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SITREP

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SGT FRANK HUDEC, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA

The flight deck of HMCS Winnipeg in the Gulf of Oman, August 2005 as part of Operation ALTAIR, Canada's maritime contribution to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

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From the Editor's Desk

The pace and intensity of operations and casualties in Afghanistan for Canada has increased over the summer months with many questioning the mission. The operations being conducted and casualties are unlike anything experienced for Canada since the Korean War and the Second World War. Therefore those Canadians who do not remember their history or insist on sustaining the myth of classical peacekeeping are casualty averse and do not put war casualties in their proper historical context. Conflict in the Middle East reached new heights, with Israeli sovereignty threatened and increased terrorist attacks by non-state actors in Gaza and in northern Israel. Nearer to home the First Nations land claim and attendant violence in Caledonia has caused the rule of law to be compromised. All in all, not a tranquil or peaceful summer.

Naturally the media and the nation are focused on Afghanistan and the Middle East. However an important issue of national security that has received little attention is NORAD renewal. This was the subject of our 10 April Defence Roundtable featuring Dr. Joseph Jockel. In our first article, Dr. Jockel, joined by Dr. Joel Sokolsy, suggest that the 2006 NORAD renewal has only delayed the inevitable need for change to the architecture of US-Canada defence relations in the era of terrorism and homeland security.

As Canadian casualties mount due to suicide terrorism, who better to comment on and increase our understanding of the complex nature of suicide terrorism in Afghanistan than Hekmat Karzai – cousin to the President of Afghanistan. He argues the need for a *fatwa* to counter the belief that the suicide bomber will enjoy beautiful maidens in heaven.

Chuck Oliviero offers a reality 'fact' check on the situation in Lebanon which provides some much needed clarity and historical perspective to the continuing commentary, much of it steeped in polemics, on the intractable situation in the Middle East.

Our own Sunil Ram provides an excellent assessment of the efficacy of the Israeli response, initially through airpower and then by army incursion, to Hezbollah's kidnapping of IDF soldiers and rocket attacks on Israel. His initial assessment and historical review of Hezbollah posits that Hezbollah achieved its aims.

Continuing a theme from a previous issue – that of Network Centric warfare, Dr. Paul Mitchell now discusses this subject in the context of maritime strategy and operations. He cites the little known Canadian navy's successful and unique lead in providing network connectivity and interoperability means to the coalition naval interdiction operations in the Persian Gulf since 2002 and offers lessons learned that could be applied to future littoral coalition operations.

Eric Morse has contributed an interesting and timely piece on the pervasive nature of communication means such as the internet and video cell phones that can result in real-time combat videos and 'blogs' from the field and whether they pose a threat to operational security.

We hope that you, our readers, find these articles both interesting and informative.

Sincerely,



Chris Corrigan
Colonel (Ret'd)
Editor of *SITREP*



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RENEWING NORAD – NOW IF NOT FOREVER

by Joseph T. Jockel PhD and Joel J. Sokolsky PhD

This past May, Washington and Ottawa renewed the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) agreement for the first time ever without an expiration date. Nevertheless, NORAD's future is in doubt.

The recent negotiations on the future of the premier Canada-US bilateral defence arrangement had special significance. For the NORAD agreement had not been renewed since the September 11, 2001, attacks and the beginnings of the global war on terror, in which the US has elevated the priority of homeland defence to a level not seen since the early days of the Cold War nuclear era. Prompted by the new threat, the US created the Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in 2002, twinned it with the bi-national NORAD and gave it an explicit mandate to provide for the defence of the continental United States.

Washington also finally moved ahead with the deployment of a national ballistic missile defence, first funded by Congress under the Clinton administration in 1998. There was also much discussion in the US about the need to attend to the maritime dimension of homeland defence. Officers from the United States Coast Guard, which has been designated the lead agency in this task, assumed positions in the USNORTHCOM headquarters.

Canada, for its part, did not stand still since the last time the NORAD accord had been renewed in 2000-01. In NORAD, it joined with the US in the reconfiguration of continental air defence, with the intent of preventing another 9/11-style attack. In 2002, Canada and the US created a "Binational Planning Group," with NORAD's Canadian deputy commander at its head, to formulate plans for continental defence at sea and on land. It got half into missile defence in 2004, and then decided in 2005 to stay half out. In addition, in 2006, Ottawa created its own military homeland defence structure, Canada Command (Canada COM).

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The NORAD renewal did little to deal with the implications of all of these developments. It did make some changes to the accord, which, however, further reinforces its unfinished character. The two most important were giving NORAD new responsibility for "maritime warning" and the extension without expiration date. "In perpetuity" is how some officials describe it. There is, however, provision in the renewal for a joint review of the accord within at least four years, or at the request of either government. Given that this most recent renewal left many important issues unresolved, and that much uncertainty remains as to the future overall architecture of US-Canada defence relations in the era of terrorism and homeland security, it is highly likely that both Washington and Ottawa will wish to avail themselves of the review provision shortly after the storied bi-national command marks its first half-century. When it takes place, the review will probably entail the most thorough, intense, and skeptical bilateral examination of NORAD since the command began to function in 1957 and the accord was first signed in 1958. For while the 2006 renewal appeared to go rather smoothly, the reality is that NORAD is under fairly intense pressure to change. The 2006 renewal simply postponed dealing with this.

Ultimately, the issue is how much of the command and-control of homeland defence in the terrorist era the US and Canada will want to keep in national structures, and how much they will wish to continue to entrust to the bi-national NORAD. Classic bureaucratic politics will undoubtedly affect how the two countries deal with the question, now that NORAD is faced with the two recently created national homeland defence commands. USNORTHCOM is unhappy with the division of responsibilities between it and NORAD; it argued for a two-year renewal of the NORAD agreement this time, so that this could be rethought. It will have more to say about it at the upcoming review. The two commands share a commander — currently Admiral Thomas Keating of the US Navy — a headquarters in Colorado Springs, and several staffs. USNORTHCOM reports solely to the Pentagon. It has a broad mandate for the defence of the United States and for what Canadians call aid of the civil power, although it has very few forces under its standing operational command. As with all US unified



CPL C. BENTLEY/AETE/IDS

CF-18 Hornet fighter jet of 410 Cougar Squadron at Cold Lake, Alberta.



commands in whatever region of the world, USNORTHCOM is charged with promoting “theater security cooperation” with countries in its Area of Operational Responsibility. This means that it seeks to engage both Canada and Mexico across a wide range of defence issues. NORAD’s responsibilities remain limited to aerospace warning and control for North America, to which has been added the new, but, as discussed below, limited role in maritime warning. It was originally created as an air defence command to deal with Soviet long-range bombers, and later acquired broader, missile- and space-related responsibilities over the course of the Cold War, as the technology developed with which North America could be attacked. North American air defence still falls operationally to NORAD and not to USNORTHCOM. After 9/11, under the rubric of Operation Noble Eagle, NORAD’s air defence efforts were reconfigured to deal with threats both approaching and arising within the continent. These efforts include such sensitive tasks as the air defence of Washington, and of the president when he is at home in Texas or travelling to or from there. It is only understandable, therefore, that USNORTHCOM, as the American national homeland defence command, would want the mandate for the air defence of the United States.

At the same time, NORAD’s position, and with it the positions of the Canadians at Colorado Springs, is weakening as the value of the command’s longstanding core function, warning of and assessing a ballistic missile attack on North America, or in NORAD parlance, “ITW/AA” (integrated tactical warning and attack assessment), diminishes. This is not because missile ballistic warning and assessment is no longer important, but rather because the United States gradually will perform this function more and more on its own, without depending on NORAD’s ITW/AA role. This trend has profound implications for the future of NORAD as a bi-national command, because ITW/AA places the Canadians at Colorado Springs at the very heart of the aerospace defence of North America, even though no system to detect or track ballistic missiles has ever been located in Canada or operated by the Canadian Forces. But as part of its BMD system, the United States is developing ballistic missile warning and assessment capabilities that may surpass and are separate from those providing NORAD ITW/AA. It will come as no surprise whatsoever to anyone who has followed Canadian politics over the past two years that the Martin government’s 2005 decision not to participate directly in North American missile defence threatens ITW/AA, and with it, NORAD. It needs to be added immediately that that same government saved NORAD in the short run with its previous 2004 decision, encapsulated in the form of an amendment to the NORAD agreement, that the NORAD ITW/AA mission could continue alongside, and in support of, the US missile defence. Launch authority for the interceptors is to be in the hands of USNORTHCOM. The then-Canadian ambassador in Washington, Frank McKenna, got it right when he said that the 2004 decision meant that Canada had already become part of missile defence.

Had the Liberals decided that Canada could have no involvement whatsoever with missile defence, including providing warn-

ing, there probably would not have been a 2006 NORAD renewal at all. The problem for NORAD now, however, is that the US will be gradually bringing online new missile detection and tracking systems that are directly linked to the missile defence, and not ITW/AA. So they are off limits to Canadians, as things now stand, after Paul Martin’s 2005 “no.” As a result, ITW/AA will be devalued, and at some point in the not so distant future keeping this a NORAD role will be open to question. USNORTHCOM sees Canada COM, with its fairly broad mandate for military operations in the defence of Canada and its approaches (including the US), as its natural partner for transboundary cooperation. By contrast, NORAD is an aging aerospace defence command. The newer command, headquartered in Ottawa, is not quite ready to return USNORTHCOM’s interest fully. At the time of the NORAD renewal, it had been in operation for a little over three months. Canada COM is part of a package of structural changes undertaken at the initiative of the energetic chief of the defence staff, General Rick Hillier, intended to transform the military. Upon its creation, wags immediately dubbed it “true NORTHCOM.” The military takes such issues of nomenclature seriously; having decided that its own original acronym, “CANCOM” was too flip and insufficiently patriotic, it replaced it with the awkward “Canada COM.” The command has had to sort out its relationship with a new strategic joint staff created at the same time in National Defence Headquarters, as well as with the navy, army, and air force. How Canada COM relates to NORAD and to the Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) headquarters in Winnipeg will also have to be worked out. Aerospace defence cooperation with the US has always been the Canadian Air Force’s bailiwick. Thus, it not only has a particular interest in promoting NORAD, but for those air force personnel and units dedicated to NORAD, a renewed Canadian interest and investment in aerospace defence might serve to balance the attention afforded the Canadian Army in General Hillier’s particular transformational vision. They can be expected to argue for this.

Yet as an Ottawa-based inter-service command, Canada COM does not at all fit neatly into the longstanding bi-national structure. Recognizing this, Hillier gave the commander of Canada COM at the command’s inception authority for all military operations in Canada *except* for operations under NORAD’s command or those the chief of the defence staff might personally command. This situation may not last for long. Canada COM is bound to find the CANR headquarters as an inconvenience, much as USNORTHCOM now tends to see NORAD. In fact, one of the Canadian military’s key planning documents in establishing Canada COM anticipates just this. It predicts that once Canada COM “develops into the sole operational HQ responsible for the Canadian theatre of operations it will likely absorb CANR and its NORAD requirements and will thus become the sole operational connection with US military authorities. The evolution of a Canada Command will in turn lead to the development of close ties between it and USNORTHCOM.” USNORTHCOM has already informally circulated several different models for future North American defence cooperation, some including Mexico. A range

of these made it into the March 2006 final report of the Bi-national Planning Group, although in the discussion of these models Mexico is only alluded to. Two involve what would be a downgrading of NORAD from its current status as a full-fledged bi-national command, with a four-star commander and a three-maple-leaf deputy commander, reporting to the chief of the defence staff in Ottawa and the secretary of defence in Washington. In one, the command would be replaced with a “combined joint task force” supporting both USNORTHCOM and Canada COM. In the other, there would be a “combined joint interagency task force, supporting not just the two national commands, but also the two lead civilian agencies in each country responsible for homeland security, namely Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada and the Department of Homeland Security.” At the time of the Bi-national Planning Group’s creation there were plenty of bets (and some fears) that, embedded as it was in Colorado Springs, it had been put in place to smooth the way toward NORAD enhancement. It is ironic that its final report turned into a vehicle for the public consideration of the command’s diminution or replacement.

To be sure, still another model on the Bi-national Planning Group’s list involved not a downgrading of NORAD, but an upgrading: its conversion into a full-scale “North American Defence Command,” with air-, sea-, and land-related responsibilities. Even here, the two national homeland commands would remain in place to respond unilaterally to threats against their respective countries. The beefed-up NORAD would provide warning of attack and stand ready to respond in situations where the two countries wanted to act jointly. As the Bi-national Planning Group had to admit, though, such a NORAD would run “counter to the prevailing trends in Canada and the United States towards the strengthening of their national defence Commands.” Creating something along these lines seems to have been a strong possibility in late 2001 and early 2002, when, right after the September 11 attacks, the US was moving to revamp its command structure for homeland defence. While all indications are that the US was open to the idea, in Ottawa there was no consensus in either the bureaucracy or the military; the Canadian Navy especially had its doubts. The ever-cautious Chrétien government was not about to leap in. Any proposal for turning NORAD into a broad bilateral homeland defence command must have been seen by Jean Chrétien as being on a par with the calls being made about the same time to reach a deal swiftly with the US to establish a continental security perimeter and to reduce or even eliminate controls along the common border, effectively “Schengenizing” North America above the Rio Grande. That went nowhere with him, either. Momentum toward doing something to expand NORAD did not entirely run out, however, in the face of Ottawa’s reluctance to do anything extensive. Pressure appears to have come from the Martin government to show that, despite its decision on missile defence, it nonetheless was committed to an enhanced continental defence relationship — of sorts — with the US. With the May 2006 deadline impending, the incoming Harper government had little time to formulate a new position. Maritime warn-

ing for NORAD is all the enhancement there is, beside the renewal “in perpetuity.” Maritime warning for NORAD seemed to fit in, too, alongside NORAD’s longstanding ITW/AA role in aerospace. The Bi-national Planning Group worked on the issue almost from its creation. It is quite limited in its scope. As the text of the 2006 renewal makes explicitly clear, NORAD has not been given any responsibility for “maritime surveillance and control” — in other words, for almost all of the work of naval forces in protecting the continent. The US and Canadian navies were opposed to that, as was Admiral Keating, and he said so in public. Surveillance and control will remain fully outside NORAD and fully in national hands, although the two countries are also free to continue to coordinate bilaterally. To provide maritime warning, a new cell at NORAD will have the responsibility for gathering existing information where it can in the two countries, especially from the intelligence and naval establishments, concerning maritime threats to the continent, and then sifting and comparing it. As the 2006 agreement puts it, NORAD’s task here “consists of processing, assessing and disseminating intelligence and information related to the respective maritime areas and internal waterways of, and the maritime approaches to, or attacks against North American utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and agencies responsible for maritime defense and security.”

Although skeptics abound who contend that Colorado Springs is not the right place for this, the new mission could well enhance bilateral maritime homeland security efforts by adding an additional degree of analysis, synthesis, and information sharing. Nevertheless, NORAD’s new warning mission is a far cry from some earlier speculation that the command might soon operationally control the forces that guard the sea approaches to the continent, much as it has controlled the defence of the air approaches for almost fifty years. Yet, in another sense, it is not too surprising that NORAD’s new maritime role is a modest one. When senior American naval leaders spoke during the past few years of “maritime NORAD,” they were not calling for an expanded role for NORAD in the maritime defence of North America. Rather, by adopting the global, forward projection view of the United States Navy, what they had in mind was a series of regional maritime security arrangements with overseas US allies, designed to provide comprehensive maritime domain awareness, warning and interception capabilities against a variety of threats ranging from terrorism and piracy to environmental dangers. As explained by the current US Navy’s chief of naval operations, the goal is to establish a “global network of maritime nations for a free and secure maritime domain,” the “1000-ship Navy.” Within this USN-led maritime coalition involving different countries and different maritime forces, bilateral Canada- US maritime cooperation would just be one component and not even the most important element. And because the warning function serves precisely to gather together this global network of maritime awareness and intelligence, this type of assignment may be better suited to the form of maritime security the US Navy envisions. In short, while NORAD has been given a limited new responsibility, its



core aerospace warning and assessment role will probably leach away and it will be faced with two formidable, national bureaucratic competitors, one of which is now openly covetous of its responsibilities. It is easy to imagine NORAD being replaced by a task force. The 2006 accord, inconclusive as it ultimately is, is hardly unique in lagging behind developments or ducking the issues. Indeed, it seems that from its inception, NORAD has been just one step ahead of changes in technology and strategy that threatened to end the command's utility for the United States. At the start, the military did not think a NORAD diplomatic agreement was even necessary, and the command was already up and running in 1957 when the Department of External Affairs and the opposition Liberals convinced the Diefenbaker government to negotiate one. And just as NORAD was getting underway and Cheyenne Mountain being hollowed out for NORAD's famous operations centre, the era of the bomber was coming to an end and the missile was becoming the principal threat — a threat against which Canadian territory was not relevant and Canada contributed no assets. The first renewal in 1968 bizarrely described NORAD's functions as if it were still only an air defence command, even though by then it had been tracking missiles and satellites for several years. So did the 1973 renewal. The 1968 renewal did include, though, a grandstanding and useless "ABM clause," which had no legal or practical effect but still bedeviled and confused public debate about NORAD for years. The 1975 renewal talked soothingly of "enhancement of mutual deterrence," just as the US was putting into place a strategy that included limited nuclear options. Not until 1981 did Ottawa dare to allow a renewal to put "aerospace" into NORAD's name. The last renewal, in 2000/01, was in this tradition, too. There were several issues to address, notably Canada's role in the NORAD space surveillance program and NORAD's role in Canada-US space cooperation. With a US decision on missile defence looming, though, the two governments simply decided instead in 2000 to renew quickly the 1996 text as it was, well before it expired in 2001. In part, NORAD was able to stay one step ahead of trends in US strategy and posture that threatened its demise as a bi-national command because its continuation did not fundamentally undermine or impede such American trends, and therefore as long as Ottawa was willing to renew, Washington was prepared to go along. Contrary to the great debates that sometimes raged in Canada over NORAD's renewals, the United States favoured successive renewals precisely because they were not controversial. One could argue that NORAD's perpetuation as a bi-national command was the result of the asymmetry in the importance to which Ottawa and Washington assigned each renewal. Intensity on the Canadian side, combined with favourable, yet decidedly benign indifference on the American side, allowed it to survive to the verge of its fifth decade.

But a mid-life crisis seems to be at hand. History may well finally catch up with NORAD as it approaches its 50th anniversary. The cumulative impact of the Canadian decision on missile defence and the creation of USNORTHCOM, combined with what has always been weak bureaucratic support for NORAD as a bi-

national command within the American national security establishment, especially in the Pentagon, could mean that this time not even indifference on Washington's part will be able to save NORAD. If one adds to the American considerations what appears to be a decided change in Canada's (or at least the Canadian Forces') estimation of the importance of maintaining NORAD as a bi-national command and the centerpiece of Canada-US defence relations, then predictions of NORAD's death may be, Mark Twain notwithstanding, not all an exaggeration. Still, NORAD must not be counted out just yet. It can make the case that air defence still belongs in a binational command, especially as the two countries gear up to deal with the emerging threat of cheap sea-launched cruise missiles. Downgrading NORAD would be a symbolic step with which Ottawa would certainly have trouble; it would pose some difficulties for Washington, too. A reversal of the Canadian missile defence decision by the Harper government, once it has safely acquired a majority, could rejuvenate NORAD as an aerospace command. Ottawa expects to launch in a couple of years a satellite —, dubbed "Sapphire" that will restore Canada's once longstanding direct participation in NORAD's space surveillance mission. Moreover, both USNORTHCOM and Canada COM represent significant new departures from how both countries have organized their homeland defences; the value of these two new commands has yet to be tested. It is not inconceivable that the US will reorganize its unified command structure again, and that USNORTHCOM will be eliminated and its missions assumed by other commands or individual services. That is what happened to NORAD's last "twin," US Space Command, which once looked like such an integral element of the US command structure. It is gone, while NORAD is still around. And, after the current push for "transformation" of the Canadian Forces loses some steam, the idea of single command for all operations in Canada may be reassessed,

Most important, in the next few years Washington is likely to find itself pre-occupied with other, more immediate defence and security issues, especially those involving overseas operations, leaving little time, attention or inclination to formally disestablish NORAD, even if the ITW/AA core mission migrates in whole or in part to other US entities. Moreover, on Ottawa's part, with new evidence of terrorist cells in Canada and the 2010 Olympics just around the corner, for which NORAD will be providing special "Noble Eagle" air defence protection, now may not seem to be the best time to downgrade or dismantle a long-standing element of continental security cooperation.

This does not mean that perpetuity is forever when it comes to NORAD's future. For even if, despite all the pressure to the contrary, the binational command survives the coming round of negotiations on its fate and enters its second half century, it undeniably will do so as a diminished instrument and symbol of close Canada-US defence cooperation. ✦

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

AFGHANISTAN AND THE LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

by *Hekmat Karzai*

A young man wearing a military uniform is sitting on the floor and reading from the Holy Qur'an. After a few minutes, he starts his sermon by introducing himself and his objective. "My name is Amanullah Ghazi and I am from the province of Khost. The infidels have come to our country and they are misleading us from our path. It is the duty of every Muslim to sacrifice oneself in the path of God. In the Qur'an, God has mentioned, if you follow My way, I will offer you the paradise." He continues, "I have come for Jihad and this is the way you should follow. InshaAllah (God Willing) I will meet you in paradise." He ends his talk and moves towards his motorcycle, which is wrapped with a large amount explosives. He is followed and filmed by his handler until he reaches his endpoint - a military training centre in the heart of Kabul — where he blows himself up, killing 13 people and injuring over 50 others.

This was the first filmed "will" of an Afghan suicide attacker that appeared recently in DVD and VCD format throughout the various parts of Southeastern Afghanistan. The objective of the piece was straightforward - inspire and motivate the particular segment of the population that is disillusioned with the Coalition Forces and the Af-

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ghan government to jihad. Given that suicide terrorism is an emerging phenomenon in Afghanistan, distributing such videos will have a major impact in radicalizing and further motivating future volunteers.

Setting the Stage

Suicide terrorism, like terrorism in general, is a complex and difficult issue to define. A leading authority on the subject, Mia Bloom, notes that the terrorist executes the action in order to achieve a political goal and with the complete awareness that he

is going to his death. Other standard definitions focus more on the goals of the act by stating that the suicide attacker's intention is to harm as many people as possible with the objective of effecting some type of political change.

The act of suicide for a particular objective has been around for centuries - from Samson to the Japanese Kamikaze pilots. However, the recent trend of religiously-inspired suicide attacks

started to appear in the early 1980's by such groups as the Hezbollah and Al Dawa. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), not a religious entity, perfected the tactic on land, air and sea through their Black Tigers unit. The LTTE, one of the most professional terrorist organizations, has been responsible for the killing of many political leaders including the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa.

They were one of the first groups to use women as suicide attackers and today 30 to 40 percent of their attacks have been delivered by women. ►►



SERGEANT CAROLE MORISSETTE, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA

Cpl Lester Budden watches for security threats on the road from Gumbad, Afghanistan in March 2006. The Canadian and Romanian convoy was attacked on route to Gumbad by a suicide car bomber. The car bomber died in the explosion. The attack wounded a Canadian soldier and six Afghan civilians, including a boy who later died.

Because of the effectiveness of the tactic, Al Qaeda joined the bandwagon in the late 1990's and conducted, coordinated and synchronized attacks using multiple bombers. Their actions were witnessed in the 1998 embassy bombing in East Africa and clearly during September 11th. The greatest impact of Al Qaeda has been to inspire other groups to adopt their modus operandi. Besides the massive proliferation of the global Jihadi ideology to groups with otherwise local grievances, Al Qaeda's tactical influence has also manifested itself in the global rise of suicide bombings; in fact out of more than 600 suicide attacks carried out in history, over 70 percent have taken place since 9/11.

The Afghanistan Case

Conflict has been a constant factor during the last three decades of Afghan history, although there was no record of a suicide attack until September 9th 2001 when two Al Qaeda members assassinated Commander Ahmad Shah Masoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance.

After the Coalition Forces came to Afghanistan, the trend of suicide attacks started to emerge very slowly with one attack carried out in 2002, two in 2003 and six in 2004. However, from this point on, the pace changed. Learning from the effectiveness of the insurgents in Iraq, the groups carried out 21 attacks in 2005 with the southern city of Kandahar and the capital Kabul as their primary targets. By March 15, 2006 nine suicide, had taken place including one that targeted former President and current Senate leader, Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi.

Speaking about the adoption of suicide attacks. Mullah Dadullah, a top military commander of the Taliban, stated in a recent interview with Al Jazeera: "The reality is that the Mujahedin of each area implement tactics they see suitable."

There are several specific reasons why Taliban and the foreign elements decided that suicide terrorism constitute 'suitable tactics' for the Afghan theatre.

Firstly, suicide attacks are effective due to their maximum impact yet minimal resources, especially, since the groups know they are engaged in asymmetric warfare, with a much more powerful adversary. Data show that when fighting force on force, the group's chances of inflicting casualties on the coalition forces are only around five percent. With suicide tactics, the chances go much higher.

Second, devastating attacks have instilled fear in the people's hearts leading them to believe that the government cannot protect them, further destabilizing the authority of local government institutions. Consequently, the gap between the government and the population is slowly expanding.

Most importantly, suicide attacks have provided renewed visibility to the Taliban and then-allies that the guerrilla attacks were just not generating. Given their high casualty and high profile nature, every suicide attack conducted is reported in the re-

gional and international media providing augmented exposure to the cause.

The key question is who is responsible for the attacks?

Many Afghans believe that the attacks are not carried out by locals, noting that "it is not culturally acceptable or a characteristic tactic of the Afghan people". This belief ignores the fact that Afghan culture has not been as isolated as it may have in the past. At one point, one quarter of Afghanistan's 25 million population became refugees and a particular part of that population attended foreign madrasahs where they were radicalized and immersed in extremist ideologies. The relatively easy to access DVDs, VCDs and other forms of technology allows ideas to spread rapidly. We only need to look at the above stated case of Amanullah.

Underlying all of this is the exposure to Al Qaeda, which has spread its extremist global ideology to various groups. During their reign, from June of 1996 till November of 2001, Al Qaeda and Taliban established a very close 'marriage of convenience' where Al Qaeda supported and trained many Taliban cadres. Following the post 9/11 transformation of the Taliban from a conventional military force into an insurgent one, this training and indoctrination are starting to reap benefits.

Need for a *fatwa*

Afghanistan is not the first nation to face the threat of suicide attacks and will most likely not be the last. While dealing with the suicide threat may be difficult for any state, it is not impossible, especially, if operational and strategic measures are implored.

Operationally, the Afghan government must enhance the capacity of its intelligence in order to disrupt the network that organizes and supports such activities. As many researchers note, suicide attackers hardly ever work alone. There is always an underground infrastructure that provides the essential financial and material resources and arranges everything else, including target identification and time and date of the attack.

Strategically, the Afghan ulama must oppose suicide bombing by issuing a *fatwa* (religious decree) to that effect. They should also explain that suicide bombing does not lead to an eternal life in paradise, nor the permission to see the face of Allah, or the loving kindness of 72 *houris* (beautiful maidens) who will serve the suicide bomber in heaven.

In my mind, the itlama should not allow *fatwas* to be manipulated by the extremists for their negative effects on the Muslim world. This responsible action by the ulama is congruent with the Islamic legal principle of *SaddalDhara 'ii* (closing the gate of evil). ❖

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

LEBANON: ACTION, REACTION AND THE VALUE OF REMEMBERING HISTORY

by Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) C.S. Oliviero PhD

Wading into the deep end of the pool of public opinion is fraught with hazard. Before doing so I must offer a disclaimer: I am neither Arab nor Israeli; neither Muslim nor Jew; I do not claim to be a Middle East expert. I am a retired career soldier who became an historian. I therefore offer my views through those prisms.

By the middle of August there were strong and persistent calls from voices across Canada to support an immediate ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his Foreign Minister, Peter MacKay, flatly refused to do so. They were right and were right not to bend to uninformed or misguided public opinion. One can only surmise the current government's motives, but Mr. MacKay was clear during an extraordinary session of the Foreign Affairs Committee in early August. The minister seized the moral high ground. He showed obvious determination in the face of demands by the three opposition parties to support an immediate ceasefire. Mr. MacKay was unambiguous: he refused to support such a ceasefire because it would treat a sovereign and democratic nation (Israel) the same as a terrorist organization (Hezbollah).

Hezbollah is an avowed terrorist organization. This is the crux of the problem, and yet, the majority of opinions offered fail to recognize this point. Many argue that Hezbollah is “not ex-

actly” a terrorist group. After all, they provide social services to many Lebanese. They provide jobs. They offer food to the poor and shelter to those in need. All of this is true. It is also irrelevant. As the old parable reminds us, when the devil appears to the maiden he does not come with cloven hooves and a tail; he appears as a handsome young man. So it is with these terrorists who would kill every Israeli man woman and child, given the opportunity.

What we are seeing with Hezbollah is not new. Sadly, neither is the world's reaction. The majority of people want peace. This is natural, admirable and understandable. Within the lifespan of many alive today, the world ignored an organization similar to Hezbollah. The result was the death of millions of innocent people and the complete restructuring of the world political order. This small radical “social organization” established itself as the “saviours of the na-



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Hezbollah fighters march on Jerusalem Day

tion” and purveyors of moral rectitude. They, too, had their own civil and military organizations; they even legitimized themselves by running for parliament. They had their own press and declared such outrageous lies that most people ignored them. However, not everyone did. Their “supreme leader” was a gifted orator but since he could not be reasoned with, the Great Powers wrote him off. He was a kook; what harm could he do?

The German people learned a valuable lesson: when you swim with sharks, you run the risk of being eaten. The Lebanese people need to learn this same lesson.

A decade ago I attended the German War College in Hamburg for two years. My family's immersion into German society was complete. We met many Germans who had a twelve year amnesia (1933-1945), but we met more who appreciated that had the Allies not turned their magnificent historical city into a heap of brick dust that they would not have learned from their sad history. Human beings are frail and slow to learn. It was only the

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utter destruction and near-total collapse of German society that woke Germany from its sleepwalk through history. One is not suggesting for a moment that Lebanon needs to relive the German horror, but unless the Lebanese learn from history, they will not appreciate the consequences of supporting a terrorist organization.

No society is beyond making similar errors. Throughout August and early September Parliament Hill saw demonstrations calling for peace in the Middle East. But peace at what price? The North Koreans live in peace. They are politically oppressed, socially indentured to a madman “supreme leader” and starving. But they have peace. Those who are wringing their hands (opposition parliamentarians and church leaders) do not seem capable of grasping this simple concept. When we look back at Germany, would we not have liked the Berlin governments of the 1920s and 1930s to have dealt more ‘sternly’ with the National Socialists? Of course we would, but the weak Weimar Republic wanted peace and could not afford to offend the National Socialists. Now we see commentators suggesting that Lebanon cannot afford to alienate Hezbollah and that Hezbollah could be ‘integrated’ into the Lebanese Army. Anyone remember what happened when the SS ‘absorbed’ the SA and then ‘integrated’ itself into the German Reichswehr?

Well-meaning pundits are criticizing Israel’s overwhelming military reaction to the kidnapping of a few soldiers. Israel has been accused of a disproportionate response. There are two errors here: First, the term “disproportionate response” only makes sense in game theory. In war, there is no such thing. Was England’s declaration of war in 1939 a “disproportionate response” to a border crossing by Germany? Was NATO’s decision to bomb Kosovo a “disproportionate response”? Of course not. Second, the Israeli response was not to the action of kidnapping. It was to the act of continuous and indiscriminate rocket attack upon civilian targets by Hezbollah. It is an ancient and longstanding Law of War that every nation has the right of self-defence. Period.

It is nonsensical to suggest or imply that Israel’s Prime Minister Mr. Ehud Olmert wants to destroy Lebanon. He came to power in his country because he wanted to do just the *opposite*. He wanted to distance himself from Israel’s past of seeking military solutions to social problems. He was looking for a more elegant solution. But, Hezbollah’s incessant rocket attacks forced his hand because in Israel, as in every other sovereign state, security trumps elegance and Mr. Olmud understands this. One can only imagine the outcry there would be in this country if rockets started falling indiscriminately in downtown Montreal or Toronto. Would Canadians want to negotiate with or appease the terrorists or would we insist that the government immediately send the armed forces to find and kill the terrorists? The answer is self-evident.

The argument here does not exculpate Israel. Mistakes were made on both sides in the last decade and on Israel’s side they

now see that they are paying the price for coming to some sort of “arrangement” with Hezbollah. They did not buy peace. Israel’s appeasement and acquiescence merely bought them a respite and gave Hezbollah time to build, arm itself and prepare for another round.

Northern Ireland has presented some important lessons and perhaps the most important is that fathers can bequeath hatred to their sons. One cannot wait out these types of hatred-based organizations. At any rate, it is not Hezbollah, after all, that Israel has to fight; it is Iran and Syria. Syria can be bought. They are more pragmatic in their politics than the Iranians. The United States could conceivably (as it did with Egypt and Jordan) demonstrate that living with Israel is more palatable than the alternative. The Iranians are a different story and have at least three generations of people alive who remember their Great Patriotic War against Iraq. They will be harder to convince. Either way, the evil of state sponsored terrorism cannot be allowed to continue. Libya proves that state sponsored terrorism can be reversed. Saudi Arabia prides itself as the protector of the holy sites of Islam. It should go further and take this responsibility to mean that they should lead the Arab community in its espousal of a peaceful interpretation of the holy Koran. This will not solve the problem but it will shine a light upon a darkening situation.

Western politicians, analysts and political science pundits need to stop looking for simple solutions to complex problems. Our governments need to start pushing our Arab friends and allies a little more firmly towards real democracy – not necessarily Western democracy, but a form of democracy that is suitable to their cultures. The Saudis, Egyptians and Jordanians, as moderate as they may have become (relative to the 1970s) must work harder to reduce the power of the more radical elements within their societies.

We all need to look back and use history as our guide. In World War Two over 42,000 (23,000 army, 17,000 air force, 2,000 navy, and 1600 merchant navy) Canadians were killed and a further 54,000 wounded because Western Europe refused to take the moral high ground against the Fascists in their midst. The more we placate and appease Hezbollah, Syria or even Iran, the harder the problem becomes. We need to declare these states and organizations as the international pariahs that they are. Had Europe listened to such advice in the 1930s, the 1940s might have looked different. It is bad enough that these radical terrorists have divided East against West as effectively as they have. It has been said that they have in some measure been aided by political and media elites. We must not allow terrorists to lead us blindly to the edge of the abyss as radicals have done before. As the philosopher Santayana reminded us, we either learn from history or we are forced to relive its horrors. ♣

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REMINDER TO RCMI MEMBERS: 2006 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 18, AT 1800

HEZBOLLAH DID NOT LOSE AND THAT'S ALL THAT MATTERS

By Sunil Ram

It has been said by many commentators that Israel's incursion into Lebanon during July and August of 2006 has been both a military and political failure. Failures that will have repercussions for Israel that will fundamentally change the face of Arab-Israeli relations for years to come. The most salient issue is that the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has been broken. For a second time an Arab/Islamic force, namely Hezbollah, has fought and survived the IDF's military juggernaut. The obvious questions are how did Israel fail and what led to Hezbollah's success? To answer these questions we must briefly look at the history of Hezbollah.

The origins of Hezbollah (or Hizbullah- meaning "the party of God") can be found in the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Though there is some variation on when Hezbollah actually formed¹, the basis of the organization were Shiite extremists. Hezbollah's military strength grew in the summer of 1982 when Iran stepped in and sent some 1,500 Revolutionary Guards to Syria² to ostensibly fight the Israelis. In reality it was an effort to extend Iranian influence into Syrian dominated Lebanon. The Revolutionary Guards helped Hezbollah to organize itself into a true military force, which included specialist units like any modern army.

During its protracted 15-year occupation of southern Lebanon, Israel sustained 244 killed in action (not including 73 IDF soldiers killed in an air crash over south Lebanon in February 1997) and 694 wounded in action.³ By 2000, Israel was forced to

withdraw from southern Lebanon (an area defined as the "security zone") due to sustained losses and mounting political pressure to bring the troops home—the Israelis due to their small population have always been hypersensitive about military casualties.

Hezbollah's military wing is the Islamic Resistance (al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah), not to be confused with Hamas that uses a similar name, had learned how to defeat the IDF's technological, strategic, and numerical superiority. These same tactics were then refined and used again when Israel came knocking in the summer of 2006.

The war began ostensibly due to Hezbollah's 12 July capture of two Israeli soldiers, though there is some debate as to which side violated the border. Israel's response was heavy handed at best, given that in the past both Hezbollah and Israel have engaged in cross-border incursions and kidnapping that resulted in negotiated prisoner exchanges such as the ones in 1996, 1998 and 2004. By overreacting and escalating this situation the IDF slipped into a classic mission creep mode and waded into a war that Hezbollah had been preparing for for six years.

Hezbollah had an estimated fighting strength of

2,000-4,000 troops plus support from local "part-timers" who provided local logistical support. The core of Hezbollah's fighting strength was composed of battle hardened, highly trained and motivated troops fighting on their home ground—these were hardly terrorists as claimed by Israel and the US. It is important to realize that over the past 25 years Hezbollah had become part of the social, economic and political fabric of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah had helped rebuild southern Lebanon, it provided security, social services and had members democratically elected into the Lebanese government. Thus when Israel invaded, it in-



AP PHOTO / HUSSEIN MALLA

Hezbollah demonstrators parade in Beirut

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vaded a region where the majority of the population was hostile to Israel and highly motivated to support Hezbollah.

In the six years since Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Iran and Syria had helped to equip and train Hezbollah with the most modern weapons available. Hezbollah also adopted a strategy that was designed to counteract Israel's technological and numerical superiority and address the one real Achilles heel the IDF has—its unwillingness to take large casualties.

The IDF's tactics have been predicated on limiting its casualties while inflicting maximum damage to the enemy by using air power to cut off command and control and armoured thrusts on the ground to eliminate or isolate core enemy concentrations causing a rapid collapse of enemy forces, tactics that had served the IDF well in the 1967, 1973 and 1982 Arab-Israeli Wars. And as Robert Bolia noted, "The Israelis also possessed what Clausewitz called *Volkgeist*, a patriotic or national spirit. Because the goal of the Arabs in most of their wars with Israel was the eradication of Israel as a nation, the Israelis always felt as though they were fighting not simply to win, but also to exist."⁴ Thus, Hezbollah's tactics were designed to counteract Israel's strengths in a classic asymmetric manner by (a) playing to the technological determinism that has so pervaded western military thinking in regards to the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and (b) to eliminate the *Volkgeist* that had always given Israeli forces their tactical advantage. Hezbollah understood that for every day it stood and fought the *Volkgeist* shifted in its favor.

To compensate for Israel's total air superiority Hezbollah diffused command and control down to the lowest levels possible. So blowing up Hezbollah headquarters or suspected command nodes changed nothing on the ground. Hezbollah with the help of its sponsors also was able to use satellite communications, thus key command and control elements, unless killed were still in contact with ground elements. Finally, Hezbollah effectively used the news media to demonstrate Israel's "terror" bombing campaign. Also by using urban locations to launch rocket attacks, the IDF was induced into bombing targets of low military value, but targets that could and did cause civilian casualties. In turn, Israel clearly bombed targets that had no military value as evidenced by the destruction of a UN post that killed four unarmed UN military observers.

The airwar was at best pointless and was the first sign of an uncoordinated process that led to mission creep. All the airwar did was push more Arabs into supporting Hezbollah. It is interesting to note that few Arab states at the beginning of the airwar supported Hezbollah's actions and many even condemned them for causing the war.⁵ Albeit, countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, who were at the forefront of this condemnation, were also worried about the spread of Iran's influence through Hezbollah. However, as the airwar continued and it became clear by week two of the war that bombing Lebanon back into the stone age was clearly not working and had caused Arab and Islamic sympathy to shift decisively to Hezbollah. As more and more images of death and destruction flooded the media, it became clear that Hezbollah was winning the information war. The obvious failure

of the airwar (unless the actual Israeli objective had been to destroy the infrastructure of Lebanon) led to more and larger incursions by the IDF into southern Lebanon.

The idea was for ground forces to clear a one to two-kilometer strip of territory north of Israel's border in an effort to stop Hezbollah from reoccupying the area. But once it became clear that the airwar was not stopping the rocket attacks, the IDF plan was modified to widen the strip to six kilometers. Although important, this objective could not offer an effective response to the network of short-range missiles in southern Lebanon.⁶

Eventually by week three of the war, Israel changed commanders, finished mobilizing reserve units, massed its army and invaded. But, this is exactly what Hezbollah had planned for. Hezbollah had built-up a complex of static defensive bunker positions that were self contained with no resupply being needed for some time. Hezbollah fighters were well trained, equipped with modern weapons and motivated and in an odd shift had taken the *Volkgeist* from the IDF. For the first time ever the IDF faced an enemy that had stood its ground and eventually, in its mind, driven out the IDF from southern Lebanon. In short Hezbollah troops were not frightened of the Israelis and in turn the Israelis were not the same army that had gone into Lebanon in 1982.

Up to 1982 the IDF had been a battle hardened military whose commanders and leaders had ample combat experience. This gave the IDF, as a citizen army, a huge edge as even most non-commissioned (NCOs) soldiers had seen some fighting. However, the IDF of 2006 is a very different beast. Few soldiers have seen any real combat; those that have for the most part were involved in security related activities in the occupied territories. Few senior NCOs or officers have actually had commands beyond company level during wartime. Thus, the IDF lacked the institutional knowledge of war that it had possessed in previous conflicts.

At the tactical level Hezbollah countered Israel's armoured thrust by using wire-guided (Russian Metis) and laser-guided (Russian-made Kornet) antitank missiles (that have double phased explosive warheads), booby traps, mines and various other anti-tank/armour weapons such as the RPG-29. This anti-armour capability forced IDF armour to holdback. According to Israeli tank commanders Hezbollah was successful in killing or disabling AFVs on about 20 percent of their hits.⁷

Hezbollah also used antitank missiles, such as the Russian made Saggar, to penetrate buildings in which IDF troops were sheltering. BGen. Yossi Kuperwasser, the former IDF Director of Intelligence Analysis noted to the New York Times that "They use them like artillery to hit houses,... They can use them accurately up to even three kilometers, and they go through a wall like through the armor of a tank."⁸

Tactical surprise was achieved by tunnel systems and spider holes allowing Hezbollah fighters to popup behind Israeli forces to attack them or launch rocket attacks against Israel. IDF units were forced numerous times to retrace their steps in an effort to clear areas they thought had been extinguished of a Hezbollah presence. Operating for the most part as separate and

largely autonomous units that lived and operated amongst the local population Hezbollah forces were relatively invisible given they did not wear uniforms or insignias. Hezbollah commanders moved about in old cars without escorts to keep their identities hidden. Also for local mobility the ubiquitous Toyota 4x4 “technical” made famous in the “Toyota War” in Chad and the dusty byways of Somali proved an effective way of providing cheap and mobile offensive capability. This is one of the key reasons why the Israeli Air Force was strafing or bombing any moving vehicles.

All these factors combined explains why the IDF movements were slow. As one Israeli soldier observed about Hezbollah, “[they] are nothing like Hamas or the Palestinians,... They are trained and highly qualified,... All of us were kind of surprised.”⁹ Israel had walked into a meat grinder and within the first week of the expanded offensive had taken over 500 casualties.¹⁰ The majority of IDF casualties from ground combat were inflicted by special Hezbollah anti-tank units.¹¹

The other aspect of the war was Hezbollah’s ability to launch hundreds of rockets a-day into Israel. Both Iran and Syria had supplied a number of different types of rockets from the long-range Zelzal missiles, the C-802 ground-to-ship missile, the Iranian medium-range 240mm Fajr-3 and 333mm Fajr-5 rockets and Syrian 220-millimeter and 302-millimeter missiles, both equipped with large, anti-personnel warheads. However, the majority of the rocket force was composed of antiquated 122mm Katyushas that has a range of 12 miles (20 km) and 107mm Katyushas that had a range of 5 miles (8 km). It is important to note that these are “dumb” bombs that once they run out of fuel they simply fall out of the sky onto whatever is below. Used in context of Hezbollah’s rocket assaults, they were more a weapon of terror than an effective military tool. But, in this context Hezbollah achieved its objectives to terrorize the civilian population of Israel and show to the world that even when under a massive military assault from the IDF, they could still attack Israel. Again this is a key indicator of the shift in *Volkgeist* in favor of Hezbollah. As far as it is known Iran did not permit Hezbollah to launch any of its long-range Zelzal missiles.

Col. Mordechai Kahane, the commander of the elite Golani brigade’s Egoz unit, told the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot

that “Hezbollah put us to sleep...the thoroughness surprised us all. A Hezbollah weapons storeroom is not just a natural cave. It’s a pit with concrete, ladders, emergency openings, [and] escape routes. We didn’t know it [Hezbollah] was that well organized.”¹²

What is obvious is that Hezbollah had no real offensive capability, thus there was no chance that Israel was going to be overrun. Also given time and a willingness to take casualties the IDF could have destroyed Hezbollah’s military capacity. Instead the tenuous ceasefire has limited further Israeli casualties, but it has left Hezbollah intact overmuch of the battlefield. Thus for a second time Hezbollah has shown the Islamic and Arab world that the IDF can be stopped and that it is not an invincible force. In Israel the national myth of the invincible IDF is being questioned. This leaves time and space now for yet another Arab-Israeli war as nothing was achieved by Israel other than a pyrrhic victory. ♣

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NOTES

- 1 Most dates indicate 1982, but others put it as late as 1985-See Tom Diaz & Barbara Newman. *Lightning Out of Lebanon: Hezbollah Terrorists on American Soil*, Presidio Press (2005), p.55.
- 2 A. Nizar Hamzeh. “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: from Islamic revolution to parliamentary accommodation”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1993.
- 3 The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. Available from [www.btselem.org/Files/site/english/lebanon/](http://www.btselem.org/Files/site/english/lebanon/Persons_Killed.asp)



RICH GARELLA (WWW.FLICKR.COM/PHOTOS/GARELLA)

Bomb damage in the Haret Hreik neighborhood in southern Beirut.

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- 4 Robert S. Bolia. “Overreliance on Technology: Yom Kippur Case Study”, *Parameters*, Summer 2004, pp. 46-56.
- 5 Khaled Abu Toameh. “Arab world fed up with Hizbullah”, *The Jerusalem Post*, 17 July 2006.
- 6 Ze’ev Schiff. “Stay out of the Lebanese quagmire”, *Haaretz*, 6 August 2006, Available online: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/746310.html> [16 Aug 2006].
- 7 Steven Erlanger & Richard A. Opiel Jr. “A Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel With Its Training, Tactics and Weapons”, *NY Times* 7 August 2006.
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 Confidential report given to the author. Also see various BBC and CNN reports.
- 11 Ze’ev Schiff. “Anti-tank fire causing most IDF casualties”, *Haaretz*, 7 Aug 2006. Available online at- <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/746680.html> [18 Aug 2006].
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NETWORK CENTRIC MANAGEMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY

By Dr. Paul Mitchell

The establishment of routine patrols by the maritime security organizations of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in the Straits of Malacca separating peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, is a welcome development for the continued economic development of the region. However, cooperation continues to lag, perhaps due to the lingering hangover of regional suspicions. This is further hampered by the cross-cutting of organizational responsibilities and differing levels of authority within regional naval, police, and coast guard organizations. Despite this complex picture, the threshold of willing cooperation seems to have been crossed. Until regularized routines and effective interoperability are established, the question of what can be done to ensure effective patrols lingers over the agreement.

Network Centric Management in the Persian Gulf

An effective model already exists for integrating disparate nations with common strategic goals but differing operational

policies and widely varying levels of technical interoperability. Since January of 2002, a “coalition of the willing” led a maritime interdiction effort in the Persian Gulf and surrounding waters to both enforce UN sanctions against the Hussein-led Iraqi government and to ensure that Al-Qaeda leadership did not try to escape to Afghanistan posing as economic migrants to Oman, Bahrain, and other regional states. In this effort, the concept of network centric warfare played a critical role in ensuring the success of this mission.

The coalition enforcing the regional interdiction operations was largely composed of NATO navies sharing a long history of cooperation at sea. However, despite this history, the navies that made up the interdiction force brought widely differing levels of

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MCPL. BRIAN WALSH CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA

HMCS Winnipeg gets into position prior to boarding a ship in the Gulf of Oman. The Halifax Class Frigate's Boarding Party inspected the ship's cargo and documents before she was permitted to resume her voyage.

technological interoperability with them. On the high end, navies from the US, Britain, and Canada carried highly integrated and sophisticated communication and networking suites. However, ships from Greece and Italy also participated in the operations and were less well equipped. Japanese ships occasionally contributed to the development of the “maritime picture” despite having no ability to interoperate tactically, operationally, or even at a strategic level.

Complicating the technical aspects of the operation was the fact of widely differing levels of strategic policies amongst the participating nations. Nations like France, which contributed a nuclear submarine on a periodic basis to the interdiction effort, actively led opposition to US policy. Even nations ostensibly closer to US policy goals brought highly restrictive rules of engagement that limited their ability to stop and board ships transiting the operational area.

Yet despite challenges at every level of warfare, the interdiction operation was an enormous success. Several Al Qaeda leadership targets were apprehended and Iraq was unsuccessful in running the blockade. The establishment of a robust coalition network to transfer information amongst partners was a critical aspect of this outcome. Run largely by the Canadian navy, the network was successful from two important perspectives. The Canadian navy has pursued what it terms “gateway C4ISR” since 1991 when it ran the coalition naval logistics operation in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm. As a result, Canadian ships are able to communicate and send data to ships with the best and worst levels of technical interconnectivity. This asset served the coalition well in the Gulf during these most recent operations as well. While US secure networks were off limits to all coalition partners, and coalition secure networks, initially, could only be accessed by British, Australian, and Canadian ships, the Canadian gateway capabilities ensured that a high quality maritime picture reached even the most technically challenged partner.

Learning from the Persian Gulf

Managing this data is absolutely crucial in a littoral environment. The Persian Gulf shares many characteristics with the Malacca straits. It is a high density shipping environment with overlapping legal claims and large numbers of small boats plying traditional fishing and local trading. On any given day in the Gulf, navies monitoring the interdiction effort managed over 6000 contacts including more than 150 merchant vessels, 100 Dhows, and 30 small boat contacts. The maritime picture that must be managed by an interdiction operation is extremely complex as such and is complicated by the relative scarcity of available enforcement assets (MALSINDO – Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia – patrols cope with similar challenges with only 17 ships). Having access to information is crucial to effective use of these assets.

The second key to success in the Gulf was the construction of a coalition database that tracked the move-

ments of all traffic that transited the region and kept track of which ships that had been boarded. This was important for a variety of reasons. First, it permitted an assessment of the effectiveness of the interdiction effort, which built confidence on the part of participating coalition nations. Second, it enabled the rational assignment of scarce assets and ensured that ships were not boarded multiple times on a single transit. This established local confidence in the professionalism of the interdiction force and, in turn, helped to ensure compliance on the part of local merchantmen, fishing vessels, and the small boats carrying economic migrants.

A final aspect of the coalition interdiction operations was the effective management of differing rules of engagement. These ranged from the highly robust rules carried by American and Canadian ships to the extraordinarily restrictive ones used by the Japanese. The range of the rules of engagement was managed on a spreadsheet by coalition commanders, permitting them to establish the range of actions any individual ships were capable of in very specific situations. Again, this enabled the rational assignment of resources and maintained a high degree of coalition cohesion. Ship captains were never placed in awkward positions, having to refuse commands from the coalition commander due to political restrictions. At the same time, the spreadsheet built up a high degree of transparency in terms of why ships were assigned the missions they were.

These are early days for the growing maritime security regime established by the Eyes in the Skies and MALSINDO initiatives. Regional maritime security organizations still have along way to go before effective security is established definitively in the Malacca strait. Despite this, there is much that can be accomplished by overseeing organizations that will not jeopardize the sovereignty or interests of the partner nations. ♦

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ARE 'HOME COMBAT VIDEOS' A SECURITY RISK?

by Eric Morse

The nearly-real-time videos that are now often posted to the Internet, often privately, by participants and observers seem at first glance to be a truly new phenomenon of war, raising questions of security unknown to the military censors of previous wars. Are they really?

The recent appearance of quite good-quality clips credited to American embed Scott Kesterton of Canadian troops in close action in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, has raised a hue and cry in Parliament and elsewhere from critics who claim that the images could endanger the safety of the troops or operational security.

The fact that this sort of thing can be done at all is likely more alarming to many commentators than what is actually being shown – or capable of being shown – in what is basically a 'home video' made under combat conditions.

Is 'battlefield home video' really much of a security threat?

First of all, whatever is shown is after the event in a fluid theatre, and so troop locations are pretty much of academic interest at best. If you were a Colonel of the *Abwehr* in France, you might indeed be interested that "Alpha Company, 2nd Platoon, 'Red Devils' of the PPCLI from Edmonton, Canada" were in a certain sector at such and such a time.

If you were an Allied Intelligence officer in France, it might come as something of a shock to see similar videos of 2 Company, 1st Panzer Regiment, 10th SS *Fruntsberg* Division anywhere at all in the Arnhem area. If you had been lucky enough to view them *before* Operation Market Garden began, you would still need some positive identifiers of location, which is usually more than most camera angles can provide. That is why the 'establishing shot' is vital in cinematography. .

But in our real-life case, close-ups of mud walls and grape arbours don't tell us much that's useful. In this war, everyone knows what units are in theatre and where. The insurgents almost certainly know who is where with what almost before they get there – if they actually care much about such details.

Close-ups of equipment might reveal details that would better not be displayed. But details of most Canadian field equipment are easily obtainable, and we are talking about very general journalistic video here, as distinct from filming with deliberate intelligence-gathering intent. Once again, if this were World War II and the video showed a Panther tank where a Panther had no business being, or with a previously unknown external modification, that might be useful intelligence, but everyone on both sides knows what equipment Canadian Forces use in this theatre.

Finally it must be remembered that 'good-quality' raw video footage under battlefield conditions is a *very* relative term.

What do the three clips in question really tell us?

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- They tell us that Canadian troops in small-unit action tend to bunch up a little too much. Human psychology being what it is, that has been happening since the Romans invented organized small-unit actions, and is not very important unless the opposition have artillery in the area.
- They tell us that Canadian and Afghan troops are working together in combat situations, apparently quite cohesively and effectively.
- They tell us that the Canadian infantry is supported by Canadian medium artillery, and that attacks that take place before dawn use airborne artillery illumination shells above the insurgent positions so that the Canadian infantry can see them and engage them with direct fire.
- They tell us that the Canadian soldier is very skilled in the delivery of certain words that would be highly explosive in his mother's kitchen, but which the insurgents have doubtless learned evasive measures for.
- They tell us that Canadian officers, soldiers and non-coms are very much aware of their own high quality as fighting troops and are poised and confident under fire.

There is no question that in some circumstances, what appears on the Web – especially if edited with malice – could have adverse effects. It is also true that occasionally, aerial video of positions, or panoramic video of identifiable large units such as warships at a base, might have some utility.* But even then, 'amateur' videography is still far more limited than we generally realize, and the most probable impact is on public opinion at home and abroad, as for instance by the visual association of Canadian troops with ghastly images of civilian casualties (whether or not said troops actually had anything to do with the images), or by violating the oldest taboo in the world of war – depiction of one's own battlefield dead. However that is in the realm of propaganda or information warfare, not of security and intelligence.

Governments and militaries have lived with the effects of combat imaging since battlefields were first photographed in the American Civil War. The images can no more be kept from the citizen who wants to see them than the media can be kept from the tarmac at CFB Trenton. 'Home battlefield videos' are just another technological extension of war photography, and governments, commanders and citizens alike must live with it. ♦

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

* In the Falklands War of 1982, a BBC crew was arrested outside an Argentine naval base. They protested that they were journalists, not spies. Apart from displaying a certain disconnect from reality on the journalists' part, the point was not that a TV crew outside the gates of a base could have filmed much of intelligence interest. The point was that they were not playing by 'the rules' as wars had traditionally been fought. Most modern embeds seem to do so. Incidentally, we have yet to see a war in which both sides dispose of battlefield embeds.