



SITREP

A PUBLICATION OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

‘OUTLOOK IRAQ’: CISS/RCMI SEMINAR ADDRESSES POLITICAL AND MILITARY FUTURES IN IRAQ

On July 11 the Institute hosted with the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies the Conference “**Outlook Iraq: Prospects for Stability in the Post-Saddam Era**”.

The keynote speaker, H. E. Howar Ziad, Ambassador of Iraq to Canada spoke passionately and eloquently about the challenges facing Iraq after decades of turmoil. Featured panelists who gave their perspectives were Ambassador Michael Bell - former Canadian Ambassador to Jordan, Israel and Egypt, Nahlah Ayed – the CBC’s Beirut correspondent, and Major Joel Rayburn US Army – Commander’s Advisory Group, US Central Command. Key themes were: the willingness of the international community and most importantly, the US, to “stay the course” by not withdrawing prematurely as the British did in 1927; partitioning or decentralization into three internal communal entities – Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites; and, addressing issues from a regional perspective. The issue of “staying the course” has striking relevance to Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan. ✦



Michael Bell



Nahlah Ayed



Maj Joel Rayburn



H.E. Howar Ziad, Ambassador of Iraq

—RCMI / ERIC MORSE

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From the Editor's Desk

With the arrival of summer comes the most recent and much needed Federal Government announcements on defence procurement that will in some measure address the years of neglect of our Canadian Forces by the former government and, by extension, of Canadians in general. This should greatly strengthen Canada's ability to respond to natural emergencies at home and internationally as a tool of diplomacy.

Still to materialize is the election promise to increase the size of the Force. Given the present operational and personnel tempo that has one-third of the operationally fit troops deployed on operations, one-third training and preparing to deploy, and a third returning, this increase in personnel is vital to the present and future sustainability of operations. With the evolution of conflict from classical peacekeeping through to Full Spectrum Operations and Canada's International Policy Statement of Diplomacy, Defence, Development and Commerce and the Canadian-sponsored UN report "The Responsibility to Protect" on human security, the Canadian Forces is performing admirably representing Canadians around the world. .

The cost of maintaining such a military does not have to be at the cost of other national programs. Detractors of the military might say otherwise, but it is not a zero sum game. Canada is rich enough to be able to support all national programs including fixing her military. Canada and Canadians need to unconditionally support the men and women that go into harm's way on our behalf by giving them the very best resources possible to ensure the success of their missions and their safe return home to their families.

With the shift to a NATO lead mission in Afghanistan in July, Professor Alexander Moens provides an excellent article on NATO military and political transformation and NATO and Canadian interests converging in Afghanistan as the priority area for NATO operations.

As Canada's contribution to the world is evolving, Dr. Adam Chapnick's examination of the immutable constants of Canadian foreign policy is very timely. He suggests that changes in the international environment do not change the fact that Canada's foreign policy has always been to protect and preserve the national interest.

LCdr (Ret'd) David Steele provides an interesting enquiry into the experience of junior Naval officers as they join the fleet and make the difficult transition from trainee to leader in a highly class-stratified society. His insightful article makes suggestions to improve the transition experience.

Hekmat Karzai and Dr. Paul Mitchell from the Canadian Forces College have provided a thought-provoking contribution that posits: "While US forces sometimes style themselves as "Knowledge warriors", the 18th Century roots of today's military establishments will undermine their hopes for military 'transformation': terrorists and insurgents are the real 21st Century organizations." They may very well be correct.

We hope that you, our readers, find these articles both interesting and informative. Sincerely,



Chris Corrigan
Colonel (Ret'd)
Editor of *SITREP*



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426 University Avenue,
Toronto, Ontario, M5G 1S9
416-597-0286/1-800-585-1072
Fax: 416-597-6919

Editorial E-Mail: ccorrigan1@cogeco.ca
Website: www.rcmi.org

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE MIDDLE POWER MUDDLE

by Adam Chapnick

The term middle power was first used in the Canadian context in the early 1940s. Countries such as Canada, not important enough to be considered great powers, but far too important to be relegated to the category of small powers, sought to create a distinct position for themselves in the postwar international community, one that would be recognized through special status on the UN Security Council.

The Council would have three tiers of powers: the great ones would have permanent seats and veto powers; the middle ones, like Canada, would receive preferential treatment in the selection of non-permanent members; and the small powers would get what was left over.

The idea failed to result in anything substantive, but the idea of Canada as a middle power became entrenched in the Canadian public mindset. As a result, before the war was over, middle power began to acquire a second meaning.

Canadians, among others, began to identify middle powers based on their capacity to contribute to specific international issues.

There were, it was said, great powers, that would have influence on every issue. There were also small powers, whose views would never really make a difference. Then there were those, like Canada, that could be important in certain situations and therefore deserved influence based on their capacity to contribute.

The new functional assertion reflected a confidence and awareness within the country that Canada was, in our current prime minister's words, not an island, and that it had a duty to contribute to world affairs to the best of its ability.

It was made official in a speech given by the Minister of External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, in Toronto on 13 January 1947. The talk is known today as the Gray Lecture, named after a Cana-



—NFB PHOTOTHEQUE

The Rt. Hon Louis S. St. Laurent, who first enunciated Canada's role as a middle power in 1947.

dian war hero, but at the time was simply called 'The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs.'

In his speech, St. Laurent defined what he saw as the five principles of Canadian foreign policy: (1) the maintenance of national unity; (2) respect for political liberty; (3) the importance of the rule of law in international affairs; (4) promotion of the values of a Christian civilization; and (5) active involvement in international affairs.

St. Laurent committed Canada to working with the United States, with the Commonwealth, with France, and through international organizations such as the United Nations to promote active and responsible international citizenship.

At the same time, he made it clear that Canada was not a great power nor did it aspire to be one. As a secondary power,

it would work within the limitations of its size and strength, and it recognized that its most effective work would be conducted multilaterally.

From one perspective, the lecture was an announcement that Canada was ready to participate in international relations in a serious way, that it had values that it believed in, and that it accepted its role as an active player in the Cold War. But it is also worth noting that the first principle cited by St. Laurent had nothing to do with international activism; rather, it stated that when it came to foreign policy, Canada would look at its domestic situation first.

What resulted, then, were two conflicting visions of what it meant for Canada to be an active player in world affairs.

The more optimistic, or idealistic, among the Canadian public took from the Gray Lecture that as a middle power, Canada had a worldly duty to spread its values and beliefs through multilateral engagement and good international behaviour.

In other words, they slowly transformed the meaning of middle power from a term which had been referring to the quantity of a state's actions – middle powers were in the middle because they simply did more than small powers and less than great ones – to one which referred to the quality of international behaviour. Middle powers had become the states that mediated, conciliated, participated in international peacekeeping missions, and were generally good global citizens.

Being a middle power gradually came to give Canadians feelings of moral superiority; they were the ones who constrained

*Dr. Adam Chapnick upon completing his doctoral studies in history, taught at the University of Toronto in the areas of Canadian external relations and pedagogical development. In 2005, he was awarded a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council post-doctoral fellowship. His most recent book, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* was short-listed for the Dafoe Prize, recognizing the best book on Canada or Canada in the world in 2005. His article, "Peace, Order, and Good Government: The 'Conservative' Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy" was awarded the Cadieux Prize, recognizing the best article written in 2005 in *International Journal*. Dr. Chapnick's current major research project is a biography of the late Canadian diplomat and commentator, John W. Holmes.*

the great powers and acted as the world's conscience when things got out of hand.

At the same time, however, the reality of the Canadian foreign policy program was that, like any other state, Canada protected its own interests first.

The government in Ottawa joined NATO, for example, because it kept the United States engaged in the international community and promoted cooperation among the Western allies.

The largely Canadian solution to the Suez crisis was designed to save face for Britain and France, two crucial Cold War allies, while preserving NATO, avoiding the disintegration of the Commonwealth, minimizing the risk of a great power conflict, and propping up the credibility of the United Nations, all reasons that served Canadian interests.

Canada participated actively in successive rounds of the GATT negotiations because its negotiators recognized that the Canadian economy, which relied so heavily on foreign trade, would benefit significantly from a system of enforceable international rules and regulations.

Canada developed a foreign development assistance policy throughout the Cold War that was also less than entirely generous, and nearly always designed with Canadian domestic interests in mind, be they improving relations with French-speaking Africa to assuage concerns in Quebec, supporting non-aligned states like India to keep them from turning to the Soviet Union, or propping up the Canadian agricultural industry through policies of tied aid.

So, indeed, Canada often worked multilaterally during the Cold War, and it often mediated, conciliated, and participated in international peacekeeping missions. All the while, however, Canadians were acting in their own interests.

The end of the Cold War had a profound impact on the international system and, consequently, a serious effect on Canada's worldwide position. Now that the West had won, a number of the former middle power roles that Canada had played in the past were no longer needed, or important.

Traditional peacekeeping missions – meant to prevent direct great power confrontations – were becoming obsolete. International organizations whose most significant purpose had been to keep the great powers on speaking terms also lost their traditional identities.

In the meantime, the UN Security Council was freed from years of deadlock caused by great power vetoes and began to intervene more aggressively in both inter- and also intra-state disputes.

While this was all taking place, successive Canadian governments cut funding to the military, to international development assistance, and to the foreign service, leaving the country in no position to play a particularly meaningful role in world affairs.

In response, a so-called 'new' belief in the importance of protecting individual human beings from the dangerous effects of international conflict became the driving idea in the national foreign policy dialogue.

The Conservatives under Brian Mulroney called this the 'new internationalism' and the Liberals, under Jean Chrétien, called it 'The Human Security Agenda,' and then under Paul Martin, the 'new multilateralism' and the 'responsibility to protect.'

At their cores, these terms were hardly different. The idea was that in a post-Cold War era the individual state's role in world affairs was declining. States were failing, governments could not take care of their own citizens, and it had become incumbent on the stable governments of the world to protect individuals, even if this meant intervening in another state's affairs without its permission.

Security therefore came to mean more than just defence against military attack; it now included defence against environmental degradation, against human rights abuses, against starvation, and against unstable and unjust governments.

Promoting human security became the so-called new middle power role, and as the world's self-appointed leading middle power, Canadians took up the agenda, or at least its rhetoric, in earnest, leading initiatives to ban anti-personnel landmines and found an international criminal court.

At the same time, the Canadian government's commitment to international humanitarian assistance continued to decline as a percentage of GDP, Canada's contribution to UN peacekeeping decreased, morale in the foreign service suffered, and the meaning of human security was increasingly adjusted to better reflect Canadian interests. Kosovo, for example, would likely not have been considered a human security issue in the early 1990s but it became one later on when Canadians felt obligated to participate.

In the post-911 era a lot has changed. The United States, whose interests cannot help but influence Canadian priorities, is focused on security with an intensity that has not been seen since the Second World War. America has also assumed a more unilateralist attitude. Rather than permanent alliances, it prefers ever-shifting coalitions of willing allies. And rather than cooperation, it seeks unquestioned support.

Where does this leave Canada?

I would argue that the changes in the international environment do not change the Canadian position very much.

First of all, the bases of the Canadian national interest has not changed. Canada is still a sparsely populated large northern landmass heavily dependent on foreign trade for its economic survival.

As a military non-power, it continues to have to rely on world-wide stability, and multilateral institutions that promote negotiated settlements to both economic and political disputes, to ensure its continued economic growth and national prosperity.

It continues to be a direct neighbour of the United States, overwhelmingly dependent on the American economy and also the American military for its continued success.

In short, the world has changed, but Canadian needs to prosper have not.

It should therefore come as no surprise that the most recent International Policy Statement said very little that was new.

CANADA AND NATO: MERGING TRANSFORMATIONS

by Alexander Moens

Converging Interests

In the last few years Canadian, American, and NATO interests have merged around a similar key objective. Canada's interest in assisting the US at the military level in the war against terror has blended with our experience in stabilizing post-combat societies. Security operations beyond the European mainland have created a de facto need for NATO action as no other organization in the world can provide the military organization and means to do it. For the United States—heavily committed in Iraq as it is—allyed cooperation and allied resources are increasingly valued in easing the resource and manpower burden.

Thus, the initial difference in approach between the United States and major European countries on how to tackle the global war on terror and political transformation in the Middle East has narrowed. The United States needs nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Europeans and Canadians need military power to do their share of the job. There is only one vehicle through which Canadian and European allies can maximize their efforts while working closely with the United States and that is the Atlantic Alliance.

The challenge for Canada and other NATO allies is how quickly they can improve their capabilities and coordinated efforts in order to maximize their contribution to this mission and to increase interoperability with the US. The issue is not only—in the words of Lieutenant-General Michel Maisonneuve, the former Canadian Chief of Staff at NATO's Transformation Command—"doing the same things better, but also doing better things."¹

The threat facing Canada and NATO has transformed. Whether to stop terror or to rebuild a terror-invested state, modern militaries are dealing with what General Hillier calls, "the

snakes: non-state actors who respect no boundaries, obey no rules and are impossible to deter."²

Unlike some old UN missions, in NATO's new operational environment, showing up is not enough. The contribution has to be a strong value added. If not, a member not only risks its own forces, but increasingly also those of others in the area of operations.

NATO transformation is an opportunity for willing allies to work together on improving coordination, jointness, and creating shared tasks, and even adding new common assets. Keep in mind that NATO's few common assets are mostly from the Cold War era. Why should it not add new shared tools in the new threat environment? NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT) set up for this new initiative is foremost an ideas generator. ACT's Commander is a US General who is double-hatted with the US Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia. There is a hard-to-overestimate advantage for NATO by being located next door to the American transformational headquarters.

The concepts and ideas that lie behind NATO's Transformation Command fit into two key American objectives: to let NATO learn and adapt from US Joint Forces experience and to guide nations through transformation without each country having to re-invent the wheel. The end goal is to prepare NATO for more expeditionary capability and better interoperability.

NATO transformation is not simply a one-way street. To reduce costs, both Canada and the United Kingdom have obtained jointness in some of their operations beyond what the Americans have achieved so far. Similarly, some of the lessons learned by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan have helped improve US and Iraqi operations in Iraq.

Beside generating new concepts, ACT also analyzes 'lessons identified' in the NATO operational experience. It trains new headquarter teams on the new tactics. At the end of the day, ACT advises the member nations and the NATO structures on how they can improve procedures and capabilities as well as design, equip, and deploy more effective forces.

At roughly the same time NATO decided to set up a separate command for transformation, it agreed to create a new high readiness force. The NATO Response Force (NRF) was given a wide mandate to undertake missions ranging from humanitarian action to entry-level combat. The plan was to create a form of synergy where ideas from ACT and practical needs for the NRF would stimulate the allies into quick action. Because NRF is to be a high readiness force, early planning and force generation is required. In practice, NATO's extensive operations in Afghanistan have demanded as much relevant military change as gearing up the new NRF.

*Alexander Moens is a professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver. He teaches American Foreign Policy and the Political and Security Relations between Europe and North America. He is the author of *The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush: Values, Strategy, Loyalty* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, November 2004) as well as *Foreign Policy Under Carter* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). His work on European Security Issues includes one edited and two co-edited books: *Disconcerted Europe: The Search for a New Security Architecture* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the Cold War's End to the Age of Terrorism* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2003), and *Foreign Policy Realignment in the Age of Terror* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003). He is a researcher with the Council For Canadian Security in the 21st Century, and a Fellow of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. In 2002, he was appointed Senior Fellow in American Policy at the Fraser Institute in Vancouver, BC.*

The author wishes to acknowledge the Security and Defence Forum Special Projects Fund in the Department of National Defence in Ottawa for research assistance that contributed to the writing of this article.



The operations in Afghanistan have again underscored the fact that many NATO allies still have a dearth of expeditionary forces and that the level of cooperation among allies is often paper-thin. Hence, the approach to speeding up NATO change has taken on considerable urgency.

Connecting Transformation in Canada and in NATO

Military capacity must first be built at home before it can be put to work abroad in ways that multiply its effect. In Canada's case, the change was already in the offing as we absorbed the frustrating lessons of light peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era, especially in the UN missions in Croatia and Bosnia. What was missing in the puzzle was a genuine commitment on the part of the civilian power to halt the Canadian Forces on their downward slope of equipment and personnel burnout. As is often the case, crises in the real world help focus the government's purpose. The Canadian government recognized that the defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants had to be secured while the stabilization of a new political and economic order had to be safeguarded by the use of armed force.

To come up to speed to this new task, Canada has suddenly halted its declining defence budget, created a new command structure and has started immediate equipment purchases to make its expeditionary capability stronger. The new Canadian Command structure with multiple headquarters outside of National Defence Headquarters reflects not only an emphasis on homeland defence, but also on the new tasks of special operations, and expeditionary forces. Canada is set to shed its 'niche' capability and replace it with a "strategically relevant and tactically decisive role" in Alliance operations.³

The multiplier effect for Canadian interests in international security is to work in coalitions of the committed. There is no doubt that a new area of synergy between Canadian and NATO objectives is in full fledge even though the public debate in Canada has not yet fully absorbed this change.

The need for sharing and stretching command abilities and resources brought the International Security Assistance Force under NATO's auspices. From patrolling Kabul, NATO is fanning out to the provinces, now including the difficult south. Next,

in the planned "Stage 4" of NATO's deployment force levels will go from some 17,000 to 25,000 with operations spread over the entire country.⁴ At some point, we can expect the US role to be mainly one of support and back-up forces as NATO operates in all areas of the country. Possibly, the US is looking at Iraq and Afghanistan in similar ways: with Iraqi Security Forces in Iraq and NATO troops in Afghanistan providing the boots on the ground while US forces concentrate on key pressure points.

More European NATO allies will begin to appreciate the objectives of NATO transformation as they deploy in Afghanistan. There will be enormous pressure to make a variety of military tasks as efficient as possible, including air lift, (both long and short), logistics, information management, and intelligence gathering and sharing.

Still, as the saying goes, everyone likes transformation but no one likes change. Even NATO's transformational goals can be thwarted by nations keen on locking in organizational or budgetary advantages while barely changing the status quo.

Allied Command Transformation has identified several areas of priority. We are now entering a second stage where implementation by the NATO nations is at focus. These areas include the following:

- Shorter and more streamlined national equipment acquisition processes.
- Better and quicker information management at ever lower levels in the military operation. Allies need to set up an interoperable network of communications perhaps even construct a new architecture that can be turned into a common asset.
- Expeditionary forces can be as much as ten times more expensive as static homeland defence forces. ACT has made it clear that European NATO allies cannot both continue to cut their defence budgets and transform their expeditionary capacity. At its meeting in Istanbul in 2004, NATO has set 40% as the expeditionary target for how members should structure, prepare and equip their land forces and 8% as the minimal number ready to go or actually deployed.
- The practice of writing an extensive lessons-learned paper that appears many months later will not do. Lessons need

An older era — the 8th Canadian Hussars Battle Group, Hohenfels, Germany, 1989

—COL. CHRIS CORRIGAN



to be identified and applied quickly. The US practice of sending an experienced team into the middle of an operation to find out what is going right and wrong and report within days or weeks is one of the transformation processes NATO needs to take to heart.

- Some specialization of resources and capacity is necessary even though nations cannot leave very big holes in their defence. The Alliance must add common assets such as a NATO logistics Command. A single network would replace various national supply chains.

NATO needs more than military transformation; it also needs political transformation. The real test of the NRF will come when it is needed for a task more challenging than humanitarian assistance. The current uncertainty about whether the NRF will be a first in or a contingency force must be removed beforehand. At the same time, the North Atlantic Council must be given the power to instruct committees and organs below it to operate on less than a consensus basis to speed up changes.

Members that do not contribute forces to a NATO operation should not have the power to block it. NATO must also create a set of limited criteria whereby nations can apply operational caveats to their forces or equipment. The bar should be as high as possible to facilitate higher levels of operational dependence among contributors.

The practice of 'costs lie where they fall' by which nations that contribute forces must pay all their own costs should be changed to differential fees where those nations who do not deploy pay more into NATO funded or supported aspects of the operation.

Finally, the interchange between NATO common assets and EU common assets should become a two-way traffic. As NATO command and control assets assist certain EU operations such as in Bosnia, so EU civilian and police assets should also be made available to NATO missions. At the same time, more synergy and alignment must be found between European defence armaments agency initiatives and NATO transformation.

Conclusion

We have seen that NATO and Canadian interests converge on Afghanistan as the priority area for NATO operations. We have also seen that the transformation sought in Canada matches the transformation process begun in NATO and that Canada will have much to gain from European allies boosting their expeditionary capacity as a result. Finally, it is worth noting that NATO has begun to think about its overall role in terms similar to Canadian foreign policy objectives.

Canada has placed its military contributions within a results-based approach. The integrated effect of diplomacy, defence, and development is aimed to stabilize a conflict-ridden area so that political and economic functions can be created or restored that remove both the sources of strife and the resulting violence.

In the same vein, NATO is proposing an 'effects-based approach' in which closer cooperation with non-military international organizations and non-governmental organizations is sought to secure the long-term success of its operations. The "effect" sought, in the words

of Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, ACT's Deputy Commander, will require the application of the full range of military and non-military levers."⁴ ♦

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

NOTES

¹ Lieutenant-General J. O. Michel Maisonneuve, "NATO's ACT: A Powerful Permanent Change Agent," May 8, 2006.

² General Rick Hillier, "NATO Transformation: Canada's Contribution," *On Track*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Winter 2005, p. 7.

³ Senior military official at National Defence Headquarters, author interview, February 17, 2006.

⁴ James Kitfield, "Divided We Fall," *National Journal*, April 8, 2006, p. 20.



—DND / CPL ROBIN MUGRIDGE, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA

A new era — Canadians set up a Village Medical Outreach station at Platoon House Gumbad in the Shah Wali Kot district of Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.

THE REALITY OF SOCIAL CLASS IN THE MODERN NAVY

by Cdr (Ret'd) David G Steele

A wag once said that the Navy was all about 300 years of tradition unimpeded by progress. Even Winston Churchill, when pressed on the subject, is reputed to have said, "Tradition? Monstrous! Nothing but rum, buggery, and the lash." Such acid wit aside, it is safe to say that the Navy remains a very tradition-bound entity that, in many ways, is still 19th-century at heart, particularly in the social context. While the overwhelming majority of the social norms of the Navy reflect those in society at large, there is an underlying social structure that remains from Nelson's day, and which arguably no longer exists in the broader sense of Canadian society. This class division exists, for better or for worse, between the officers, as the leader or *de facto* upper class, and the sailors as the working-class.

There is a perception today that junior officers entering the fleet are having some difficulty adjusting to the social realities of the Navy. It seems there is, in some cases, a hesitancy to assume the full role of officer, and to embrace the status and attendant responsibilities of the "upper" or leader class. There is a perceived reluctance on the part of some junior officers to superordinate themselves above those sailors who would otherwise be their peers in society. In short, there seems to be an inherent, initial lack of awareness of the existence of, or need for, a hierarchical class separation in the navy. There is even, in some cases, a subsequent rebellion against or rejection of that system amongst junior officers. Although most junior officers overcome this difficulty in relatively short order, a smoother transition would undoubtedly benefit all concerned.

It has been noted that this particular phenomenon is a relatively recent occurrence in the Navy. In the past, aspiring junior officers spent considerable time at sea in training destroyers and were able to experience firsthand the social strata that exist in ships, without the burden of having to assume a leadership position. For the latest generation of officers however, the training ships have been eliminated from the fleet, and the overall train-

ing program has been significantly shortened. In the past, the aspiring officer would undergo his training in real ships manned by real sailors. The modern aspirants, however, do a significant portion of their training in simulators, and in many cases, have no real, sustained interaction with sailors until they are thrust into a leadership position upon joining the fleet.

The unfortunate result is that the aspiring junior officers are placed in operational ships before having truly completed their development, or having had a chance to adjust to their new roles as leaders. This situation becomes doubly difficult because the junior officer must depend, to a certain extent, on the help of the sailors to complete his training, and then the next day must assert himself as their superior. This dichotomous relationship makes it more difficult than necessary for the junior officer to grow into his role as leader, and is also somewhat confusing to the sailors onboard. This awkward relationship places the junior officer at odds with well-established psychosocial norms of affiliation behaviour.

In the broadest context, class consciousness has been included as an important element of the psychology of the self, along with race and gender identity, and it has been theorized that a change in social status can often instigate a crisis in self-identity. This may be an important underlying element of the transitional difficulties experienced by junior officers joining the fleet.

If class consciousness is a fundamental element of the self, it is hypothesized that a person undergoing a change in class status (e.g. a junior officer transitioning from trainee to leader) would experience a change in self-identity, characterized in part by a process of class adaptation by way of a series of steps: class awareness, class identity, and class affiliation. In this hypothesis, social class refers to a particular location within a class-stratified society and is generally differentiated by occupational prestige, education, and income. Class awareness, or consciousness, refers to subjective awareness of class relations, and class identity refers to a subjective sense that one belongs to a particular social class or group. Finally, class affiliation refers to the public declaration of the claimed class identity.

The trigger that initiates the class adaptation process in junior officers is likely similar to the phenomenon of upward social mobility as experienced in the general population, although perhaps more intensely felt, since the organizational context is much more sharply defined.



1805 — Adm Lord Collingwood, Nelson's second in command at Trafalgar, typifies the traditional class structure among naval officers

Cdr (Ret'd) David G. Steele prior to retirement held the appointment of Vice Director NORAD Plans and Policy in Colorado Springs where he was responsible for integrating maritime surveillance into the rubric of continental defence. In addition to holding a variety of headquarters positions, he served at sea in HMC Ships SASKATCHEWAN, QU'APPELLE, HURON, PROTECTEUR, SKEENA and most recently as Executive Officer in HMCS OTTAWA during the Arabian Gulf operations of 2002. He is also a veteran of the Gulf and Kuwait campaign of 1991. This article is an abridgement of an RCMI sponsored research paper written as a partial requirement to the completion of his MA from Royal Roads University.

This class adaptation process can be viewed as a critical subset of the larger process of how junior officers develop a sense of themselves. It is hypothesized that an officer who experiences a rapid and positive journey to leadership class affiliation is likely to develop a strong sense of self as a leader, to find personal satisfaction in that role, and to thus be more career oriented. Conversely, an officer who experiences the class adaptation process negatively, is not as likely to achieve as strong a self-identity as leader, is less likely to find personal satisfaction in that role, and is therefore more likely to suffer poor morale, and have a shorter career.

It is therefore suggested that the junior officer's experience of the class adaptation process may be a point of maximum leverage in creating life-long leaders with a career orientation, and in preventing morale and retention problems. A small investment in preparing junior officers for this process may pay great dividends in the future.

Within the Navy, there seems to be a clear consensus of opinion about the exigencies of social class. There is agreement that the existence of a class distinction between officers and non-commission members is a reality in the Navy today, and that class distinction serves a beneficial purpose in separating leaders from followers. Further, there appears to be consensus that class distinction is valuable, under threat, and is something that should be preserved.

The majority of junior officers appear to experience at least some difficult period of upward mobility as they transition from trainee to leader class. This seems to stem, in large part, from the apparent fact that while in training, the junior officers are not treated like, nor do they self-identify as, members of the leader class. It seems that, given a lack of opportunity to act as leader, or a lack of adequate role modeling, that in terms of their self-concept, the junior officers are unprepared to step seamlessly into the social position of the leader class when they arrive in the operational fleet.

There appears to be a prolonged period of transition during which the junior officer gains the experience and confidence to begin to self-identify as a member of the leader class. It is only when the junior officer begins to feel that he or she is making a personal contribution that he or she truly begins the transition to the leader class. It seems reasonable to conclude, based on the

apparent fact that there are certain processes that affect the transition, that this period of adaptation is not fixed, and may be shortened by deliberately driving these processes.

At least some junior officers experience difficulty in affiliating themselves with their class peers on arrival in the fleet. Social psychology would suggest that, in accordance with psychosocial norms, junior officers would tend to affiliate themselves to those with whom they have much in common, at least superficially, such as a compatible age demographic. It would seem that during the difficult transition process described above, that some officers become vulnerable to fraternization problems because they are having difficulty affiliating themselves with other more

senior officers in the wardroom. It is apparent that those officers who experience the most difficulty self-identifying as members of the leader class tend to be most likely to seek friendship wherever they can find it. Conversely, those who have the least transition difficulties are also those who are the least vulnerable to problems with fraternization.

It would seem reasonable to conclude, therefore, that efforts made to ameliorate the difficulties experienced during the process of upward mobility, might have an added beneficial effect of reducing the prevalence of frat-

ernization between officers and non-commissioned members.

Finally, it can be argued that the naval training system is not taking sufficient measures to adequately prepare junior officers to assume the roles of leader. It is clear that the junior officers are not self-identifying as leaders during training, simply because they are not given the opportunity to lead. Many junior officers also feel that they have received insufficient support from senior officers in helping them adapt during the difficult transition period.

So, what can be done to ameliorate this phenomenon?

Since self-identity can be significantly influenced by external agencies, it seems reasonable that a shift in emphasis during training might help the junior officers self-identify as a leader before reaching the operational fleet. The officer may consequently experience reduced time spent in transition. It is also reasonable to assume that senior officers could be doing a better job of inculcating their values and viewpoints in junior officers during training, by offering themselves as mentors or role models.



—DND / MCPL. BRIAN WALSH, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA

2005 — Two young watch officers, Canadian and Australian, on the bridge of HMCS Winnipeg in the Arabian Sea. In addition to a radically mutated social class structure, gender equity within all ranks presents issues unimaginable to Nelson's 'Band of Brothers'.

NETWORKED POWER: INSURGENTS VERSUS “BIG ARMY”

by *Hekmat Karzai & Paul T. Mitchell*

Just as Microsoft with its Windows operating system dominates the computer industry, new operational concepts emerging from the United States over the past decade are coming to shape how other militaries pursue their objectives in the field. The most important of these new “operating system” concepts is that of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). However, while most modern militaries are busy attempting to implement variations on this idea, it is actually insurgents and terrorists that are likely to be the most successful in realizing the promise of NCW. While US forces sometimes style themselves as “knowledge warriors”, the 18th Century roots of today’s military establishments will undermine their hopes for military “transformation”: terrorists and insurgents are the real 21st Century organizations.

Network Centric Warfare and Military Power

Concepts of NCW began to emerge from the writings of Alvin and Heidi Toffler who have predicted the economic shifts to knowledge industries since their early publications. In the mid-1990s, US Department of Defense analysts began analyzing corporations such as Walmart to determine how they were using information to enhance the speed of business operations and make them more efficient. By flattening management hierarchies and placing information about consumers and product choices on line with supplier inventories, stores were able to enhance their turnover of product in ways that centralized inventory control was unable to anticipate. Product purchasing became linked directly to localized sales figures, minimizing inefficiency and inventory costs. These concepts were redeveloped into a military context in the hopes of eliminating the traditional fog of battle. The hope was that by freeing up information, especially in terms of intelligence and planning details, operational commanders would be able to use their forces more efficiently, increasing the speed and manoeuvrability of their forces in ways the enemy would find

Dr. Paul T. Mitchell is on sabbatical from his position as the Director of Academics, Canadian Forces College. He is presently a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He is a winner of the US Naval Institute’s Literary Award for his article in the Naval War College Review, “Network Centric Warfare and Small Navies, is there a role?” Mr. Hekmat Karzai is the designated Head of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, Kabul, Afghanistan. He is currently a Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Political Violence and Terrorism Research at IDSS. He has conducted extensive research and is an expert on groups such as the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hizbe Islami. He previously was a Fellow at Georgetown University. His latest thesis “Strengthening Security in Contemporary Afghanistan: Coping with the Taliban” is currently being published by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. This article was first published in the IDSS Commentaries series.

difficult to respond. This in turn would permit smaller forces to deal with more numerous opponents as a side benefit. The outcome of the conflict in Afghanistan and the initial outcome of the Iraq war seemed to suggest that the US was in fact on the verge of creating a “transparent” battlefield where commanders possessed a “God’s eye view” of everything, permitting immediate control of all operations.

The current imbroglio in Iraq has failed to curb this enthusiasm. However, aside from the difficulties of US forces to control events in the streets of Karbala in the fashion anticipated by the theorists of NCW, there are solid reasons why NCW is unlikely to generate a transparent battlefield. Information on the Internet flows seamlessly amongst users. Type a question into Google and it consults its list of more than eight billion pages and sends the most likely answer. Such searches, however desirable, are simply not feasible in a military context. Military information concerns life and death and matters of national security. As such, information is constrained in many ways. Its flow is hindered by rank levels (corporals see different information than generals), by military occupation, by classification and by service. Air Forces pursue operations differently than Armies and frequently regard their service compatriots as bigger competition than their putative enemies. As the 9/11 Commission uncovered, inter-service cooperation within bureaucratic organizations is frequently oxymoronic.

Insurgents and Information

Information flows far more efficiently in terrorist organizations. Terrorism is above all a means of communication, a highly dramatic way of sending a message. The new information revolution has empowered terrorists to disseminate their own message in their own particular means, completely bypassing traditional established media outlets. Even before Al Qaeda was established, its future leadership knew the valuable role of the media. Abdullah Azzam, the ideologue of Al Qaeda, and Osama Bin Laden established Maktab al-Khidmat (Service Bureau) (MAK) to disseminate propaganda, raise funds and recruit new members through a network of offices (including thirty in the US cities) in thirty-five countries. Under Azzam’s leadership, MAK was responsible for producing the most comprehensive 11 volume ‘Encyclopedia of Jihad’ that has become the standard manual for the average Jihadist and can be found all over the Internet for training, hence, there is no need or reason to travel to places like Afghanistan, Bosnia or Iraq. A future terrorist has the luxury of downloading any manuals from anywhere to train him and his future cell members.

The structure of terrorist and insurgent groups facilitate this transfer of information amongst themselves. Lacking the tradi-

tional bureaucracy of modern militaries, information flows rapidly and efficiently between participating subunits. Indeed, Al Qaeda's organization has gone virtual as many of their former activities are conducted solely on line: spreading propaganda, recruiting new Jihadist, fundraising, indoctrination and psychological warfare. They even have the ability to produce and disseminate their own professionally produced and mass marketed CD-Roms and DVDs.

Al Qaeda's shift is a clear and natural progression as the Internet provides easy access, little or no regulation, censorship, or other forms of government control, potentially huge audiences spread throughout the world, anonymity of communication, fast flow of information, inexpensive development and maintenances of a web presence, a multimedia environment (the ability to combine text, songs, books, posters, and so forth), and the ability to shape coverage in the traditional mass media, which increasingly use the Internet as a source of stories.

Anarchy and the Internet

Ultimately, the power of the Internet lies in its anarchical nature. As such, information is persistent – difficult to remove once posted, transportable – easily moved from place to place, and universal – everything is shared with everyone, everywhere. Hierarchically flat, informal groups are best positioned to take advantage of these characteristics, unlike the highly organized, highly centralized, highly rationalized organizations like the mili-

tary. Not only can flat informal organizations access information more effectively, they can use it faster as well. The military talks about operating inside an enemy's decision cycle, but nothing illustrates this tendency better than the rapid dissemination and growing sophistication of how insurgents are using and adapting improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ultimately, networking and using networked information requires 21st century organizational principals. Modern militaries came of age in the 18th century under the demands imposed by industrial culture. Discipline and standardization were required to survive the Napoleonic battlefields of mass fire and movement. Adaptation and flexibility will be required on the modern (complex) battlefields of urban conflicts in tribal cities. Can militaries adapt to this style of conflict? Special Forces seem to be leading the way, but only if they can rise above the challenges presented by the traditional military hierarchy. Insurgents and terrorists are still unlikely to win battles against their traditional opponents, given the disparity of resources militaries can deploy against them. As in all guerilla wars, the solutions will require military persistence and political acumen. Until then, networks will guarantee terrorists and insurgents a place on the battlefield, rather than ensuring their demise. ✦

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Middle Power Muddle — continued from page 4

Then Prime Minister Martin told Canadians that “Canada benefits directly when the world is more secure, more prosperous, more healthy, and more protective of the natural environment.”

He spoke of Canada’s commitment to make a difference in the world, but at the same time the recognition that as a smaller country it was limited in the role it could play.

There was talk of the importance of promoting Canadian values, and of the benefits of multilateralism.

All of the issues can and should be seen as relics of the old Gray lecture: dramatic rhetoric, an apparent commitment to act, and a conscious acknowledgement of the limits of Canadian abilities which can later be used to justify a less than complete embrace of international responsibilities.

This was the old middle power doctrine: a combination of rhetorical idealism and cautious, pragmatic policy execution.

This tradition, it should be noted, is also not limited to Liberal governments. Perhaps, over their time in power, the Harper Conservatives will fund the military more aggressively than the Liberals, but no party will fund it to the point of making it a credible force on the international stage. Canadians simply wouldn’t tolerate having such large sums of money diverted from social programs.

The Conservatives will continue to work through multilateral coalitions because such a strategy is in Canada’s best inter-

ests. And they will continue to encourage negotiated solutions because of Canada’s dependence on international order for national prosperity.

In conclusion, then, the evolving meaning of the term middle power can tell us a lot about the history of Canadian foreign policy.

The term was originally about order: how to order the international system to effectively represent states of various capacities. It was Canadian in its conservatism.

Over time, its meaning was corrupted to connote a type of international behaviour that made Canadians feel good about themselves at a time when their actions on the world stage were not always as pure as they might have wanted.

And today, it means just about as much as the most recent international policy statement, which is very little.

Call it what we want, Canadian foreign policy has always been about protecting and preserving the national interest, and this has always meant largely the same thing:

Promote a secure and stable international order. Maintain good relations with your most important allies. Support the Western side in global conflicts. Work multilaterally when possible. And, when it is not too much of a burden at home, attempt to spread the national prosperity as widely as possible. ♣

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Social Class in the Navy — continued from page 9

A formal education process should be instituted early on in the training program to deal specifically with the realities of the social hierarchy, the distinction between the leader class and others, the value of maintaining that class separation, and, the consequences allowing that separation to break down. Moreover, junior officers undergoing training, and more senior officers already serving in the fleet, need to be made aware that there will likely be a difficult period of upward mobility when the junior officers arrive in the fleet.

There is also a requirement for more open dialogue on the subject of affiliation behaviour, both within the training system and in the fleet. Junior officers need to be educated on the difficulties to be expected during transition, and on the serious consequences of fraternization. Senior officers in the fleet need also to be educated on the dangers and the vulnerabilities of the junior officers, with respect to affiliation when they first join the fleet.

The training system should be modified so that officer trainees are given more opportunities for hands-on leadership development, to foster their sense of self-identity as leaders. Senior officers need to be encouraged to involve themselves more closely in the leadership development of junior officers.

In order to successfully implement all these recommendations, a slight shift in cultural thinking is required at all levels of

the officer development chain. The perception that senior officers do not care about the well-being of junior officers, that they “eat their young”, or that junior officers should be left alone to sink or swim, is too widespread and must be addressed, beginning at the highest levels.

It is not a significant leadership challenge for the Navy to implement some form of cultural education in the training system for junior officers. It is, however, a difficult challenge to instigate a shift in cultural thinking that would result in junior officers being treated more like leaders, rather than just trainees. The Navy as an institution must learn to value its junior officers. This will require persistent, clearly articulated, and serious guidance from the highest levels of command in the Navy.

Failure to address the issues raised here will result in a continuance of the status quo. Junior officers joining the fleet will continue to experience difficulties transitioning to the leader class; many will have problems with affiliation and fraternization, and most will be left to their own devices to adapt, with little support from either above or below in the chain of command.⁴ ♣

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