The General Sir William Otter Papers

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Canada's Defence Policy: Is Change Really Needed?

By Peter Gizewski



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THE GEN SIR WILLIAM OTTER PAPERS

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Designed by David S. McDonough

Canada's Defence Policy: Is Change Really Needed?[1]

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Introduction

For many observers of Canada's defence scene, an honest, accurate answer to the question of whether our defence policy is in need of change would doubtless be painfully obvious. In light of the litany of problems the Canadian Forces (CF) faces as a result of the rust-out of equipment, the burnout of personnel, and years of chronic under-funding , the answer would most certainly be a resounding yes.

But then again, there are various types of change. Some major, some relatively minor. In fact, one could argue that an answer to the question is both yes *and* no. "Yes," in the sense that in terms of maintaining the present system, certain specific changes and improvements are essential (e.g. in strategic and tactical lift, in specific types of equipment, in sustainment and training systems, in terms of reserve restructure, etc.).

Yet in terms of the system itself (i.e. its overall size, structure and purposes), the answer may well be no. In fact, beyond the retention of a well-maintained, balanced, combat-capable multipurpose force able to continue to do – more or less – what the CF have been doing over the last decade, change aimed either at radically expanding military capabilities, or alternatively at contracting them, is not really needed. Nor, for that matter, is it very realistic or wise.

Such a claim becomes more comprehensible when one considers some of the realities upon which current Canadian defence policy is based, and the actual record attributable to our current arrangements. This record is in fact less dismal than is often claimed. Moreover, proposed alternatives to the status quo appear not only less realistic, but would likely prove incapable of delivering a level of benefit *sufficiently compelling* to generate incentives to overturn it.

Current Policy: The Status Quo

What is this status quo and why is it seen as so unacceptable?

Basically, it consists of a defence policy aimed at protecting and promoting Canadian interests and values[2] though use of a balanced, multipurpose and combat-capable CF.[3] And central among these values and interests are promoting prosperity and employment, protecting our security within a stable global framework, and advancing Canadian values and culture within the world at large.

Critics observe that resources devoted to secure these ends are inadequate, equipment is increasingly obsolete and CF personnel are overworked and underappreciated. Canada's defence contributions are generally insufficient and unimpressive. Capabilities are not up to commitments – and the call is for major change.

Yet such criticism often tends to ignore (or at the very least, obscure) the difference between CF activities and performance as a whole and what is actually required to secure Canadian interests. In fact, the demands of meeting the latter are relatively modest.

Notably, both the current and likely future security environment are such that – notwithstanding the war on terror – *direct* threats to both Canada and North America are relatively few in number. And, of those that do exist, few clearly necessitate a military response. In this regard, threats of the spread of infectious disease are better addressed through enhanced epidemiological capacity than armed intervention, and the problem of illegal refugees by good border control and a solid coast guard – not by bullets and bombs. Even the spectre of terrorist infiltration may be better eliminated by effective intelligence gathering and assessment and civilian policing than through added military might.

Meanwhile, Canada's privileged geo-strategic position (i.e. next to the world's sole superpower) ensures that despite relatively limited resources, those required for fulfilling responsibilities to national security and continental defence need not be high.

Responsibilities abroad also appear manageable. Regarding commitments, most are more "discretionary" than essential, and – by and large – take the form of contributions to larger, generally US-led coalitions. In virtually all such cases, Canadian contributions can rarely, if ever, be strategically *decisive*. This would be the case even if military resources were substantially increased. In fact, while the military utility of Canadian contributions abroad must be assured, their rationale is heavily diplo-

matic and political (i.e. to ensure that Canada retains salience as a useful and, above all, loyal ally).

When viewed in these terms, current defence policy and overall force structure is, by and large, grounded in realism and has generally proven more than adequate.

Throughout the 1990s, and despite substantial defence cutbacks, Canadian contributions to missions abroad were relatively high. In fact, with forces deployed to the Persian Gulf during the first Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, East Timor and Kosovo Canadian defence contributions clearly exceeded true national interests. By the end of the decade, the CF had almost as many personnel in Europe as it had when the Cold War ended. And unlike much of the Cold War, such experience involved actual military operations – including combat – and the need to truly operate effectively with allies.[4] In fact, despite occasional problems, both the force structure and its employment offered reasonable value for investment, allowing the CF to undertake a range of missions, up to and including the mid-intensity level of conflict.[5]

Similarly, and notwithstanding Canada's unwillingness to contribute forces to the ongoing war in Iraq, contributions to the war on terror in general have been both salient and solid. Notably, 9/11 brought relatively prompt Canadian reaction – with Canadian aircraft taking to the skies under NORAD, Canadian ships dispatched to the Arabian Sea and Canadian troops deployed to Afghanistan – all in relatively short order. In fact, troop levels actually exceeded 2000 at a time when the CF was also maintaining forces in the Balkans (and all of this out of an army of less than 20,000 and a navy of 16 warships).[6]

Meanwhile, broader plans for transformation of the character of the forces (i.e. to a lighter, more mobile, agile, sustainable and knowledge-based force) reflect a reasoned response to the unfolding security environment and the threats and challenges that could conceivably warrant a Canadian military response within it.

Alternative Models

Can one do better? Certainly, a number of critics think so and have advanced a range of interesting ideas to back them up.

a) An Expanded Force?

Some call for a major expansion of the forces – arguing in effect that not only would this remedy existing shortfalls in the system, but provide Canada with military capabilities that would allow her to meet a wider range of contingencies than is currently possible.

Here, arguments are for constructs that arguably approach a "general purpose" capability i.e. a force capable of deploying globally and engaging in conflict ranging from low to high intensity.[7] These can feature the addition of new commands, a marked increase in equipment and personnel, light and heavy-armour, and acquisition of costly and dedicated means of power projection and ground combat support.

For instance, some advocate the creation of a reorganized DND in which a National Military Headquarters (NMHQ) is distinct and separate from DNDHQ, a Special Operations Group, and two new joint commands – Joint Strike Command (JSC) and Joint Forces Command (JFC).[8] The former would be explicitly devoted to war-fighting operations and would consist of new purpose-built naval projection vessels, existing surface and subsurface combatants, new modern fighter aircraft and helicopters, aerial tankers, strategic and tactical air transport and largely light, all-arms army formations, including paratroop and special forces units.

Supporters contend that this would significantly extend Canada's abilities to undertake a broader range of operations (most notably at the higher intensity end). It would increase our ability to take a lead or even operate independently in operations abroad if circumstances so warranted. And it would also offer the prospect of gaining Canada greater political and diplomatic influence with key allies (the US in particular).

Yet such ideas tend to ignore economic and political realities. A significantly expanded force would require a level of investment that is excessive when considered against the potential military and political returns promised.

Implicit acknowledgement of the economic difficulties that can attend such constructs is evident not only given past experience,[9] but also in light of the discussions embedded in a number of the proposals themselves – with advocates even going so far as to propose novel funding arrangements as a means of realizing what they admit is a tall order.[10] When one factors in the costs of personnel and training, technological innovation and modernization as well as the additional fact that capabilities acquired must remain interoperable with those of key allies, the potential economic obstacles that could arise over the long term are compounded. Nor is it entirely clear that the personnel levels that such proposals seek are remotely viable in light of current demographic trends.

Examination of the evolving strategic environment also raises questions about the military and political value of such a force. While that environment may well be characterized by high uncertainty and feature numerous threats and challenges, the need for a wider range of capabilities – especially at the heavy combat end – is not entirely self-evident. In fact, a strong case can be made that most future expeditionary missions in which

the CF will participate will strongly resemble those conducted over the past decade (i.e. low-to mid-intensity conflicts, stability operations, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, etc.).[11] And the vast majority of such commitments will remain discretionary. Accordingly, and based upon likely future strategic realities, the need for the CF to undertake a wider range of combat roles and missions seems less than compelling.

Beyond this, and once again given the fact that Canada will doubtless play the role of coalition partner in future engagements (and quite likely a relatively junior partner at that), the likelihood of gaining appreciably more political or diplomatic capital from a substantial investment in additional capabilities – particularly at the high-intensity end – is unclear.

Ultimately, the ability to prevail in such engagements will lie in the hands of coalition leaders rather than those of the led. And forces mirroring those of the lead nation may well be redundant at best and irrelevant at worst. In such cases, a larger force may yield at best marginal returns militarily and limited additional salience and influence politically and diplomatically. Consequently, the pursuit of general purpose or at least markedly larger constructs may result in a force that is not only overly costly, but one with a number of capabilities that are rarely – if ever – used.

b) Emphasizing the Assets: Niche Options

Alternatively, we might consider moves toward niche force specialization and the emphasis of certain key military assets. Here the argument is that if economics is truly the main constraint facing an improvement in our defence strategy, then let's really get serious about it. A balanced force offers too little capability at too high a cost. Far better to specialize and bank on the near certainty of doing certain things well than risk mediocrity – or perhaps even failure – by undertaking a range of tasks and thereby spread forces too thin. Simply put, force specialization promises exceptional security value at reasonable cost.

In fact, many see niche logic as the key to both small and middle powers playing a major role in addressing the challenges of a highly fluid – and uncertain – security environment. Today, security threats and challenges are so diverse, diffuse, localized and technology-driven that a country with special competencies or positioning can have "huge leverage." As one commentator has observed; there may be a number of opportunities "for Davids to fight alongside Goliaths, if they bring the right slingshot."[12] Indeed, effective niching holds out the prospect of turning an economic necessity into a military virtue.

Certainly, recent years have witnessed growing interest in the potential benefits of specialization among other nations and their militaries. In fact, such logic is already operative in the Norwegian armed forces – a fact reflected in an increased specialization in the areas of mine-clearing, mountain reconnaissance and urban operations, as well as in the armed forces of Poland, (i.e. for stabilization operations), Latvia (i.e. live-ordnance disposal) and the Czech Republic (i.e. chemical and biological weapons detection).[13]

In Canada's case, ideas tabled have included: the creation of a force dedicated to reconnaissance, aerial surveillance and monitoring, a rapid-deployment stabilization-type force,[14] a peace-building and reconstruction force,[15] and a force emphasizing a special operations capability (e.g. "Ranger-like" capability, or Marines).[16]

Still, wholesale adoption of niche strategies carries a number of risks. On the one hand, choosing an optimal niche focus can be difficult – particularly within an international security environment strongly informed by uncertainty and rapid change. Developments in the international arena may generate contingencies in which specializations pursued are rarely required. Indeed, given the present and likely future security environment, distinctions between missions may increasingly blur. Peacekeeping may quickly morph into enforcement and warfighting. And even domestic contingencies are likely to become more multifaceted and complex. Accordingly, forces that are too specialized may prove incapable of coping with the contingencies that arise (and would be highly vulnerable).

A niche orientation may also work to encourage a perception of a national force as "excessively limited" – either incapable or perhaps even unwilling of doing much else. And if the niche chosen is an area characterized by particularly high demand, one may become a prisoner of one's own success. Indeed, effective niching may lead to an over-dependence of allies on certain military contributions and an increase of external pressure on the nation involved to contribute. The result may well be some narrowing of one's perceived freedom of action when considering participation in coalition operations.

Nor, despite some recent evidence to the contrary, are such strategies especially popular with the armed services. Not only would a niche focus require major alterations in strategy, procurement, and training, but considerable bureaucratic adjustment. The contraction of missions and capabilities that niching generally involves would risk an elimination of long-standing and important competencies from the military repertoire, and would stunt both the learning processes and expectation horizons of soldiers and their leaders alike.[17] And on the political side, leaders embracing a niche focus may be tempted to sacrifice military effectiveness to considerations of economy – seeking out the safest and cheapest roles, as well as those requiring a minimum of equipment.[18]

Accordingly, *strict* pursuit of a niche specialization is not

only politically unrealistic, but excessively risky on a number of counts.[19]

c) "Constabulary-Like" Variants

A final – albeit distinctly minority view – would have us move to some variant of a constabulary (or policing) force. Here the tendency is to advocate constructs calling for an emphasis on territorial defence and sovereignty protection – yet with a modest expeditionary mission as well. Most notably, land force missions abroad would be confined to traditional (i.e. non-combat) UN peacekeeping activity.[20]

In one such vision, peacekeeping commitments would be heavily – if not exclusively – UN focussed, with the CF contributing to the UN Standing force (i.e. SHIRBRIG). At the same time, Canada would withdraw military and financial support from NATO, and pull out of all peace-enforcement/stabilization operations involving the prospect of combat operations (e.g. Bosnia, Afghanistan).

The model would forsake all "offensive-oriented" capabilities associated with the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Accordingly, forces for air-to-ground attack, heavy artillery, heavy armour, tanks, submarine and anti-submarine warfare capacities would be discarded.[21] Canada would withdraw from the joint strike fighter (JSF) programme, and use its existing fighter-capability only for territorial defence. Plans to convert transport aircraft into long-range refuelling aircraft would be cancelled. And concerted efforts would be made to eliminate any waste or mismanagement in the procurement system (i.e. rid forces of obsolete and unwanted equipment).[22]

Resources saved would be used to better fund the remaining force – most notably by adding additional capacity to engage in traditional peacekeeping missions. Accordingly, greater emphasis would be placed on securing well-equipped light infantry and support vehicles, as well as dedicated strategic lift. Additional savings would be directed towards increasing non-military capacities for contributing to international peace and security (e.g. a strengthened diplomatic corps, increased and more effectively directed foreign aid).[23] The result, some argue, would be a force capable of ensuring security and sovereignty at home and a force that would possess more international legitimacy and relevance than a NATO-based approach.

Certainly, the forces inherent in such visions would not likely pose excessive fiscal or economic burdens on a government. In fact, given that resources saved by forsaking future combat missions abroad would be re-directed to a more limited set of commitments and tasks, constabulary models would be attainable. And it is likely that the ability of all three services to meet their principal responsibilities would not only be achieved, but also bolstered.[24]

Beyond this, advocacy of an additional concentration on traditional peacekeeping operations and the curtailing of any significant combat role abroad would undoubtedly play to a secondary but nevertheless significant strain of opinion in the Canadian body politic. Indeed, this addresses the desires of those groups advocating greater independence of thought and action in Canadian policy, greater support for the UN and a CF primarily devoted to traditional peacekeeping.

Still, such a profound revision of missions and capabilities would pose innumerable problems. For instance, it presents a clear challenge to the culture and ethos of the CF. In particular, it directly and fundamentally threatens longstanding visions of the Canadian army as an expeditionary force "par excellence," whose core purpose is to engage in combat. Internal opposition to such plans would therefore be considerable.

Movement in such a direction would also carry diplomatic risks. Indeed, it could well be taken as signalling an abrupt retreat of Canada from the international stage.[25] Proposals arguing for Canada to abandon NATO would necessitate a marked scaling back of Canada's commitments,[26] and would imply far less willingness to share key burdens and risks associated with the pursuit of a stable and secure international order. One result could well be an erosion of relationships with key allies as well as a decline of Canadian influence and status in a range of international security institutions and councils. Yet another would be the loss of much of the technical, scientific and intelligence information that Canada's involvement in such security relationships inevitably generates.

Commitments to more active diplomatic engagement, foreign aid and continued participation in traditional (i.e. inter-positional) peacekeeping operations would not likely relieve concerns over such a move. While diplomacy and foreign aid are undoubtedly crucial to the pursuit of international peace and stability, they are also not be sufficient in and of themselves to guarantee it. Violent conflict will continue to occur. In fact, with ongoing trends in the international security environment strongly suggesting a future in which conflicts will be highly fluid, complex, and increasingly deadly, combat forces capable of engaging in peace enforcement are likely to remain the order of the day and few opportunities for traditional peacekeeping are likely to arise.

Put simply, the practical result of a traditional and primarily UN oriented peacekeeping focus could well be less an assertion of a valued Canadian tradition than confinement of the CFs expeditionary role to a state of irrelevance. And the diplomatic payoffs offered would undoubtedly prove equally unimpressive.

Conclusion: Stuck with the Status Quo?

At the end of the day, and despite its problems, the status quo and the multipurpose, combat-capable force model which informs it retains considerable power. What's more, it offers a stronger, more realistic choice than major alternatives. More economically and politically viable than either a broader, more general-purpose construct, and more useful militarily, politically and diplomatically than a constabulary-type force, the multipurpose option appears to offer the right amount of capability and insurance at a reasonable cost.

The superiority of such a model is also evident when compared with niche force thinking. Indeed, while such constructs would offer greater capability to perform certain specific missions, the obstacles associated with their achievement are likely to prove prohibitive – particularly given the fact that an improved, multi-purpose force would provide at least some of the capabilities that each would offer.

Does this mean that nothing should be done to improve the present state of affairs? Certainly not. The CF must continue to grapple with key shortfalls such as strategic and tactical lift, problems of sustainment, and with ensuring that it has sufficient, well-trained personnel in the years ahead.

Adoption of some of the thinking advanced by advocates of niche logic could also produce benefits. When *added to or given somewhat greater emphasis within* a multipurpose construct, such ideas could in effect result in a model more tailored to the challenges and threats that are increasingly likely to characterize the emerging security environment.

For instance, the development of enhanced light forces may be a particularly fruitful avenue for exploration. Indeed, pursuit of such forces would increase capabilities to meet asymmetric challenges in complex environments (e.g. irregular and urban combat), yet still offer additional and improved generic skills which would be applicable to contingencies throughout the spectrum of conflict as well as in Operations Other than War (OOTW).

A *slightly* greater emphasis on domestic and continental operations could also be useful. Such a move would aim at sharpening capabilities primarily -- although not exclusively -- for the purpose of meeting asymmetric threats (terrorism in particular).

Here, the potential payoffs, both in terms of security and political optics, could be considerable. While non-military activities are likely be more important than military power in the pursuit of continental security, greater military cooperation with the US, as well as provision of some additional military capability in this area (e.g. NBC defence, protection of critical infrastructure, crisis response) would not only bolster Canadian security, but would offer reassurance to the US at a time when such reassurance is increasingly crucial to the US-Canadian relationship. Given that the US is Canada's most important ally and largest trading partner, ensuring Washington that Canada is vigilant in the war on terror is clearly in the national interest.

Continued pursuit of the department's defence transformation agenda is vital as well. In fact, it is more in the area of changing the *character* of forces and the *processes* by which they operate and interact that significant improvements can occur – not in the area of overall force size and structure. In this regard, continued pursuit of a more knowledge-based, lighter, more flexible, and agile force is essential. So too is an enhanced ability to network efficiently and effectively both with other militaries, with other government departments and agencies and with NGOs. Given the complexities likely to characterize future threats and challenges, no one department is likely to have a monopoly on ensuring security.

Last, but certainly not least, we must think more carefully about how, or more accurately, how often our forces are employed and to what purposes. While Canada's recent performance may be relatively solid, future judgements about when and where Canada should contribute to missions abroad must continue to be informed by sound analysis of Canada's core interests and goals in the years ahead. ■

The views expressed are those of the author, and do no necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

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Notes:

1. The views expressed in this paper are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of National Defence or the Government of Canada.

2. See Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada and the World* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, Canada, 1995), pp. 10-11. The chief pur-

poses of the forces in contributing such goals are to defend Canadian territory and sovereignty, contribute to the defence of North America, and promote – with like-minded nations – international peace and security abroad.

3. While combat-capable, the present force is designed on an explicit understanding that the CF will not have the full range of capabilities. Indeed, such a force sees mass and heavy armour sacrificed for increased speed and mobility, a more selective acquisition of new systems, and greater emphasis placed on reorganization and maximizing efficient use of existing resources as opposed to their wholesale replacement. Nevertheless, the force allows the CF to operate across a broad range of terrains, in a number of capacities – both in the domestic and the international spheres and against a diverse set of opponents. Indeed it is generally informed by a belief that only by retaining a range of combat and non-combat capabilities can the CF best ensure its relevance and effectiveness in a rapidly changing security environment. Not only does such a force better ensure an ability to meet a range of contingencies, but also cope with the unexpected – a fundamental characteristic of a highly uncertain world.

4. Joel Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chretien Legacy," *Policy Matters*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June, 2004), p. 16.

5. The truth be known, a more accurate criticism of recent policy would be that policymakers have tried to do too much as opposed to too little with the CF. Arguably this tendency is largely attributable to the conflation of interests with values.

6. Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style," p. 18.

7. In general, such a position seeks retention of the range of combat and non-combat capabilities that the CF possessed during the Cold War, with a focus on a capacity to deploy globally as part of multinational operations of varying intensity. As former Chief of Defence Staff John de Chastelain observes, such a force "…means a 'blue water' navy, an army in which the combined arms team is retained (and at its lowest denominator for combat effectiveness and self-sustainability that means the brigade group), and an air force that has the ability to provide effective support to maritime and land forces, as well as the capability to execute air defence, surveillance, transport and search and rescue missions." As quoted in Joseph T. Jockel, *The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies; 1999), pp. 31-32.

8. The model offered above is drawn from a paper bearing the name "Viktor" – an anonymous writer actively involved in discussions facilitated by the Council for Canadian Security. The document is available in pdf format at the Council's website. See, Viktor, "Freedom is Canada's Nationality: A Vision of Canada's Military in the 21st Century," 6 June 2003, at http://www.ccs21.org/

9. For a detailed examination of recent Canadian experience, see, Douglas L. Bland (ed.), *Canada Without Armed Forces?*, The Claxton Papers, No. 4., (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queens University; 2003). See especially, Howie Marsh, "The Gathering Defence Policy Crisis," pps. 83-103.

10. The vision would require a substantial build-up in defence spending – amounting in effect to a doubling of the defence budget over the next ten years (i.e. about 2% of GDP or approximately $24 billion by decade's end). As such, it is accompanied by calls on Parliament to undertake initiatives to bring corporate tax rates down and to accelerate the depreciation rates used in capital cost-recovery calculations. This would help reduce the burdensome cost of defence production. A lowering of capital gains tax rates would provide needed investment incentives for the defence industry. And pro-growth tax reform measures could be implemented so as to elevate the tax revenue baseline to fund the increased military spending that such a vision would require. See Viktor, "Freedom is Canada's Nationality," p. 10.

11. For a similar assessment see, Douglas Bland, "Finding National Defence Policy in 2004," *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2003-2004), p. 7.

12. As quoted in Matthew Brezezinski, "Who's Afraid of Norway?" *New York Times Magazine*, 24 August 2003, pp. 24.

13. Ibid., p. 27.

14. See, Peter H. Langille, "Enhancing the Rapid Deployment Capacity of the Canadian Forces" Discussion Paper, CPCC Peace Operations Working Group, Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria, 22 September 2002. Indeed, according to Langille, "(t)he CF could…be well positioned to make a substantial and cost-effective contribution to the protection of civilians through a specialization in a rapid deployment to diverse peace operations, including enforcement." See Langille, p. 1.

15. See for instance, Matthew Bouldin, "Keeper of the Peace: Canada and Security Transition Operations," *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (September 2003), pp. 271-75. The author in fact calls for the creation of a "security transition" or "human security" force.

16. For a useful survey of such thinking, see, Maj. J.H.G. Lizotte, "A Special Operations Capability for Canada," *Army Doctrine Training Bulletin*, Vol. 6. No. 2, (Summer 2003), p. 23-35.

17. In Canada's case, consideration of a more niche-oriented focus would in fact contradict a number of recent statements from key defence officials – particularly within the army – indicating that a niche capability is not an option.

18. See Lewis MacKenzie, "No to Niche Roles for Our Military," *National Post*, 2 October, 2003, p. A12.

19. Notably, concern with such issues is reflected in many of the recent proposals advanced for a more niche-oriented CF generally and land force in particular. In most cases, ideas and initiatives advanced are offered with the qualification that they would still seek to retain a combat-capable force. Yet little is said about just how "combat capabile" such a force would be.

20. Perhaps the most articulate institutional proponent of this position is the Polaris Institute. For a good statement of its position, see, Steven Staples, "Three Ways to Improve the Canadian Forces Without Increasing Military Spending," *Corporate-Security State Project*, (Ottawa: Polaris Institute; 18 February 2003), http://www.polarisinstitute.org/polaris_project/corp_security_state/publications_articles/ as well as Steven Staples "How We Can Democratize Canada's Foreign and Defence Policies," *Canadian Dimension Magazine* (September/October, 2003). For a more in-depth discussion of their views, see House of Commons, SCNDVA, 20 March 2003. Notably, the New Democratic Party has advanced a vision along similar – although not entirely identical – lines. See New Democratic Party of Canada, *A Stronger Canada – Defence Policy* (Ottawa, New Democratic Party of Canada; 2003), http://www.ndp.ca, p. 1.

21. See Staples, p. 2.

22. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

23. Ibid., p. 4.

24. Notably however, the specific model sighted above could require revision even in light of its own stated goals. Specifically, its call for cancellation of plans to convert transport aircraft into long-range re-fuelling aircraft grates against the goal of territorial defence. Indeed while essential for supporting missions abroad, such capabilities are equally important for securing the home front.

25. Extreme versions of this school would totally eliminate Canada's overseas capabilities. As such, they would directly and strongly contradict Canada's 1994 Defence White Paper. Indeed, the White Paper notes that such a withdrawal would send a "…very clear message about the depth of our commitment to our allies and our values, one that would betray our history and diminish our future." See Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services; 1994), p. 13.

26. Such a move would undoubtedly impact on the character of Canada's foreign policy. As Denis Stairs observes, absent a combat capable expeditionary force, "(y)ou can't then go around claiming that Canada is a foremost power or principal power or even a leading middle power in the world. Indeed, you would have to "downgrade the rhetoric and also your foreign policy ambitions." See Stairs testimony in SCONDVA, 19 November 2001, p. 7.

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