ISR will be increasingly important in the coming decades.

7. Tactical Air Reconnaissance. Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly useful in the so-called Three-Block War environment, as a means of securing fast tactical intelligence at minimal cost.

8. Search and Rescue. Although not strictly a military role, this has traditionally been carried out by the Canadian Forces with great skill and effectiveness.

9. Snowbirds. Canada's world-renowned Air Demonstration Team does not provide a direct military capability, but its contribution to pride and morale cannot be discounted.

10. Humanitarian Assistance. This important and traditional role will in all likelihood be carried out by existing equipment, in that no major procurement could be considered for this role alone, if only for cost reasons. Nevertheless, the utility of CF airlift and helicopter resources in this role needs to be taken into account in future procurement of these fleets.

11. VIP Transport. Again, this is a non-military role performed by the Canadian Air Force.

In addition to these aircraft-oriented missions, the Air Force will have to consider the retention or creation of a number of related capabilities having capital acquisition implications, but generally on a lesser scale than the aircraft systems mentioned above. These include long-range air surveillance radars, coastal radars, air traffic control systems, and communications systems, including space-based systems. Although not discussed in detail here, they are a part of the total acquisition picture.

Note also that flight training in Canada is a contracted-out operation, using relatively modern aircraft. It is therefore not considered in this appraisal.

Industrial Imperatives

Achieving the delicate balance between the capital needs of the Air Force on the one hand and regional industrial benefits on the other is always a challenge, but it is both a matter of political necessity and practical reality that large capital expenditures be conducted in such a way as to bring substantial benefit to industry while contributing to the establishment of a strong support base within our domestic industry. At the same time, however, this requirement must not be allowed to override the essential needs of



DND / PRIVATE PIERRE THÉRIAULT

CF-18 Hornet

the Canadian Forces, either by adversely influencing the selection of equipment, or by unduly adding cost, risk and time to a given acquisition program. Recent attempts to create a viable national strategy need to be brought to a successful conclusion.

Meanwhile, it is encouraging to note the use of Performance-Based Requirements (PBR) by DND, rather than the past practice of dictating greatly detailed design specifications to industry.

Continued on page 8

MARCH - APRIL 06 7

Options For Canada

Since the available defence budget is always finite, the acquisition of aircraft fleets not only has to be based on rational priorities within the air element, but important judgments also have to be made about air priorities relative to the needs of the Army, Navy and support elements. “Jointness” is the watchword.

Capital budget limitations may preclude what would otherwise be more efficient solutions. For example, the early procurement of a new fleet might well result in a lower long-term cost and greater operational effectiveness, but it might not be affordable. Similarly, leasing could be the only available solution, even though this might be more expensive over the life cycle of the system.

What follows is a set of proposed decision rules that could be useful in the conduct of capital equipment procurement for the Air Force over the next ten to fifteen years. These are arranged rather subjectively in their order of perceived importance. No attempt is made here to recommend specific solutions. That is the job of the Department of National Defence.

1. CF-18 Fleet. The current upgrade program gives the Hornet fleet a substantial boost in effectiveness across a wide range of missions and roles, and it will keep the fleet operationally effective through to the end of its life, around 2017. In the meantime, studies should be conducted to determine the best projected replacement option, including the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Low-cost, lower-performance alternatives may also have to be considered. Suggestions that UAVs may supplant manned fighters altogether in air superiority roles by 2017 seem highly unlikely.

2. Airlift. Strategic and tactical airlift must be considered together. The CF has an imperative requirement for both forms of military air transport. Although the roles themselves are distinct, there are aircraft in the marketplace which have the potential for performing both missions effectively. This option therefore deserves careful study. Furthermore, the recent practice (budget-induced) of leasing foreign strategic airlifters is an unsatisfactory solution. It presents the great risk to Canada of being low on the totem pole of bidders in times of greatest need, which at best would limit our operational response to crises, both domestic or international. There is also uncertainty about the reliability of suppliers and leasing costs in the long term. A “pooling” arrangement, wherein Canada would join allied air forces in a joint acquisition of strategic airlifters (in particular), deserves careful study. Again, there is a risk that shared use in time

of crisis would be problematical. Basing and maintenance problems can also be foreseen. All things considered, the best options for Canada would appear to be: (A) the outright purchase of modest fleets of both strategic and tactical airlift aircraft, or (B) the acquisition of a single fleet of strategic airlifters capable of performing both roles. The ultimate decision must be made on the basis of a rational comparison of key factors, including life-cycle cost.

3. Medium/Heavy Lift Helicopters. The acquisition of approximately 15 medium/heavy lift helicopters is an urgent requirement. These should be responsive to the needs of forces operating in a combined maritime-land theatre as well as purely army operations. Their utility in humanitarian support operations is important, as witnessed in recent global episodes such as the tsunami, hurricanes, and earthquakes.

4. Maritime Helicopter. The current program to replace the Sea King Helicopters must proceed with all due haste. Any further delays in phasing out the Sea Kings would have serious implications for operational effectiveness, flight safety and fleet maintenance costs.

4. Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft. The program to replace the Buffalo and Hercules in this role has been shamefully delayed. A new SAR aircraft needs to be selected quickly, if only to clear the way for other much-needed acquisitions.

Conclusion

Following through quickly on these programs will allow the Canadian Forces to perform effectively across the full range of operational undertakings foreseen in any likely defence policy statement. It will help to get rid of the dangerous backlog of much-needed upgrades of air assets that has build up over the last decade, and it will open the way for a rational, phased acquisition program in the longer term, thereby avoiding the fleet obsolescence problem that currently plagues the Air Force.

To be sure, solving the problem will take a generous measure of political courage, quick analysis and teamwork within DND, government as a whole, and industry.

Failure to act will have dire consequences for Canada’s ability to employ airpower effectively in meeting the tough challenges of the future. ♣

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

THE COUNTERREVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:

Fashionable thinking about defence ignores the great threats of our time

by Ralph Peters

Revolutions notoriously imprison their most committed supporters. Intellectually, influential elements within the military are locked inside the cells of the Revolution in Military Affairs – the doctrinal cult of the past decade that preaches that technological leaps will transcend millennia-old realities of warfare. Current conflicts have freed the Pentagon from at least some of the nonsensical theories of techno-war, but too many military and civilian leaders remain captivated by the notion that machines can replace human beings on the battlefield. Chained to their 20th-century successes, they cannot face the new reality: Wars of flesh, faith, and cities. Meanwhile, enemies, immediate and potential, appear to grasp the contours of future war far better than we do.

In Iraq's Sunni Triangle the *counter*revolution in military affairs is well underway. We are seduced by what we can do; our enemies focus on what they must do. We have fallen so deeply in love with the means we have devised for waging conceptual wars that we are blind to their marginal relevance in actual wars. Terrorists, for one lethal example, do not fear "network-centric warfare" because they have already mastered it for a tiny fraction of one cent on the dollar, achieving greater relative effects with the Internet, cell phones, and cheap airline tickets than all of our military technologies have delivered. Our prime weapon in our struggles with terrorists, insurgents, and warriors of every patchwork sort remains the soldier or Marine; yet, confronted with reality's bloody evidence, we simply pretend that other, future, hypothetical wars will justify the systems we adore – purchased at the expense of the assets we need.

There is, in short, not a single enemy in existence or on the horizon willing to play the victim to the military the United States continues to build. Faced with men of iron belief wielding bombs built in sheds and basements, our revolution in military affairs appears more an indulgence

than an investment. In the end, our enemies will not outfight us. We'll muster the will to do what must be done – after paying a needlessly high price in the lives of our troops and damage to our domestic infrastructure. We will not be beaten, but we may be shamed and embarrassed on a needlessly long road to victory.

Not a single item in the American trillion-dollar arsenal can compare with the genius of the suicide bomber – the breakthrough weapon of our time. Our intelligence systems cannot locate him, our arsenal cannot deter him, and, all too often, our soldiers cannot stop him before it is too late. A man of invincible conviction – call it delusion, if you will –

armed with explosives stolen or purchased for a handful of soiled bills can have a strategic impact that staggers governments. Abetted by the global media, the suicide bomber is the wonder weapon of the age.

The suicide bomber's willingness to discard civilization's cherished rules for warfare gives him enormous strength. We refuse to comprehend the suicide bomber's soul – even though today's wars are contests of souls, and belief is our enemy's ultimate order of battle. The suicide bomber can justify any level of carnage because he's doing his god's will. Islamist terrorists would do *anything* to win. Our enemies act on ecstatic revelations from their god. We act on the advice of lawyers.

The ultimate precision weapon, the suicide bomber simultaneously redefines the scope of "legitimate" targets. Delighted to kill, this implacable enemy who regards death as a promotion is equally ready to slaughter men, women, and children of unknown identity who have done him no harm. His force of will towers over our own.

We will develop the means to defeat the majority of, if not all, improvised explosive devices. But the suicide bomber – the living, thinking assassin determined to die – may prove impossible to stop. Even if we discover a means to identify him at a distance from our troops, he has only to turn to easier targets. Virtually anything the suicide bomber



MERRILL MORROW

**Forerunners: Afghan
Mujahideen ca. 1985**

Ralph Peters, a retired US Army officer, is the author of 21 books, including "New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy" and the forthcoming "Never Quit the Fight." This is an abridgement of his article that appeared in the Weekly Standard.

Continued on page 10

attacks brings value to his cause – destruction of any variety is a victory. The paradox is that his act of self-destruction is also an undeniable assertion that “I am,” as he becomes the voice from below that the mighty cannot ignore. We are trained to think in terms of cause and effect – but the suicide bomber merges the two. The gesture *and* the result

Revolution



USDOD

Advanced technology such as the Hellfire UAV and the Desert Patrol Vehicles exemplify the focus of attention in modern militaries.

are inseparable from and integral to his message. Self-destruction and murder join to become the ultimate act of self-assertion.

Even in the days before mass media, assassins terrorized civilizations. Today, their deeds are amplified by a toxic, breathtakingly irresponsible communications culture that spans the globe. Photogenic violence is no longer a local affair – if a terrorist gives the media picturesque devastation, he reaches the entire planet. We cannot measure the psychological magnification, although we grasp it vaguely. And the media’s liturgical repetition of the suicide bomber’s act creates an atmosphere of sacrament. On a primal

level, the suicide bomber impresses even his enemies with his conviction. We hasten to dismiss his deed as a perversion, yet it resounds as a vivid act of faith. Within his own cultural context, people may hate what the suicide bomber does, yet revere his sacrifice (and, too often, they do *not* hate what he does).

We may refuse to accept it, but suicide bombing operates powerfully on practical, emotional, and spiritual levels – and it generates dirt-cheap propaganda. To the Muslim world, the suicide bomber’s act is a proof of faith that ensnares the mind with a suspicion of his righteousness. He is a nearly irresistible champion of the powerless, the Middle East’s longed-for superhero, the next best thing to the Mahdi or the Twelfth Imam.

The hallmark of our age is the failure of belief systems and a subsequent flight back to primitive fundamentalism – and the phenomenon isn’t limited to the Middle East. Faith revived is running roughshod over science and civilization. Secular societies appear increasingly fragmented, if not fragile. The angry gods are back. And they will not be defeated with cruise missiles or computer codes.

Consistently disheartening is the endless attempts by intellectuals and intelligence professionals to explain religious terrorism in clinical terms, assigning rational motives to men who have moved irrevocably beyond reason. We suffer under layers of intellectual asymmetries that hinder us from an intuitive recognition of our enemies. Our rear-guard rationalists range from those convinced that every security problem has a technological solution, if only it can be found, to those who insist that members of al Qaeda and its affiliates are motivated by finite, comprehensible, and logical ambitions that, if satisfied, would make our problems disappear.

Honourable men and women have convinced themselves that Osama bin Laden’s professed goals of driving the United States from the Middle East and removing corrupt regional governments are what global terror is all about. They gloss over his ambition of reestablishing the caliphate and his calls for the destruction of Israel as rhetorical effects – when they address them at all. Yet, Islamist fanatics are more deeply committed to their maximalist goals than to their lesser ones – and their unspoken ambitions soar beyond logic’s realm. Religious terrorists are committed to an apocalypse they sense within striking distance. Their longing for union with god is inseparable from their impulse toward annihilation.

A dangerous asymmetry exists in the type of minds working the problem of Islamist terrorism in our governments and society. On average, the “experts” to whom we are conditioned to listen have a secular mentality (even if they go to church or synagogue from habit). And it is a very rare secular mind that can comprehend religious passion. Those who feel no vital faith cannot comprehend faith’s power. A man or woman who has never been intoxicated by belief will default to mirror-imaging when asked to describe terror’s roots. He who has never experienced a soul-shaking glimpse of the divine inevitably explains religion-driven suicide bombers in terms of a lack of economic opportunity or social humiliation. But the enemies we face are burning with belief, on fire with their vision of an immanent, angry god. Our intelligentsia is less equipped to understand such men than our satellites are to find them.

The struggle with Islamist terror (other religious terrors may haunt our descendants) has almost nothing to do with United States’s actions in the Middle East. It’s about a failing civilization’s embrace of a furious god.

We are not (yet) at war with Islam, but the extreme believers within Islam are convinced that they are soldiers in a religious war against us. Despite their rhetoric, *they* are the crusaders. Even our conceptions of the struggle are asymmetrical. Despite the horrors we have witnessed, we have yet to take religious terrorists seriously on their own self-evident terms. The United States invaded a succession of their tormented countries, but haven’t come close to penetrating their souls. The hermetic universe of the Islamist terrorist is immune to our reality (if not to our bullets), but our intellectuals appear equally incapable of accepting the religious extremist’s reality.

We have no tools of persuasion effective against a millenarian belief. What logic can we wield against the soul fortified by faith and barricaded beyond argument? We are told, rather smugly, that the Koran forbids suicide. But our enemies are not concerned with how we read their faith. Religions are living things, and ultra-extremists are improvising a new and savage cult within Islam – even as they proclaim their return to a purified faith.

Security-wise, we have placed our faith in things, in bright (and expensive) material objects. But the counterrevolution in military affairs is based on the brilliant intuition that the American military can be sidestepped often enough to challenge its potency. Certainly, we inflict casualties on our enemies – and gain real advantages from doing so – but we not only face an enemy who, as observed

above, views death as a promotion, but also one who believes he has won even when he loses. We underestimate the power of his faith, his most potent weapon. Which well-intentioned information operation of ours can compete with the conviction that a martyr’s death leads to eternal joy?

Counter-Revolution



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These Chechen mujahideen use expert knowledge, low technology and determination to achieve local victories as in this destruction of a Russian APC.

This century may prove to be one of multi-sided struggles over the interpretation of god’s will, between believers and unbelievers, between the varieties of the faithful, between monotheists and polytheists, between master faiths and secessionist movements, between the hollow worshipers of science and those swollen with the ecstasy of belief.

Naturally, we view the cardinal struggle as between the West and extremists within the Islamic world; yet, the bloodiest religious warfare of the coming decades may be between Sunni and Shia Muslims, or between African Mus-

Continued on page 12

lims and the new, sub-Saharan Church Militant. Hindu extremists gnaw inward from the epidermis of Indian society, while even Buddhist monks have engaged in organized violence in favor of their ostensibly peaceable faith. In a bewildering world where every traditional society is under assault from the forces of global change, only religion seems to provide a reliable refuge. And each god seems increasingly a jealous god.

Faith is the great strategic factor that unbelieving faculties and bureaucracies ignore. It may be the crucial issue of this century. Our guided bombs may kill individual terrorists, but the terrorist knows that our weapons can't kill his god.

The global media may skew secular, but that doesn't protect them against alternative forms of faith. Europeans, for example, have discarded a belief in God as beneath their sophistication – yet they still need a Satan to explain their own failures, just as their ancestors required devils to explain why the milk soured or the herd sickened. Today, America has replaced the horned, cloven-footed Lucifer of Europe's past; behind their smug assumption of superiority, contemporary Europeans are as superstitious and irrational as any of their ancestors: They simply believe in other demons.

One of the most perverse aspects of anti-Americanism in the global media and among the international intelligentsia is that it's presented as a progressive, liberal movement, when it's bitterly reactionary, a spiteful, elitist revolt against the empowerment of the common man and woman (the core ethos of the United States). Despite their outward differences, intellectuals are the logical allies of Islamist extremists – who are equally opposed to social progress and mass freedom. Of course, the terrorists have the comfort of religious faith, while the global intelligentsia, faced with the triumph of capitalism, has only its rage.

Human beings are hard-wired for faith. Deprived of a god, they seek an alternative creed. For a time, nationalism, socialism, Marxism, and a number of other-isms *appeared* to have a chance of working – as long as secular intellectuals rejected the evidence of Stalin's crimes or Mao's savagery (much as they overlook the brutalities of Islamist terrorists today). The intellectuals who staff the global media experienced the American-made destruction of their secular belief systems, slowly during the Cold War, then jarringly from 1989 to 1991. The experience has been as disorienting and infuriating to them as if we had proved to Muslim fanatics that their god does not exist.

The suicide bomber may be the weapon of genius of our time, but the crucial new strategic factor is the rise of a global information culture that pretends to reflect reality, but in fact creates it. Iraq is only the most flagrant example of the disconnect between empirical reality and the redesigned, politically inflected alternative reality delivered by the media. This phenomenon matters far more than the profiteers of the revolution in military affairs can accept – the global information sphere is now a decisive battleground. Image and idea are as powerful as the finest military technologies.

We have reached the point (as evidenced by the first battle of Falluja) where the global media can overturn the verdict of the battlefield. We will not be defeated by suicide bombers in Iraq, but a chance remains that the international media may defeat us. Engaged with enemies to our front, we try to ignore the enemies at our back – enemies at whom we cannot return fire. Indeed, if anything must be profoundly reevaluated, it's our handling of the media in wartime. This doesn't mean that all of the media are evil or dishonest. It means we need to have the common sense and courage to discriminate between media outlets that attempt to report fairly (and don't compromise wartime secrets) and those whose track records demonstrate their hostility to national purposes or their outright support for terrorists.

The media may constitute the decisive element in the global counterrevolution in military affairs, and the video camera – that insatiable accomplice of the terrorist – the cheap negation of our military technology. (And beware the growing capability of digital technology to create American "atrocities" from scratch.) We are proud of our ability to put steel precisely on target anywhere in the world, but guided bombs don't work against faith or an unchallenged flood of lies.

We need to break the mental chains that bind us to a technology-*über-alles* dream of warfare. Certainly, military technologies have their place and can provide our troops with useful tools. But technologies are not paramount. In warfare, flesh and blood are still the supreme currency. And strength of will remains the ultimate weapon. Welcome to the counterrevolution. ✳

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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO OUR CANADIAN OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS (THE COTC)?

By Honorary LCol Dr. Neville G. Poy O.C., OStJ

The COTC disappeared from our universities in the late-sixties. In retrospect, it must be said that we foolishly, and needlessly, abandoned a good thing.

Historically, the COTC produced excellent officers, who were graduates from Canadian universities, for both the Regular Force and the Reserves, thereby meeting both the military's need for superior quality leadership, and the need for a continuous awareness of the Canadian military's presence and purpose within our civilian population. One of the most significant casualties of the attrition of our military, which took place in the late sixties and seventies, was its discontinuation.

Canada has always played a significant role in serving the International Community by its determined commitment toward maintaining global peace and stability. We have committed to every United Nations endeavor requested of us in the past. Indeed, our future commitments appear to be increasing. Moreover, there will be a continuing need for an escalation of our military strength in order to guarantee our domestic security in the presence of increasing global terrorism, to act swiftly and effectively in dealing with any event of national disaster, and to enforce our sovereignty over our domestic perimeters.

There must, therefore, be a concomitant growth in the complement of officers capable of ensuring a command leadership of the highest order, if we are to produce, once again, a first-class military presence. A public interest in and awareness of these vital purposes must be realized once again. The restoration of the COTC, or of a similar entity, would be a desirable and effective way to achieve these ends.

It is with these thoughts in mind that I was led to enquire further into the possibility, or more importantly, the feasibility of bringing back an Officers' training programme to be sited in Canadian university and other tertiary educational settings. Without exception, all those with whom I

spoke reminisced nostalgically, praising the virtues of COTC. And all expressed interest in its re-establishment.

Having discussed these positive responses with my fellow Queen's York Ranger, LCol Michael Stevenson, and with MGen Reginald Lewis of the Royal Regiment of Canada, both of whom support the merits of COTC, I was encouraged to review the British system of the UOTC (University Officers' Training Corps) as it has existed uninterrupted, since before the First World War to the present day.

I visited, therefore, the United Kingdom to see, firsthand, their UOTC programme. I obtained the interest and approval of the Minister of National Defense, the Hon. Bill Graham, and the co-operation of the Canadian Defense Liaison Staff (CDLS London), who provided military escorts throughout my tour. My visit, in December 2005, was entirely self-funded.

Lt Col Stevenson, a former Green Howard during his service in the British Army before coming to Canada, arranged through his friend, Brig John Powell, Colonel of the Green Howards and Secretary-Chief Executive of the South East Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Association, my visitations to the Leeds and Oxford UOTCs.

My visit commenced in Richmond, the Regimental Headquarters of the Green Howards, with a visit to their splendid Regimental Museum, and a dinner following, hosted by Brig Powell.

The following day, I visited the Leeds UOTC. The Commanding Officer, Lt Col David O'Kelly, briefed me on their programme and accompanied me on a tour of the field exercises being undertaken by their Officer Cadets (OCdts). I chatted with many of the keen and determined young men and women enrolled in a variety of diverse under-graduate studies. The OCdts were undertaking both first and second year Military Training. The first year students were in their initial three months of training yet behaved as though they were veteran soldiers.

Salisbury was my next day's destination for a visit to the British Army's Land Command where I was escorted by Col Mathew Overton, the Senior Advisor for CDLS (London). Lt Col Stephen Hughes, who is responsible for policy direction for all nineteen UOTCs in Great Britain, gave me a comprehensive briefing on the national programme.

I then had the distinct privilege of meeting and conversing with the C-in-C, Gen Sir Richard Dannatt, who was on his way to the Balkans. We had a most relaxed time to-

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gether, discussing the UOTC and our affiliated regiments. He too, is a Green Howard.

The following morning, accompanied by Brig John Powell, and Cdr John Creber (of the Canadian Navy CDLS, London), who was my escort in Oxford, I visited the Oxford UOTC and met its Commanding Officer, Lt Col Nick Channer. We met further with Professor Stachan, who represented the MEC (Military Education Committee) of the Oxford University's Service Units. He enlightened me upon the composition, structure, and purpose of the MECs in their governance over the military and academic instruction of the OCdts, and their obligation to ensure a balanced mix of studies and military training, thereby avoiding any danger of academic compromise.

Thereafter, I visited Falklands House, the on-campus building housing the headquarters of the three University Service Units for the Army, the Royal Navy (the University Royal Naval Unit), and the Royal Air Force (the University Air Squadron). After receiving briefings from each of the Service Units, a tour was made of this spacious facility which houses administration, training, sports, and dining activities, and provides the opportunity for sizable social events.

What had I learnt?

I learned that the long, unbroken and proud history of military traditions, accomplishments, and strength of discipline in times of war and peace continued to be well borne out in the manner in which the British train their forces, beginning with their selection and cultivation of their Officer Cadets. The philosophy and aspirations inherent within the mandate of the UOTC were most evident.

The Mission of UOTC is stated to be: "To develop the Leadership potential of selected university students through enjoyable and challenging training, in order to communicate the values, ethos and career opportunities of the British Army".

Their emphasis is upon leadership training rather than the training of soldiers. Their desired end-state is that: "OTCs are to provide students who graduate with the best degrees of which they are capable, and who will be leaders in their field, whether in the army or elsewhere. They will hold the army in high regard from an informed perspective, thereby helping to maintain a fertile environment in their society for both the regular and territorial (reserve) army".

Any physically fit British, Irish, or Commonwealth citizen in tertiary education, with two or more years left in university, who are between the ages of 17 and one half and

less than 30 years, can join. There are no other prerequisites.

Training is conducted in the first two terms of each academic year, leaving the third term free for examinations. Academic obligations come first, and training is planned around them. Summer Camp is scheduled early to permit OCdts to take up summer employment, or other commitments or activities. Annual pay is based upon a minimum of 15 training periods fitted into evenings and week-ends throughout the academic year.

There are nineteen UOTCs, which are based in the largest cities around the U.K. Each UOTC serves those universities within, or in proximity to, its area. A UOTC may take its name from a city, Leeds University, for example, or from a larger geographic area such as the East Midlands.

Each University Service Unit has an MEC which provides academic representation from each of the constituent universities. It, thus, provides a formal conduit between the unit and the universities. The membership of the Committee can also include representatives such as the local Brigade Commander, and the Chair of the local Reserve Forces and Cadet Association, etc. Their principal responsibilities are to encourage and promote an interest in defence studies within their constituent universities and to supervise the University Service Units which are contained within their university, in order to ensure that students' military activities are not undertaken to the detriment of his or her academic welfare.

The OTC Syllabus includes a balance of military and adventurous training, and of sport and social activities. The military training comprises three levels which are referred to as Military Training Qualification (MTQ). The training syllabus is equivalent to that of the Territorial Army (TA) "potential officer" training course undertaken prior to admission to Sandhurst. However, anyone seeking a regular Army commission is required to restart training from scratch.

There is also a civilian vocational award from the City and Guilds Institute for those candidates who pass the Military Training Qualification 2 (MTQ2) Exam, an award which recognizes their achievement in leadership, organization and self-discipline, communication, teamwork, and analysis and problem solving. The award demonstrates to prospective employers their qualities of high capability, motivation, acceptance of responsibility, ability to thrive under pressure, and their capacity to enjoy new challenges and to appreciate the opportunity of developing new skills.

In 2004, the OTC retention rate was 64% over the two year period.. The total strength of the Corps was 4,500, made up of OCdts, Young Officers, and Sponsored Army Bursars. The total cost of operating the OTC programme was just under 27 million pounds, which equates to approximately 6,000 pounds per head, including all the costs of regular Army and Army Reserve part-time instructional staff, property maintenance, office running costs, fuel, etc. It takes at least two academic years to train an OCdt to the standard required for the Army Reserve commissioning course, so the final cost to produce an officer candidate is 12,000 pounds.

The universities do not permit the OTC to act as a formal recruiting organization. Consequently, there is no obligation, upon graduation, to continue with military service. Nonetheless in 2004, some 42% of the Regular Army entrants of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst were ex-OTC. They accounted for 44% of the successful Sandhurst graduates as they have a lower wastage rate in training. Moreover, 47% of the Territorial Army Reserve Commissions awarded were from the OTC.

There is a remarkably healthy attitude within the UOTC student body. They develop an Esprit de Corps and camaraderie that enriches their university experience. Their adventurous experiences, sports activities, and social events present a long-lasting bonding, and a healthy life-style. Their teamwork and competitive spirit is exemplified by their participation in adventurous and sporting events. Every year the British Army runs a Cambrian Patrol Exercise in the rugged mountains of Wales. The event is open to Regular

Army and TA units, and UOTCs, as well as to teams from foreign countries. Last year this also included teams from the Canadian Army. As a testimony to success of the Corps, the Leeds UOTC won a gold medal, 4 UOTCs won silver medals, and 7 won bronze medals. Only one 'B' team withdrew; but of the 88 teams to enter, 27 did not complete the course.

Essentially there are three types of members of the OTC:

- 1 Those committed to joining the Army as officers in the regular Army or Reserve.
- 2 Those who definitely do not intend to pursue a military career, but who may one day be future employers, opinion formers and decision makers.
- 3 Those who are undecided and need more time to make an informed choice.

Based upon my observations and the data provided by the UOTC, I am most impressed with the British system of UOTC Officer Training. I believe that a further study of this system, and of its relationship to the merits of our extinct, but previously highly successful COTC programme, would be desirable. A resumption, either of the original COTC programme, or an integration of the positive aspects of the United Kingdom UOTC into our existing Officers Training programme, deserves serious consideration. 🍁

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LCol Poy (second from left) with British UOTC colleagues.

“OCH LADDIE - ‘TIS A FINE IDEA - BUT WHO PAYS?”

by Col (Ret'd) Brian MacDonald



Dearest Virginia, you say that you would like a nice bedtime story tonight—one full of villains and treachery and gold and heroes with shining swords rescuing a fair damsel? Well, I'm not sure I can produce a fair damsel for you, but I might be able to do something about the rest of your requirements.

Shall I tell you about the Canadian 2006 election campaign and the defence budget? It certainly had a lot of politicians making promises to replace the old rusty swords of the Canadian Forces with nice sharp, shiny new ones. You can make up your own mind as to whether they were villains or heroes at the end of our story.

Our story opens with the 2005 Liberal budget that promised a 31% increase in the defence budget by 2009/10, from 15.1 billion dollars to 19.8 billion dollars. Lots of gold there, Virginia!

The budget showed that almost all of the new gold was going to be put in the capital account, which would rise by no less than 67%, going from 2.266 billion dollars in 2005/06 to 6.053 billion dollars in 2009/10. Lots of shiny swords there, Virginia.

It was a triumphal answer to those nasty doomsayer analyst villains who kept harping about “CF Rustout,” and “The Mass Extinction of the Canadian Forces,” and kept producing Powerpoint presentations and booklets with scaremongering tables covered in red and yellow boxes showing equipment either past its Treasury Board “pull-by date,” or perilously close to it.

“Take that, Sirrah,” the politicians cried! “Begone foul villains, doomsayers, and you nattering nabobs of negativism! The Golden Age for the Canadian Forces is at hand! The Long Night has Ended! A New Dawn Has Come!”

“Now is the winter of our discontent made glorious summer by this sun of York, And all the clouds that loured upon our house, in the deep bosom of the ocean buried!”

But, Ah Virginia, you sweet child, as you well know, every long slow curve comes with a fast break at the end.

When the election was over, and as a new government was getting itself organized to be installed, some unknown creature, probably a fairy, since this is a fairy tale, left a brown bag on the doorstep with a new budget table in it, with a sixth

year added, a year that hadn't been there in the 2005 budget that we had been shown before.

What's that, Virginia? You darling child—you did notice! A pea has disappeared from under a walnut shell—in fact it is a rather large pea that has just disappeared—a 3.6 billion dollar pea!

In Year Six of the former government's plan, 3.6 billion dollars has suddenly disappeared from the defence budget. And guess where that \$3.6 billion dollar cut landed.

Oh, Virginia, you are paying attention tonight. That's right—it came out of the defence capital budget. Lucy has pulled the ball away again, just as Charlie Brown was going to kick it for the winning field goal.

And now, Virginia, what does it all mean? Well at least we get the benefit of the “bump” in the capital budget. Even if it is only for three

years, it still represents about 6.8 billion more in the capital budget.

And maybe the new government will live up to its fine promises to do better than its predecessor in exchanging shiny swords for rusty ones.

But, dearest Virginia, like the favourite expression of the thrifty Scots factors of the Company of Gentlemen Adventurers Trading Into Hudson's Bay at the top of our little story, the real question will be whether these fine promises will be reflected in the upcoming budget, and whether, for a starter, that 3.6 billion cut in the Year 6 capital budget will be reversed.

What's that, Virginia? You don't think that the analyst doomsayers were really the villains of the story? You have someone else in mind? You *are* a perceptive child! ♦

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	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6
	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11
Capital	2.266 bn	2.252	2.850	4.993	6.053	2.429
Pay of the Forces	3.970	4.021	3.942	3.940	3.940	3.940
Other	8.853	8.637	9.038	9.769	9.788	9.788
Total	15.089	14.910	15.830	18.702	19.781	16.157

The 3.6 Billion Dollar Pea

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